

BORROWED POWER

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Abstract

The theme of this book revolves around the concept of borrowed power. The author explains this concept in the opening chapter and describes it as the differential of power which a weaker state would need to settle its issues with a powerful state. Blending geo-strategy, international relations, and defence analysis, the author presents a conceptual model where GDP, ranking in science and technology, and military power are the determinants of national power. The narrative essentially deals with the India-Pakistan security paradigm in context of borrowed power. The book highlights, in three different chapters, how borrowed power had influenced India-Pakistan military confrontation during the First Kashmir War (1947-1949), 1965 War, and 1971 War. A separate chapter has been dedicated to the impact of nuclear deterrence on the asymmetric India- Pakistan relationship. Next, the book describes, in different chapters, how the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 reshaped the security environment in the arc stretching from the Sub-continent to the Middle East. It analyses, in detail, how the U.S. sponsored Jihad in Afghanistan, with Pakistan's active involvement, morphed into terrorism. It also highlights the strategic importance of Pakistan's Northern Areas which act as a giant plug that blocks Indian influence and economic expansion to the northwest towards Central Asia, Eurasia, and thence to Europe. The second last chapter gives a detailed account of the cycle of proxy wars in the Sub-continent and the regions around, and how a slow burning ongoing war is sapping the energies of all the regional players. The narrative is wrapped up by a comparison of the specific forces which will play a decisive role in the offensive operations during a future war.

Among themselves, officers will debate the effectiveness of current operations as they endlessly reassess history. They are interested in the Army to the point of obsession, and they are disturbed by any failings it may have. They will argue about personalities and politics, swap stories of absurdities and criticize GHQ, but none of this indicates any ambivalence about the Army

Schofield (2011)*

*Schofield, C. (2011). Inside the Pakistan Army. Biteback Publishing,

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I

DYNAMICS OF NATIONAL POWER

Borrowed Power can be explained within the context and broad concept of power. Organsky (1968) defines power as “the ability to influence the behavior of others in accordance with one’s own ends”. At the national level, this influence is based on relations between the nations. According to Jablonsky (1997) national power has two main attributes – national and social. Geography, resources, and population constitute the national attribute whereas economy, politics, military strength, psychological, and informational factors form part of social attribute. Jablonsky maintains that whereas national power is a complex concept which cannot be accurately quantified, it nevertheless remains the key factor in developing a national security strategy. The relevance and importance of the constituents of national power depend upon the situation. Notwithstanding the complexity of national power and the various contradictions involved, we have to create conceptual models to see patterns through random data. This is because our brains are used to taking messy and incomplete inputs and turning them into something comprehensible. Various models have thus been evolved to explain national power. Significant among these are:-

National Power Index (NPI)

Evolved by the National Power Project team, NPI scores are the product of an index combining the weighted factors of GDP, defence spending, population and technology. Scores calculated are expressed as a state’s relative share (percentage) of all global power. The forecast of these values for any country and some regional groupings can be produced up to 2060.

Source: www.nationalpowerinfo.com.

Comprehensive National Power (CNP)

It is an original Chinese political concept about the national power of a state. It reflects the contemporary political thought of the Peoples Republic of China. CNP can be calculated numerically by combining various quantitative indices to create a single number held to measure the power of a nation-state. These indices take into account both military factors (known as hard power) and economic and

cultural factors (known as soft power). Being a China –centric model, it aims at preventing China from repeating the mistakes of the erstwhile Soviet Union in over emphasizing military power at the expense of economy (Pillsbury, 2000; Singh, Gera & Dewan, 2013)).

Whereas no country is absolutely weak, there also is no omnipotent power on the planet (Handel, 1990). In the power calculus every relatively strong power has its Achilles heel which if accurately identified by the weaker power, and exploited at the right time, can neutralize the power advantage enjoyed by the strong power. The instruments used to exploit the Achilles heel may be diplomacy, watchful waiting, and even war, in that order.

Thailand and Finland used diplomacy to defend their independence - Thailand from Britain and France, and Finland from Russia (particularly during the eras of Peter the Great and Stalin, and after WWII). After its defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, India has adopted a strategy of building up its economy and armed forces, putting its territorial dispute with China on the back burner and waiting to settle its grievances in the distant future. Algeria and Vietnam waged bloody and protracted armed struggles to win their independence from France (in the case of Algeria), and France and the United States (in the case of Vietnam). But that requires lots of patience, willingness to sacrifice lives, and in the process sacrificing entire generations. For the last more than three decades the Afghan people are fighting for their freedom. During their struggle they confronted and defeated two superpowers - the Soviet Union and the United States. However, their struggle has remained inconclusive, mainly because of infighting and absence of unity of command.

Borrowed Power

Theoretically, if the relatively strong country's aggregate national power is 'x', and the weaker country's aggregate national power is 'y', then their power differential will be 'x-y'. This will be the quantum of the additional power required by the weaker country to offset the superiority of the stronger of the two. This borrowed power will come from a third country, if that country is willing to lend it to the weaker country. This implies that the power lender also needs to trade off its power with the weaker state to achieve its objectives. Borrowed Power will be available to the borrowing country partly in tangible form and partly as an underwriting by the lender. There is a limit to the effectiveness of the borrowed power. It can help the client state in seeking a parity of sorts with a stronger power through formal and informal alliances.

According to Handel (1990):

'Weak states must learn to draw on or borrow the strength of other states..... they will try to manipulate or commit, if they can, the strength of other states (mostly great powers) in order to secure their own interests. There are two major ways in which the weak states can recruit the support of other countries. They may either enter into a formal alliance with other states, or they may reach an informal, though not necessarily less helpful, understanding with partners sharing common interests'.

Manipulation of borrowed power by a weak power for the resolution of its dispute(s) with a stronger power can be likened to the “gravity assist manoeuvre” which, in orbital mechanics and aerospace engineering, is the use of relative movement and gravity of a planet, or any other heavenly object, to accelerate a spacecraft for saving propellant, time, and expense.

However, no country will lend its power to a client state for fighting the latter's wars. During the Korean War America and China directly intervened in favour of their proxies - South Korea and North Korea respectively. China did not send its forces to fight in the Korean Peninsula because of any bonhomie for the North Korean despot Kim Il Sung. It did so for its own sake. At that time the communists were still consolidating their hold on mainland China and, with Nationalist China still a permanent member of the Security Council and strongly backed by the United States, feared a comeback by Chiang Kai Shek. Hence, by sending their forces in the Korean peninsula the Chinese communists were essentially fighting for their own survival. As for the United States, starting from WW1 when did it miss a chance to militarily interfere in foreign lands and reshape the world in its own image? But unlike its support for Israel the American intervention in the Korean Peninsula was purely to pursue America's global interests.

There is an exception in Israel's case. Israel has been a constant borrower of American power. It can be said with 100% certainty that America will militarily intervene if there is an existential threat to Israel. During the 1973 Arab-Israel War, there came a stage when the military situation became so precarious for Israel that the defence minister Moshe Dayan advised his military commanders to withdraw from the Suez Canal and take up new defensive positions along the line of Mitla and Giddi Passes. That was the time when Moshe Dayan made his famous remark “this is the end of the Third Temple” and told his prime minister “ Golda, I was wrong in everything. We are heading towards a catastrophe. We shall have to withdraw on the Golan Heights to the edge of the escarpment overlooking the

(Jordan, sic) valley and in the south in Sinai to the passes and hold on to the last bullet” (Herzog, 1975). It was then that the United States started a massive airlift to replenish the Israeli equipment losses by even bleeding the American units of their equipment. It was also the time when Israeli leaders seriously considered using the nuclear option (Ginzberg, 2013). Had the Israeli army not restored the situation on the ground, America would definitely have landed its marines in the Middle East.

Despite so much assurance of American help Israel always fights its wars alone, without factoring direct American military intervention in its war calculus. It does not even accept foreign dependence on military hardware and, by hook or by crook, has managed to create a military industry, which produces hardware and software comparable to, and in certain cases superior, to the military equipment offered by the world’s leading arms producers. This is possible because Israel has a robust science and technology base and also because it steals critical technologies from the United States (and elsewhere) while the latter look the other way (Ostrovsky, 1994). In the past Israel stole Mirage aircraft blueprints from Switzerland while the latter feigned ignorance. Israel has sold its airborne early warning radar system (based on US technology) to both China (surreptitiously) and India (with U.S. blessings). China’s J-10 fighter aircraft is based on Israel’s Lavi technology demonstrator which borrowed heavily from US technological know-how.

When Vietnam fought against France and then the United States, it did borrow power from the Soviet Union and China in the form of moral and material help, but the actual fighting was done by the Viet Cong. That Vietnam defeated the United States shows no matter how large the power differential, a weak country can defeat a global power provided it is prepared to pay the price. To secure its independence, Vietnam had to sacrifice hundreds of thousands of lives and suffer enormous losses to its economic and communications infrastructure from which it has not recovered even four decades after the end of the war.

In February 1979 China fought a border war with Vietnam in what is known as the Third Indochina War. China attacked to draw Vietnamese forces away from Cambodia, which was occupied by Vietnam in 1978 by toppling China’s ally, the Khmer Rouge. With fighting taking place mainly in the border provinces, the PLA advanced about 15-20 kilometers into Vietnam. The Vietnamese, after a tip-off from Soviet satellite intelligence, fought back mainly with their militias, avoiding direct combat, and held back some 300,000 regular troops for the defence of Hanoi. Once the Chinese saw through the game, they announced that their

punitive mission had been accomplished and carried out a unilateral withdrawal. Afterwards both the sides declared victory.

In this war, Vietnam borrowed power from the Soviet Union in the form of intelligence information and material support and, using an indirect approach, thwarted China's strategic aim of getting Vietnamese forces out of Cambodia. Later, China, also using an indirect approach mobilized international opinion against Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia and improved its relations with ASEAN by promising protection to Thailand and Singapore against any future aggression by Vietnam. The dispute was finally resolved in 1989 when the Vietnamese agreed to fully withdraw from Cambodia.

During the Cold War period Pakistan borrowed power from the United States to seek parity with India, while India borrowed power from the Soviet Union (and also the United States) to seek parity with China. Pakistan sold its sovereignty cheap whereas the Indian leadership displayed better marketing skills through the enigmatic marketing tool of non-alignment. Pakistan's membership of the American sponsored military pacts is well known. That India was also aligned during the Cold War period is generally ignored. During the 1962 Sino-Indian War Nehru requested the United States to bomb China (Galbraith, 1969). China's unilateral ceasefire was not an act of magnanimity. It feared direct American intervention in the Sino-Indian conflict. Again, the United States was not supporting India because of any moral reason.

After WW II, Britain and the United States had wanted a united India to counter the Soviet Union –the nascent superpower. They accepted partition reluctantly as the law and order situation in the Subcontinent was gradually getting out of Britain's control. After partition of the Subcontinent, for a brief period the United States still hoped that India and Nationalist China would form the Asian pivot of America's global reach (China was governed by the nationalists till 1949, when toppled by the communists). However, only when China was "lost to the Free World" - and it became clear that India under Nehru was intent upon its own empire building under the concept of non-alignment, was Pakistan brought into the matrix of American security and offered military and economic assistance. The 1962 Sino- Indian War provided the United States an opportunity to increase American influence over India without coercing the latter into a formal and declared pact. This, to some extent, also explains America's totally indifferent stance towards Pakistan during the 65 and 71 wars.

In 1971, India, through the Indo-Soviet Treaty, borrowed Soviet power to 1) make certain the dismemberment of Pakistan and 2) prevent China from coming to

Pakistan's help. Soviet Union directly contributed in the Indian war effort by: 1) arming India with enough military hardware for waging the war by providing it, besides other equipment, enough MiG-21 fighter aircraft in advance to replace the expected war wastage; 2) sending its military transport aircraft to airlift Indian troops and military equipment from the western theatre to the eastern theatre and, after the fall of Dhaka, vice versa ; 3) providing India satellite photos of Pakistani troop movements; 4) there is a likelihood that PNS Khyber was sunk off the coast of Karachi by a Soviet submarine*.

*See details in Chapter V

A Proposed Conceptual Framework

The author suggests a conceptual framework which is simple and makes it easier to calculate National Power - the power to wield influence within and without. The determinants of national power in the proposed model are: 1) GDP; 2) Ranking in Science & Technology; and 3) Military Power. Internal Stability, the fourth factor in National Power, is a moderating variable – it partially modifies the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable, i.e. National Power.

Internal Stability

Internal stability plays an important role in national power dynamics and can be determined by the Fragile States Index List. Like GDP, the list only assesses sovereign states (as determined by membership in the United Nations). Several territories are excluded until their political status and UN membership is ratified in international law. Ranking is based on the total scores of the 12 indicators. A fragile state has several attributes. Common indicators include a state whose central government is so weak or ineffective that it has little practical control over much of its territory; non-provision of public services; widespread corruption and criminality; refugees and involuntary movement of populations and sharp economic decline. Fragile States Index has eleven levels of state security, the highest being Very High Alert (VHA). The levels keep changing every year. For calculating the level of national power these security levels are reversed, i.e., very Sustainable (VS) becomes level 1. Rating parameters for 2015 are given below :-

Table 1.1

Ranking Category	Fragility Score Intervals	Stability Level	Fragility Level
Very Sustainable (VS)	Up to 17.8	1	11
Sustainable (S)	20.2-29.7	2	10
More Stable (MS)	30.4-39.8	3	9
Stable (St)	40.9-49.3	4	8
Less Stable (LS)	51.0- 58.7	5	7
Low Warning (LW)	61.9-69.7	6	6
Warning (W)	70.5-79.9	7	5
High Warning (HW)	80.0-89.2	8	4

Alert (A)	90.0-99.9	9	3
High Alert (HA)	100.00-109.7	10	2
Very High Alert (VHA)	110.0-114.5	11	1

Source: www.fragilestatesindex.org

From the above table it is evident that a country's internal stability is inversely proportional to its level of fragility.

U.S possesses political stability through well established and pluralistic state institutions (A "Very Stable" country, according to the Fragile States Index). Indian internal stability is deeply influenced by its grinding poverty and separatist movements in its various states. On the other hand China 's political stability is becoming increasingly vulnerable due to 1) centrifugal tendencies, and 2) opening up of Chinese society due to exposure to the application of information technology.

To address this problem, China is fine tuning an already practiced pattern of governance, which suits authoritarian states and provides them with an alternative of sorts to democracy. This pattern is also being practiced in varying forms by Malaysia, Singapore, the Gulf states, and Iran. The author has coined the term "Corporate Governance" for this pattern. It transforms the state into a huge corporate entity where the government is reduced to the status of an oversized board of directors and the population becomes state employees. The system has all the trappings of democracy - legislature, judiciary, and executive. These institutions make all the right noises, but the real power rests with the board of directors (ruling parties in the case of Malaysia and Singapore, communist party in the case of China, royal families in the Gulf states, and the watchdog institution of clerics, in Iran's case). Looks like the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, with the difference that it is already being practiced.

The concept can be likened to a refined form of Mussolini's Corporate State. To put the Italian economy on a fast track and save time on pointless strikes, the Duce had experimented with a system of mixed economy by creating corporations controlled by the state. Within the system, companies were privately owned, allowing for competition. Had it not been for WW2, Mussolini would be remembered as a great Italian reformer. Corporate governance differs from communism and the classical dictatorships in that it is relatively benign and the populace gets a fare share of the national wealth. In this system, human rights are regulated by the state to the extent where they do not clash with the interests of the ruling elite. Cynics believe that western democracy is also a sophisticated version of corporate governance.

Economic Power

A country's economy, as reflected by its GDP, is the most important determinant of its national power. Presently, the United States is the world's strongest nation because it has the largest economy with a USD 17.418 trillion GDP. U.S. economy propels its military strength. Together; these two factors play a major role in the projection of American power globally. After the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States emerged as an unchallenged hyper power. However, its national power is gradually slipping down, not actually declining, relative to the increase in the national power of the emerging nodes in a multi-polar world.

With a USD 10.380 trillion economy, China, after the United States, is a distant second economic power. In governance, present day Peoples Republic can be compared with Taiwan under the Koumintang. Deng Xiaoping had once remarked he was not sure if China would follow communism in the distant future. And we should not forget that the much talked about Sino-Soviet ideological rift during the Cold War period was essentially a struggle for their respective national interests behind the façade of communism. China, as envisioned by Deng, has chosen to follow a path which will eventually lead to greater freedom and economic prosperity. For the present, it is wary of granting more liberties to its people because of the Glasnost syndrome- it fears that granting civil rights to its people like the erstwhile Soviet Union will open a Pandora's Box where the resultant chaos will be fully exploited by the United States. Fragmentation of China, by at least separating Tibet and Manchuria from the mainland is what the western powers are working for. So, in China's case, Perestroika should precede Glasnost.

India is an aspirant for regional power status and sees itself as a competitor to China. It has world's 9th largest economy (after Italy, at USD 2.049 trillion). However, India's GDP to population ratio is very low, which indicates that most of its economic power is consumed in providing basic facilities to its population. The bulk of what remains caters for maintaining a large military establishment. Nonetheless, with the passage of time, Indian global reach and coercive power will also increase relative to the increase in China's power. This is so because the US and the European Union are propping up India against China. National space programmes are the symbols of geopolitical aristocracy. After China failed in its attempt to send a spacecraft to Mars, the United States, to score a point on China, helped India in putting a satellite in Mars' orbit. The Indian space mission utilized NASA's Deep Space Network (DSN), situated in Spain, California, and Australia, during its journey to the Red Planet. The NASA assets provided additional support during the Indian network's "non- visible period." America's MAVEN Mars orbiter, which was launched two weeks after India's Mangalyaan, overtook the

latter during the last leg of the journey and acted as a pathfinder for the Indian spacecraft.

Western powers justify their post Cold War cozying up to India to their shared “moral values”. They consider India a benign, and somewhat persecuted country which is pitted against an expansionist, brutal, and totalitarian China. While doing so, they ignore that during the Cold War period, India, in spite of its professed non-alignment, had been a close friend and supporter of the Soviet Union, another expansionist and brutal power of the era. India had fully supported the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan when almost the entire world was against it.

Russia is a quasi- democracy governed by the former communist party bosses. With a USD 1.857 trillion economy, it is the world’s 10th largest economic power. In aggregate national power, Russia ranks 7th in the world, but it is due to its military strength, not economic power.

Military Power

After the economy, aggregate national power of a country is shaped by its military strength, as indicated in America’s case which is militarily the world’s most powerful country. Military Power can be measured through Global Firepower (GFP) ranking, which is based on a formula utilizing over fifty different factors, compiled and measured against each nation. The finalized GFP value is recognized as the “Power Index” (pwrindx) which supplies a nation its respective positioning in the rankings. Power Index scores are judged on the perfect value of “0.0000” which is realistically unattainable due to the number of factors considered per country. Bonuses and penalties are added to each nation, as needed. Nuclear power is not counted. According to Handel (1990):

‘The possibility of weak states acquiring nuclear weapons as the great equalizer does not diminish the power gap between the weak and the powerful. Acquisition of nuclear weapons is considered by weak states only vis-a-vis other weak states, and as a bargaining counter in relation to the great powers.’

Presently, the United States is militarily the most powerful country in the world (pwrindx: 0.1661), followed by Russia (pwrindx: 0.1865). Russia remains the single most powerful military force in Europe even though its national power has been greatly reduced since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The key to Russia’s military power is its nuclear arsenal (though the Firepower Index precludes nuclear power), which is rivaled only by the United States. Ranked 13th in scientific research, Russia is one of those European powers that have the ability to develop

their own weapons platforms, which closely match in quality, those of the United States and the European Union countries. China (pwrindx: 0.2315), and India (pwrindx: 0.2696) rank 3rd and 4th respectively in global military power.

Ranking in Science & Technology

Economy and military power are catapulted by a country's ranking in science and technology which can be effectively quantified through H-index which attempts to measure both the productivity and citation of the published body of a scientist scholar. The index is based on the set of the scientist's most cited papers and the number of citations that the individual has received in other publications. The index can also be applied to the productivity and impact of a scholarly journal as well as a group of scientists, such as a department or university, or country. Those aspects of a country's ranking in the realm of science and technology, not captured by H-index, have been highlighted and analysed separately.

Presently, and in the foreseeable future, the U.S. will continue to possess the highest level of political and military clout on the planet because it has the world's best universities and scientific research institutions. And it has a work ethic and intellectual culture not matched elsewhere in the world. Those forecasting that in the foreseeable future China and India will over shadow the United States should remember that the brain drain is taking place from China and India, and the rest of the world, to the United States, not vice versa. Even in the 22nd Century, China and India may not emerge as leaders in science and technology but remain as America's auxiliary seats of learning because of the Chinese and Indian Diaspora working in American science and technology institutions.


Whereas SJR ranks China second in scientific research (H Index: 495), the Chinese lag behind in cutting edge technologies. To a large extent, they have access to sophisticated technologies which, combined with cheap labour, allow them to compete in the international markets. During the 1980s, in retaliation to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the western powers joined China in an informal alliance. For China it was an opportunity to modernize its armed forces and economy, and improve the level of its science and technology. As a result, The United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Australia, and Israel offered military sales to China and also provided it technological knowhow, either openly or covertly. Since then, China has come a long way and is now capable of designing and producing its own high value industrial products and weapons platforms like stealth aircraft. However, China's science and technology lack the

sophistication of the established leaders in this field. Unless China closes this technological gap, its quest for replacing the United States as a global power will remain a pipe dream.

India stands 9th in scientific research (H-index: 383). Like China, its military – industrial complex is woefully dependent and will remain so in the years to come on foreign state – of - the- art technologies. Besides military technology India needs the latest civilian nuclear technology to meet its energy requirements.

The above mentioned variables can be incorporated into a conceptual model for explaining the national power through various inter-linkages. The model is evolutionary in nature and possesses flexibility by allowing for adjustments and improvements:

Figure 1.1



National Power Index

Based on the proposed conceptual model, National Power index (NP index) , a function of a country's Aggregate National Power, considers the rankings of the 100 top countries in GDP, science & technology (reflective of intellectual power), and military power. The National Power Index is then calculated by the formula:

$$100 - \frac{\text{GDP Ranking} + \text{Ranking in Science \& Technology} + \text{Military Power Ranking}}{3}$$

NP index determines a country's ranking in Global Power. The reliability of NP index lies in the availability of authentic indices of its constituent factors. GDP ranking has been based on the IMF list 2014 (statistics for 2015 are not yet available). Military Power of each state has been determined by Global Firepower (GFP) ranking (2015) .Scientific ranking has been based on SJR ranking (2015).

Internal Stability, the moderating variable in the relationships between GDP, Ranking in Science & Technology, Military Power, and Aggregate National Power, has been determined by the Fragile States Index List (2015). NP index will keep fluctuating every coming year.

Future studies on appraising the suggested model should aim at determining the relative weight of each determinant, i.e. GDP, Military Power, and Ranking in Science & Technology. A comprehensive study may be carried out based on a ten year secondary data of each constituent factor to evolve a more effective generalization.

The proposed model may come under criticism for various reasons, particularly for its focus on four determinants only and the absence of weights for each determinant. The author considers the model adequate for explaining the national power within the ambit of internal stability, GDP, military strength, and a nation's mastery and application of the exact sciences.

Despite the absence of weights, or co-efficient for each determinant, it fulfills the purpose of quantifying a nation's power accurate enough for general discussions. Remember, the dynamics of the national power fall in the realm of social sciences. Even in exact sciences no single model can fully explain the existence and behaviour of a phenomenon. Newton's laws of motion and of universal gravitation have not become redundant and we utilize them even today to explain the universe to a certain extent beyond which Ein Stein's Theory of Relativity takes over. Then we have the M-Theory, which deals with those aspects that cannot be explained by the Theory of Relativity.

Analysis

Appendix I rank national power of world's top 50 countries. Presently, the United States leads the world in all the four determinants of national power ((NP index: 99). It has political stability through well established and pluralistic state institutions (A "Very Stable" country, according to the Fragile States Index), has the world's largest economy (USD 17.418 trillion), the most powerful military (pwrindx 0.1661), and its economy and military strength are driven by its intellectual power (H Index: 1648). Hence, presently, and in the foreseeable future, it will continue to possess the highest level of political and military clout on the planet.

As mentioned above, GDP is the biggest determinant of national power. The NP-index scores of the United States, China, Japan, Germany, UK, and France are closely reflective of their respective GDPs. However the NP-index slips down in the case of Brazil and goes up in India's case, mainly due to the Firepower Index. India's aggregate national power is lopsided because military power plays a higher

proportion in determining it. Judging by the ranking in GDP and Science & Technology (according to 2014/15 estimates, India ranks 9th in each of these criteria), India's actual ranking in national power should be 9th in the world. Japan, Germany, UK and France are among the world's top five countries in NP-index (France and Japan share the 5th position). These countries, along with the United States and China, are the global players which have, to a large extent, shaped the present world order.

Internal stability partially moderates a country's National Power. This is in line with ground realities. China and India are "Warning" states, and Russia is a "High Warning" state, but these countries rank 2nd, 6th, and 7th respectively in NP Index. On the other hand, Argentina is ranked as a "Stable" state, but has a lower NP Index than Saudi Arabia (a High Warning state). This has following implications: -

- a. A country may have low internal stability and yet possess a high NP-index
- b. If a country improves its internal stability, it may generate an even greater NP index.
- c. A country enjoying high internal stability will have to increase its GDP, ranking in science & technology, and military power to generate a greater NP index.

Weakness and strength are relative. China and Russia are weak powers relative to the United States. India is a weak power relative to China. Pakistan's weakness is in relation to India. While discussing the above mentioned conceptual model we have seen that a nation, while being compared with another nation, may not be weak in all the dimensions of national power. Italy's economy is bigger than India's, however India has a higher National Power- index in comparison to Italy. Israel's economy is miniscule as compared with the Chinese and Indian economies, but Israel enjoys a higher level of science and technology than China and India and thus exports its weapon systems and military/ civilian technologies to both these countries.

We will next discuss the national power of a few selected states which are either located in turbulent zones (Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel), or embroiled in internal or external conflicts (Pakistan, Argentina, and Taiwan) that endanger their very survival.

Turkey, (NP-index: 84.0) is Middle East's most powerful state, followed by Israel (NP-index: 76.7). Having a turbulent past, Turkey has managed to transform itself from a backward remnant of the Ottoman empire to a modern state with a thriving economy (USD 806 billion), 10th most powerful army in the world (pwrindx: 0.4335), and 20th ranking in level of science and technology (H index: 266).

Despite these encouraging national power indicators, Turkey is a relatively fragile “High Warning” state (Fragile States index: 74.4), mainly due to a long drawn out Kurd insurgency and the spillover of violence from Iraq and Syria. Over the Cyprus issue with Greece, Turkey has proven that it has the military muscle and political will to seek resolution of its territorial disputes with its neighbors. Reacting to Turkey’s occupation of one third of Cyprus, the European Union has shown its displeasure by repeatedly denying Turkey its membership. Turkey’s relations with Israel, with which it has traditionally maintained friendship, have remained under strain during the past few years as Turkey’s present Islamist government has shown greater concern over Israel’s handling of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Due to the changing Middle East scenario, Israel and Turkey are potential regional rivals with a narrow power differential of 7.3 (84.0-76.7) in Turkey’s favour.

The most likely regional conflict in the Middle East can take place between Iran and Israel. With a national power differential of 2 (76.7-74.7) in Israel’s favour, the two declared adversaries can fight it out among themselves till they are exhausted. Because of its relatively large economy (USD 404 billion against Israel’s USD 303 billion), Iran can sustain a little longer. But military power, the level of science and technology, and America’s backing favour Israel. The dispute on Iran’s nuclear weapons programme dragged on for quite some time and it will be an illusion to think that somehow Iran will manage to buy time or circumvent the crisis. We should not be misled by the recent understanding between Iran and the United States. In the final analysis, it will be Israel, not America, which will confront Iran. Israel not only possesses the capability to destroy Iran’s nuclear weapons programme, it also has the second strike capability. This implies that if Iran manages to resurrect its nuclear weapons programme say, ten years after it has been destroyed, Israel’s nuclear capable submarines would be lurking around to take care of it.

During the Iran- Iraq War, US and its allies found the real fissure in the Muslim world and started exploiting it to their advantage. It is the Shia- Sunni divide. This explains why US is sometimes on the side of the Shias and sometimes abets the Sunnis. America stumbled on the fissure while dealing with the Iran- Contra Affair. During the Iran –Iraq war America was indirectly helping Saddam Hussain through the conservative Arab regimes. On the other hand, it secretly facilitated the sale of arms to Iran, the subject of an arms embargo. Some U.S. officials hoped that the arms sales would secure the release of several hostages and allow U.S. intelligence agencies to fund the Nicaraguan Contras. It was planned that Israel would ship weapons to Iran, and then the United States would resupply Israel. The

Iranian recipients promised to do everything in their power to achieve the release of the U.S. hostages.

The Shia –Sunni divide brings Saudi Arabia into the power matrix. Whereas Iran, a Shia power, is a quasi-democracy in which real power is wielded by a council of clerics, Saudi Arabia, a Sunni bastion, is an absolute monarchy. The oil rich Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the city states dotting the southern and eastern fringes of the Arabian Peninsula have significant Shia populations, all of them ruled by Sunni governments. Iran claims that this region was part of the ancient Persian Empire. If Iran had its way, this entire region would become part of a Shia confederacy controlled from Tehran. From a larger perspective, Iraq and Syria would also be absorbed into this confederacy. This is a modern power struggle based on ancient rivalries and prejudices. The power differential between Saudi Arabia and Iran (1.7) is so narrow, any future war between them will be a replay of the Iran-Iraq War. It will sap the potential and energies of the entire region and suck in peripheral countries like Israel and Pakistan into the conflict.

In yet another regional permutation, Saudi Arabia may opt for borrowing power from Israel to deal with the threat from Iran. The American led effort to reach a deal with Iran on the latter's nuclear programme has prompted such a sharp reaction from Israel and the Gulf states that it has had the effect of bringing together these erstwhile antagonists. The probable reason behind Saudi Arabia cozying up to Israel is because of Saudi apprehensions that the U.S. government is yielding too much to Iran.

There have been reports about secret collaboration between Israel and Saudi Arabia for years, often denied by both governments. A 2009 report said that Saudi Arabia had offered to let Israel fly over Saudi territory to attack Iran, a report denied by Israel. Saudi Arabia is wary of Hamas, and it remained notably quiet during Israel's bombing campaign against the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. Another report claimed that Israel had offered its "Iron Dome" missile-defence technology to Saudi Arabia for use in the proxy war being fought in Yemen.

Israel and Saudi Arabia have been covertly conducting diplomacy to discuss Iran over a series of five meetings since 2014. They are worried about Iran's growing strength as a regional power. To deal with Iran, for quite some time the Israelis have been advocating : 1) peace between Israel and Arab nations ,2) regime-change in Iran ,and 3) creation of a new state of Greater Kurdistan including parts of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey (Graham,2015).

During Nasser's rule (1952-70), Egypt, then officially designated as the United Arab Republic (UAR), was a bulwark of Arab nationalism and nerve centre of the Arab world. A towering personality, Nasser commissioned Nazi scientists who helped UAR in producing supersonic fighter aircraft, biological weapons, and a delivery system (providing the backdrop for the Frederick Forsyth's thriller "The Odessa File"). Interestingly, while Messerschmitt was busy designing UAR's Helwan fighter aircraft (Zohar & Hirschel, 2012), Kurt Tank, another Nazi aeronautical engineer, was constructing the HF-24 Marut for India (Heinz, 1960, Taylor, 1976). Both these aircraft were to be powered by the Egyptian E-300 Brandner jet engine (Bhargava, 2008). Nasser and Nehru were aware that the foundations of the aerospace programmes of both the United States and the Soviet Union rested on WWII German military technology. Hinting at Israel while witnessing a military parade, Nasser had commented that his rockets could land south of Lebanon. While considering the threat from Israel, perhaps Nasser ignored that during WW II many of the future Israeli military commanders had served on the Allied general staff. After its defeat during the 1967 Arab- Israel War, Egypt gradually lost its clout in the Arab world. In 1973, Anwar Sadaat, Nasser's successor, tried to restore the status quo ante by attacking Israel in a two front war planned with Syria. Margolis (2013) reported:

"A US SR-71 Blackbird Mach3 recon aircraft and satellites spotted a yawning gap in Egypt's lines that separated its two armies on the east side of the Canal. Israel's brilliant Gen. Sharon exploited this gap. Rushing his armour across the Suez Canal and destroying much of Egypt's anti-aircraft guns and missiles on its west side that had been fending off the Israeli Air Force. Israel's crossing the canal cut off Egypt's two armies on the other side of the Canal."

At a crucial time the power borrowed from the United States saved the day for the state of Israel. However, Sadaat achieved his strategic objective of recovering the Sinai Peninsula from Israeli occupation. Felt betrayed, the other front line Arab states – Jordan and Syria, along with the rest of the Arab world boycotted Egypt. Though, over the period Egypt has come out of isolation, it no more represents the Arab political consciousness.

Argentina, with a USD 540 billion GDP, ranks 24th as an economic power. Having a Fragile States Index of 47.3, Argentina is a "Stable" country. It has the world's 47th most powerful military machine (pwrindx: 1.2364) and enjoys the 36th position in the level of science and technology (H Index: 273). It fought its last war with Britain in 1982 over the Falkland Islands and lost. It had to lose because the

outcome of the war depended on the relative naval power of the belligerents. And Argentina represented the weaker side. In a future war with Britain over the Falklands, Argentina will again lose because its navy is still very weak in comparison to the British navy, as shown in Table 1.2 below. The only way Argentina can regain possession of the Falklands is by changing the demography of these islands in Argentina's favour through human trafficking, and then demanding a plebiscite under the United Nations.

The author wants to discuss Taiwan as a special case because it will help carry out an appraisal of the Pakistan-India asymmetric relationship. Taiwan was de-recognized as a country when it was expelled from the United Nations making way for the People's Republic. Though considered a non-entity, except as a breakaway province of mainland China, Taiwan has a USD 529 billion GDP, ranking it as the world's 26th largest economy (below Belgium, but above Norway and Austria). It is the world's 15th largest military power (pwrindx: 0.5671), ranking it ahead of Italy and Pakistan. Taiwan has a robust science and technology base, giving it 16th ranking in the world. The island state faces threat of re-absorption by China while it does a tight rope dance. Though practically an independent country, Taiwan cannot even make a formal declaration of independence because China has threatened to attack Taiwan if it does so. Despite all this, Taiwan has survived because it does not want to become part of China. May be, in the 22nd Century there is a commonwealth of Chinese states, with China, Taiwan, and perhaps Singapore as its members. Pakistan has been effectively deterring India even as Taiwan and Vietnam deter China.

Table 1.2

	Argentina	Britain
Total Naval Strength*	41	66
Aircraft Carriers	0	1
Frigates	0	13
Destroyers	4	6
Corvettes	9	0
Submarines	3	10
Coastal Defence Craft	7	28
Mine warfare Units	0	15

Source: www.globalfirepower.com

*Includes all known auxiliaries
as well

6

Note: Pakistan's case has been discussed separately in Chapter III.

APPENDIX I

POWER MATRIX
(Top 50 Countries in Aggregate National Power)

Country	GDP In Millions of USD	GDP Ranking	H Index	Ranking in Sc. & Tech.	Military Power Index	Military Power Ranking	National Power Index	National Power Ranking
USA	17,418,925	1	1648	1	0.1661	1	99.0	1
China	10,380,380	2	495	2	0.2315	3	97.7	2
UK	2,945,146	5	1015	3	0.2743	5	95.4	3
Germany	3,859,547	4	887	4	0.3505	8	94.7	4
France	2,846,889	6	811	6	0.3065	6	94.4	5
Japan	4,616,335	3	745	5	0.3838	9	94.4	5
India	2,049,501	9	383	9	0.2696	4	92.4	6
Russia	1,857,461	10	390	13	0.1865	2	92.0	7
Italy	2,147,952	8	713	8	0.5735	16	80.4	8
Canada	1,788,717	11	794	7	0.5625	14	80.4	8
S. Korea	1,416,949	13	424	12	0.3098	7	80.4	8
Australia	1,444,189	12	644	11	0.5281	13	88.0	9
Turkey	806,108	18	266	20	0.4335	10	84.0	10
Taiwan	529,550	26	331	16	0.5671	15	80.7	11
Poland	546,644	23	371	19	0.6688	19	79.7	12
Spain	1,406,855	14	591	10	1.0641	38	79.4	13
Sweden	570,137	22	614	18	0.8075	24	78.7	14
Netherlands	866,354	17	694	14	1.0281	37	77.7	15
Switzerland	712,050	20	686	17	0.8942	30	77.7	15
Israel	303,771	37	496	22	0.4974	11	76.7	16
Brazil	2,353,025	7	379	22	0.7063	22	75.4	17
Mexico	1,282,725	15	289	28	0.9071	31	75.4	17
Iran	404,132	29	180	23	0.7619	23	74.7	18
Austria	437,123	28	449	24	0.9444	34	71.4	19
Norway	500,244	27	402	30	0.9327	33	70.4	20
Indonesia	888,648	16	140	61	0.5231	12	70.0	21
KSA	752,459	19	164	45	0.8702	28	69.4	22
Singapore	308,051	36	349	36	0.8584	26	68.7	23
Thailand	373,804	32	213	43	0.6833	20	68.4	24
Denmark	340,806	34	518	25	1.0994	39	67.7	25
Egypt	286,435	38	165	42	0.6214	18	67.0	26
S. Africa			292	35	0.9233	32	66.7	27
Belgium	534,672	25	547	21	1.3258	55	66.0	28
Pakistan	250,136	42	148	46	0.6122	17	64.4	29
Malaysia	326,933	35	165	37	0.9612	35	64.4	29
Argentina	540,164	24	273	36	1.2364	47	64.4	29
Czech R.	205,658	51	294	29	0.8748	29	62.7	30
Nigeria	573,652	21	115	51	1.1085	41	62.4	31
Finland	271,165	40	443	26	1.2417	48	61.7	32
Ukraine	130,660	59	174	39	0.8214	25	59.4	33
Chile	257,968	41	233	44	1.1724	43	57.0	34
Algeria	214,080	47	97	56	0.8695	27	56.7	35
Greece	238,023	44	326	27	1.6161	65	55.7	36
N. Zealand	198,118	54	351	34	1.9474	80	44.4	37
Vietnam	186,049	55	133	66	0.7024	21	52.7	38
Romania	199,950	53	167	41	1.3741	56	50.4	39
Hungary	137,104	58	301	38	1.4558	59	49.8	40
Morocco	109,201	61	117	55	1.2431	49	45.0	41

Venezuela	205,787	50	155	57	1.5172	62	43.7	42
Bangladesh	185,415	56	124	62	1.2894	53	40.4	43
Belarus	76,139	65	122	60	1.1917	45	40.4	43
Peru	202,948	52	140	76	1.2698	51	40.7	44
Bulgaria	55,837	77	167	50	1.6704	67	34.7	45
Kuwait	172,350	57	100	69	1.7336	71	34.4	46
Kenya	60,770	74	165	67	1.6835	68	30.4	47
Oman	77,755	64	83	78	1.6836	69	29.7	48
Azerbaijan	74,145	67	58	86	1.5211	63	28.7	49
Syria	71,998	69	74	101	1.1677	42	28.7	49
Sri Lanka	74,588	66	107	79	1.7556	73	26.7	50

Sources:

Economy – IMF Ranking of GDPs (2014)

Military Power: – www.globalfirepower.com

Level of Science & Technology –SJR Ranking (www.Scimagojr.com).

Note: GDP

rankings

are based

on 2014

statistics.

Rest of the

rankings

are based

on 2015

statistics.

APPENDIX II

INTERNAL STABILITY RANKING -2015

Country		Fragile States Index	Fragility Ranking among 178 States	Stability Ranking among 178 States	Country	Fragile States Index	Fragility Ranking among 178 States	Stability Ranking among 178 States
USA		35.3	158	21	Pakistan	102.9	13	166
China		76.4	83	96	Argentina	47.6	141	38
UK		33.4	161	18	Czech R.	37.4	154	25
Germany		28.1	165	14	Nigeria	102.4	14	165
France		33.7	160	19	Finland	17.8	178	1
Japan		36.0	157	22	Ukraine	76.3	84	95
India		79.4	68	111	Chile	41.5	150	29
Russia		80.0	65	114	Algeria	79.6	67	112
Italy		43.2	147	32	Greece	52.6	134	45
Canada		25.7	168	11	N. Zealand	22.6	172	7
S. Korea		36.3	156	23	Vietnam	72.4	97	82
Australia		24.3	170	9	Romania	54.2	132	47
Turkey		74.4	90	81	Hungary	49.1	139	40
Taiwan	Not	Counted	-	-	Morocco	74.6	89	90
Poland		39.8	153	26	Venezuela	78.6	75	104
Spain		40.9	151	28	Bangladesh	91.8	32	147
Sweden		20.2	177	2	Belarus	75.6	87	92
Netherlands		26.8	166	13	Peru	71.9	98	80
Switzerland		22.3	173	6	Bulgaria	55.4	130	49
Israel/West Bank		79.4	68	111	Kuwait	57.5	128	51
Brazil		62.6	123	56	Kenya	97.4	21	158
Mexico		71.8	100	79	Oman	52.0	135	44
Iran		87.2	44	135	Azerbaijan	77.3	80	99
Austria		26.0	167	12	Syria	107.9	9	100
Norway		20.8	176	3	Sri Lanka	90.6	34	45
Indonesia		75.0	88	91				
KSA		71.6	101	78				
Singapore		34.4	159	20				
Thailand		79.1	71	108				
Denmark		21.5	175	4				
Egypt		90.0	38	141				
S. Africa		67.0	113	66				
Belgium		30.4	163	16				
Malaysia		65.9	115	64				

Source:
Internal Stability – www.fragilestatesindex.org

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II

THE COLONELS' WAR

Alternate Narratives

Close on the heels of independence followed a massive influx of refugees from India. Hardly a month had elapsed when the specter of Kashmir started breathing down Pakistan's neck. The Pakistan Army was still struggling to create a semblance of its General Head Quarters. Units and equipment apportioned to the nascent army had slowly begun to move from the cantonments and depots located in India. A frail government, smarting from the wounds of partition and the massive challenges of establishing refugee camps, lacked the political will and military power to address the problem. This was the beginning of the evolution of a peculiar mindset which would henceforth govern the decision - making process in Pakistan.

Pakistani politicians and bureaucrats often complain that whereas Jinnah, founder of Pakistan and its first governor general had declared on independence that the future relations between India and Pakistan would be like those between the U.S. and Canada, Indian leadership never reciprocated in kind and never missed a chance to harm Pakistan. To substantiate their grievance, they cite Indian occupation of the Muslim princely states of Jammu & Kashmir, Hyderabad, and Junagarh, withholding Pakistan's share of civil and military assets and stopping the canal water flow through the head works located in India. On the face of it, the argument is neat and logical. What they miss or feign not to understand is that the partition of the Hindustan Peninsula was a bloody and macabre event which resulted due to a messy divorce.

The leaders on both sides of the political divide had remained daggers drawn throughout the struggle for independence. Short of abusing, they used all sorts of derogatory epithets against each other. Jinnah called Nehru a Peter Pan* (Wolpert, 2005). Nehru repaid by stating that Jinnah was not a properly educated person as he did not have a university education, and that success had come very late to him in life (Bolitho, 1954). And this hatred was transformed into a mass frenzy when partition approached nearer. Both sides accuse each other of the blood bath, rape, plunder, and arson heralded by the partition. However, neither side accepts that the death dance immediately before and after the partition was jointly choreographed by both the sides.

*Allegory to a mischievous character created by Scottish novelist and playwright J.M. Barrie – a day dreaming person who never grows up.

On the eve of independence Jinnah, while replying to a foreign correspondent, talked about a local Monroe Doctrine, which would seal the Sub-Continent against foreign interference (Singh, 2010). However, leaving diplomatic pleasantries aside, leadership on both the sides considered partition akin to a cease- fire in an as yet inconclusive multidimensional struggle. Each country had different strategic objectives. While the main objective of Pakistan was to survive, Indian leadership nurtured the ambition of re-absorbing Pakistan. To achieve its strategic objective, Pakistan had to secure Jammu & Kashmir through which flow the rivers that give life to the Indus Valley stretching from the Karakorams to the Arabian Sea. On the other hand, Patel termed partition as a temporary phase and was confident that Pakistan would soon be brought back into the pack (Wolpert, 2005). Congress' mindset can be gleaned from a letter written by Nehru to Brigadier Cariappa, a member of the Reconstitution Committee formed to oversee the division of armies:

“Let things take shape for a while. But of one thing I am convinced, that ultimately there will be a united and strong India. We will have to go through the valley of shadows before we reach the sunlit mountain top” (Khanduri, 2007).

This same Nehru had once remarked to B.K. Nehru *“let us see for how long they last”* (Singh, 2012).

Out of the five hundred plus princely states which had separate treaties with the British, Jammu & Kashmir was the only state over which Pakistan and India fought their first war soon after independence. The complex demography of Jammu & Kashmir rested on overlapping fault lines which often slipped, producing ethnic and communal tremors from time to time.

Whereas Pakistan entered the first Kashmir war on the premise that, being a Muslim majority state, Jammu & Kashmir should have logically acceded to Pakistan, the situation was not that simple. Kashmiris, the largest ethnic group in the state, were a much- persecuted people. They had suffered almost equally under the Moghul, Afghan, Sikh, and Dogra rule. Notwithstanding the political leanings of their leaders, ordinary Kashmiris were too preoccupied grappling with their grinding poverty to bother which direction the wind blew.

With the decline of Mughal power, the Kashmir Valley was annexed by the Afghans who ruled it for 67 years (1752 to 1819 A.D.). After four centuries of Muslim rule, the Valley was wrested by the Sikhs. After the defeat of the Sikhs in the First Anglo-Sikh War, Gulab Singh, the Dogra chieftain of Jammu and a vassal

of Ranjit Singh, received from the British all the lands in Kashmir that were ceded to them by the Sikhs by the Treaty of Lahore, for 7,500,000 rupees (Bamzai,1994).

Map 2.1



To the west of the Valley, Poonch is Muslim, but of a different ethnicity than the Kashmir Valley. Poonchis are racially and culturally close to the inhabitants of the border districts of West Punjab. Established in 1850 by one Moti Singh, Poonch remained a separate state till 1935/36 when it was reduced to the status of a vassal by the Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir. After the Indian revolt of 1857 in which the state's ruler sided with the British, and the subsequent assumption of direct rule by Great Britain, Jammu & Kashmir state came under the paramountcy of the British Crown.

Jammu region, mostly hilly or mountainous, lies to the south of Poonch. Pir Panjal range separates this region from the Valley and part of the Great Himalayas in the

eastern districts of Doda and Kishtwar. It is the only Hindu majority region in Jammu & Kashmir state.

To the east of the Valley, Ladakh is a vast high- altitude desert interspersed with narrow and isolated valleys which extend all the way up to the Tibetan plateau. Inhabited by the Indo- Aryans and Tibetans, the people practice different strands of Buddhism, Shamanism, and Islam (particularly of the Ismaili Shia Order). Ladakh is one of the most sparsely populated regions in the state.

Finally, to the north of the Valley are located Gilgit and Baltistan. These areas border Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to the west, Xinjiang, China to the east, and Afghanistan's Wakhan Corridor to the north. Inhabited by the Shins, Yashkuns, Kashmiris, Kashgiris, Pamiris, and Kohistanis, etc., the people are mostly Ismailis.

There are alternate histories of Kashmir – Hindu/Sikh and Muslim. Both sides accuse each other of committing horrible atrocities while ruling the state. According to the Hindu/Sikh narrative, Muslim rule was one of immense cruelty and loot. Public executions, rape, and death by drowning in the rivers were a normal practice to keep the locals, particularly Hindus and Sikhs, overawed and loyal (Rai & Mridu, 2004). Muslims accuse the Sikhs and the Dogras of flaying alive their Muslim subjects. Cow slaughter was punished with death. Entire villages were burnt and women gang raped on even the slightest suspicion of Muslim defiance.

Jinnah thought that Kashmir was the jugular vein of Pakistan, for, without the river waters that are the lifeline of Pakistan's agrarian economy, Pakistan is but a vast desert. He, therefore, inferred that Pakistan had a legitimate right to control the waters of the Indus and its tributaries. It was thus vital for Pakistan to control the sources of river waters flowing into Pakistan from Kashmir. And Pakistani leadership took measures of sorts to achieve this national objective, albeit half - heartedly, and in a confused and hush-hush manner. It was soon clear to the entire world that the tribesmen abetted by the Pakistani government had invaded the Valley, yet the government of Pakistan remained in a state of denial. What was the reason?


While deciding how the war would be planned and fought, it seems there were three major considerations before Pakistani leadership: (1) military asymmetry with India. (2) the Supreme Command of the Indian Army, headed by Field Marshall Auchinleck, with its headquarters in New Delhi, should not be offended by an overt invasion. (3) A proxy war through reservists, army officers on leave,

and tribesmen should be waged for a few months till India was forced to seek a political solution.

The economy of Jammu & Kashmir state was heavily dependent on road and rail communications emanating from West Punjab. The shortest and economically most viable routes for transportation of fuel, food, and other basic commodities to the state were Rawalpindi-Muzaffarabad-Srinagar road (approximately 160 km all weather tarmac road without any major water obstacle or serious gradient), and Sialkot- Jammu road/rail link. According to Amin (1999), Pakistan was geographically better poised to launch a military operation in this area. On the other hand, the only Indian link with Srinagar was the dirt road from Pathankot (the nearest Indian road/railhead) to Jammu and thence to Riasi from where a metalled road passing through the Banihal Pass led to Srinagar. The pass remained snow- bound from November to May and the total distance between Pathankot and Srinagar was some 400 km.

The Infiltration

Map 2.2



It started with the unrest in Poonch. On a clear day, while traveling between Lala - Musa and Jhelum along the Grand Trunk road one can see, to the east, the snow

capped peaks of the Pir Panjal range. Standing sentinel in the Kashmir Valley, Pir Panjal Mountains gradually slope down westward and merge with the plains of Punjab. Claspings Pir Panjal, and surrounded by Jhelum and Chenab rivers, is the area of Poonch. Contiguous to Poonch, and sprawled between the Jhelum and Indus rivers, is the Potohar plateau comprising the districts of Jhelum, Chakwal, Rawalpindi, and Attock. The inhabitants of these regions share strong religious and ethnic ties with each other. They speak closely resembling mountain dialects of Punjabi language – Dogri, Gujar, and Pahadi in Poonch, and Potohari and Hindko in Potohar.

Denied job opportunities, particularly recruitment in the Maharaja's army, the Muslims of Poonch sought jobs in the British Indian Army in large numbers and fought, along with their distant cousins in the highlands of Punjab borderland, in the two world wars. On returning home after the First World War, to their chagrin, they found that their state had been reduced in 1936 to the status of a jagir (duchy) by Maharaja Hari Singh. This, along with the charged atmosphere in 1947 when atrocities were being committed by both the sides, Poonch had become a tinder-box, ready to be ignited anytime soon. Skirmishes had already started between the Poonchis and the Maharaja's Dogra army (Khan, 1975).

While the government of Pakistan, including its GHQ, feigned ignorance, this war was masterminded and executed (with the tacit approval of Pakistan's prime minister) by two serving colonels of the Pakistan army. When the war started, colonels Akbar Khan and Sher Khan were serving as Director Weapons & Equipment and Deputy Director Military Intelligence respectively at GHQ (Nawaz, 2008). Unbeknownst to the General Headquarters (read Generals Gracey and Messervy), Colonel Akbar Khan (later promoted to the rank of major general) of the Pakistan Army, was tasked by the Pakistani premier to set up a covert command headquarters to organize and execute the operations in Jammu & Kashmir. Colonel Sher Khan, subsequently promoted to the rank of brigadier, and the future Director Military Intelligence (Nawaz, 2008), was to assist him. For this purpose, Akbar Khan was to coordinate with the Muslim Conference led by Sardar Ibrahim, a Poonchi lawyer hailing from Rawalakot.

On 23rd October 1947 the invaders crossed over into the Jhelum Valley and reached Muzaffarabad (Kaul, 1967). Both sides have made conflicting claims about the number of infiltrators. According to the Pakistani sources, 5000 -8000 men were involved. Indians claim a force of 50,000 (Khanduri, 2007). The raiders kept infiltrating the state in packets of varying numbers throughout the war. The state forces stationed around the border towns of Muzaffarabad and Domel were

quickly defeated. Some state forces even mutinied and joined the raiders. Thereafter they advanced towards Baramulla; a town located about 55 km (34 mi) from Srinagar, the state's summer capital. The way to Srinagar was open. Rather than advancing towards Srinagar before state forces could regroup or be reinforced, the invading forces remained in the captured cities in the border region, engaged in looting and arson. The situation would have been different had the operations been conducted by the regular army. In the Poonch Valley, the state forces retreated into towns where they were besieged.

Prasad and Dharam (1988) wrote:

"The invasion of the Kashmir Valley from Pakistan was planned with meticulous care and showed considerable strategic and tactical insight. The plan was first to split up the State's Army into tiny groups by means of hit and run attacks all along the long frontier with Pakistan. In trying to control these apparently uncoordinated attacks, the defending force was compelled to distribute itself into garrisons of platoon strength spread very thin indeed along the entire southern frontier. The terrain was hilly and communications primitive so this distribution of the State Army into innumerable tiny garrisons meant that it ceased to exist as a strong cohesive force able to offer battle to any strong invader anywhere along the frontier. The defending army was thus hamstrung most effectively. Vicious communal propaganda at the same time was turned full blastand the Muslims in the frontier areas and in the State Army were incited to rebel against the Hindu Maharaja and to murder their neighbors of the minority community."

Here we must keep in mind that this was no disciplined army with a properly organized logistics system. The behavior of the raiders was in conformity with the tribal norms where, in times of need and scarcity, raiding the neighbors to carry off cattle and food stuff is normal practice. The invaders did not formally represent the state of Pakistan and did not consider themselves bound by the laws of international armed conflict. Rather, they did not even know the existence of such laws. It is said that the leaders of the invading force, including Khurshid Anwar, an ex- INA officer, quarreled about who would lead the victory march into Srinagar.

Jhelum Valley

Contrary to the general perception, the Indian government did not merely react to the tribal invasion, but was fully cognizant of and prepared to address the situation. On 7th October, Patel had written a letter to the defence minister Sardar Baldev Singh, cautioning him to be prepared for providing military assistance should the situation demand. It appears that Nehru was focusing his attention on addressing both the political and the legal dimensions of this issue. His strategy was to lean on Sheikh Abdullah and simultaneously pressurize the Maharaja into signing the instrument of accession. This, he thought, would take the wind out of Pakistan's balloon. To take care of the military dimension Nehru relied on Mountbatten who, he expected, would influence the Boundary Commission, headed by Sir Cyril Radcliffe, to award Gurdaspur Tehsil to the Indian dominion, thus providing India access to Jammu & Kashmir (Collins & Lapierre, 1975). Geographical contiguity would thus pave the way for a projected Indian onslaught on the state.

The Maharaja signed the instrument of accession on 26th October. In his book Lamb (1990) indulges in an academic argument that the instrument of accession was signed on the evening of 27th November, "that is to say, after the Indian troops actually began overtly to intervene in the State's affairs on the morning of 27 October 1947". For the Indians, saving Srinagar and controlling its surrounding areas was the key to securing the whole Kashmir Valley, Gilgit, Baltistan, and Ladakh. The most suitable way to do this was by airlifting troops to Srinagar. Hence on 26th October India had decided to airlift 161 Infantry Brigade to Srinagar and move 50 Parachute Brigade into Jammu overland.

On 27th October, using the tribal invasion as a pretext, India attacked Kashmir. Mustering all the military and civilian passenger planes it could lay its hands on, India undertook a massive airlift of troops and equipment to Srinagar to counter the invasion (Sinha, 2002). Starting first light 27th October, the advance elements of 161 Brigade comprising two companies ex 1 Sikh Regiment and a battery from the 13 Field Regiment were airborne from Palam airport. The civilian Dakotas landed on the Srinagar airfield at 0830 hours. Contrary to the earlier gossip and speculation, the raiders were nowhere in sight. In fact, they were still in Baramula, 55 km from Srinagar. During this period of uncertainty for the Indian troops, instead of waiting for the arrival of the raiders, CO 1 Sikh advanced his force, making contact with the attackers in the vicinity of Baramula. The CO was killed in the ensuing skirmish, however, the Indians succeeded in delaying the enemy advance. On the second, or third day the RIAF started strafing the Baramula-

Srinagar road to further impede the raiders' movement towards Srinagar. The entire 161 brigade rendezvoused in Srinagar area by 2nd November (Singh, 2000).

On evening 27th October Jinnah ordered Pakistan's acting Commander-in-Chief, General Douglas Gracey to move an infantry brigade each along Sialkot – Jammu and Rawalpindi - Srinagar axes to counter the Indian invasion and capture the Srinagar airfield and the city. General Gracey was deputizing for General Messervy who was on leave. Jinnah's plan could not materialize due to the ambiguous nature of the Supreme Command of Indian Armed Forces, which was established to oversee the division of the British Indian Army. To this supreme command, headed by Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck, the commanders-in- chief of the Indian and Pakistani armies reported. Gracey, ignoring Jinnah's orders conveyed this information to Auchinleck. The field marshal flew into Lahore in the morning on 28th October and had the orders withdrawn on the understanding that the governor generals and prime ministers of the two dominions would meet in Lahore on 29th October 1947 to discuss the matter. It was a tactical victory for India (Rabbani, 1996).

After the massive Indian airlift and the subsequent fierce clashes around Baramula between the Indian Army and the raiders the situation in the Valley was becoming increasingly worrisome for Pakistan. Akbar Khan, in a bid to retrieve the situation, had gone right up to milestone 4 on the Muzaffarabad –Srinagar road to spur the raiders whose advance had been held up by a road block hastily established by the Indian Army. He even arranged a picnic at the nearby Hokersar Lake to raise the morale of his rag- tag force (Bhattacharia, 2013). By 3rd November 1947 another tribal contingent led by Major Aslam and Major Khurshid had also infiltrated into the outskirts of Srinagar, the nearest they could reach the city.

With the Srinagar airfield firmly in the hands of the Indian Army and induction of fresh troops into the Valley, the situation was fast becoming desperate for the tribal contingent. This prompted Akbar Khan to return to Rawalpindi and discuss the situation with the scriptwriters. At a conference held on 4th November 1947 Akbar Khan pleaded for air, armour, and artillery support for the tribals if Srinagar airfield and the city had to be recovered at all. Major Tommy Masud from 11 Cavalry who was stationed in Rawalpindi even volunteered to take his squadron of armoured cars with his men in civil clothes. His proposal was shot down by Raja Ghazanfar, a Muslim League leader, and Sher Khan. Having left with no other option Akbar Khan decided to go in for an all out attack with whatever he had for the capture of the airfield and the city. The operation was planned to be executed on the night 6th/7th November 1947 (Amin, 1999; Bhattacharia, 2013).

In the meanwhile, 161 Brigade fanned out in all directions, carried out aggressive patrolling, and established a defence perimeter around Srinagar. The brigade, along with a troop of armoured cars from 7 Cavalry, and supported by RIAF Tempest aircraft, attacked the raiders on 7th November in the open plain of Shelateng on the outskirts of Srinagar. The tribesmen, used to fighting in the mountainous terrain, could not hold their ground in this well-coordinated joint operation by the enemy, suffered heavy casualties, and withdrew towards Baramula and Uri, pursued by the Indians. This was a decisive battle which secured Srinagar for the Indians. Success has many fathers. In their books, both Brigadier Sen (1994) and Colonel Harbaksh Singh (2000), commander and deputy commander respectively, of 161 Brigade, have eulogized themselves and claimed the credit for planning and executing the battle. After Shelateng the tribesmen avoided pitched battles in the Valley while the Indian Army busied itself in combing operations. By 17th November, attacking the infiltrators with infantry supported by artillery and air force, Indians had captured Uri and Baramula. Interestingly, Akbar Khan denies that a battle ever took place at Shelateng. To reinforce his point he mentions that the bulk of the tribesmen had already withdrawn to Baramula on 5th November 1947 (Khan, 1975).

Akbar was not present at Shalateng and there is no doubt that a battle did take place there. It is likely that many tribesmen, after getting frustrated due to the absence of support from the Pakistan Army and Air Force may have withdrawn from the Srinagar area between 27th October and 5th November 1947. Despite the absence of many tribals from the scene the Indians, though supported by armour, artillery, and air, failed to exploit their success by hurriedly advancing west and capturing Muzaffarabad. They were psychologically too shattered by the initial shock of the tribal onslaught on Srinagar. Despite the fact that most tribesmen were not fighting the battle, few demolitions and a few snipers who were too motivated to withdraw stopped the Indian advance approximately 3 miles west of Uri. After 10th November the Mahsud and other tribesmen returned and played a major role in stabilising the front between Uri and Muzaffarabad (Khan, 1975). Their task was facilitated by the terrain. Flowing westward the Jhelum gorge becomes narrower between Baramula and Uri (Amin, 1999).

The tribesmen and the local irregulars were essentially raiding parties devoid of proper organization, training, and equipment. They were good at launching hit and run attacks, inflicting damage on the enemy, and then melting away. Properly planned and sustained attacks, followed by holding the captured ground and repelling counter-attacks were not their forte. Moreover, as Shelateng had proven, the tribesmen were more adept at fighting in hilly terrain rather than plains. Despite their vulnerabilities, they did well according to their fighting capacity.

Combining a judicious mix of raids, ambushes, roadblocks, and lightning attacks, they kept the enemy embroiled, harassed, and on tenterhooks till the cease- fire.

Poonch Amphitheatre

The city of Poonch lies in a bowl shaped valley surrounded by high hills on all four sides. Soon after entering the state, the raiders had captured all the heights dominating Poonch city. At that time the city was garrisoned by roughly one brigade of the state forces. After the successful battles of Shelatang, Uri, and Baramula, the Indians had planned a double pincer move. The northern pincer, comprising a column ex 161 Brigade, was sent southwards to relieve Poonch. The southern pincer comprising 50 Para brigade supported by a squadron of armoured cars ex 7 Light Cavalry was to move along axis Akhnur, Beri Pattan, Naushera, Jhangar, Kotli, and then to Mirpur with the aim of reaching Mirpur by 18th November 1947. The northern and southern pincers were to meet at Kotli by 18th November. The northern pincer was ambushed and divided into two parts. A major chunk of the brigade went back to Uri whereas 1 Kumaon, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Pritam Singh, managed to reach Poonch on 21st November 1947. In order to have a unified command of Indian Army and State Forces, Pritam Singh was elevated to the rank of brigadier and handed over the command of the Poonch Brigade (Sen, 1994).

Fighting in Poonch again showed that the infiltrators, though holding the heights dominating Poonch city, lacked the sustained drive and the firepower to physically attack and uproot a well- entrenched enemy. In the second week of December 1947 RIAF started landing Dakotas at a hastily prepared airstrip. Besides the much - needed rations for the beleaguered garrison, the Indians transported heavy weapons and artillery and, in concert with the air force, not only held out against the attackers but also nibbled away at some of the strategically important features dominating Poonch. The city withstood the siege from November 1947 till relieved by an Indian offensive, Operation Easy, on 20th November, 1948. However, despite its superiority in infantry, artillery, and air power, the enemy failed to dislodge the infiltrators from majority of the heights dominating Poonch city.

South of Poonch

Area Akhnur - Beri Pattan- Naushera- Jhangar - Kotli is semi-mountainous and interspersed with seasonal streams. This area allows for employment of armour. 50 Para Brigade succeeded in relieving Kotli garrison on 26th November 1947. However, news of the fall of Mirpur which had been captured by the raiders on

25th November 1947 forced the Indians to abandon Kotli which could not be defended while Mirpur was in hostile hands. This also forced the Indians to abandon the plan for a link up (Sinha, 2002; Amin, 1999).

Map 2.3



Jhangar was captured by the raiders on 24th December 1947. This gave them the vital Mirpur-Jhangar-Kotli-Poonch road link. They were now poised to attack Naushera, approximately 26 kilometers from Jhangar. By evening 25th December the same men who had captured Jhangar besieged the Indian force at Naushera. The attack came on 6th February 1948. However, the attackers, with 3-inch mortar as their heaviest support weapon, were no match for the Indians who were well entrenched and had the support of artillery and aircraft. The attackers were defeated with heavy losses. Naushera was of crucial strategic significance and the Indians gave it the very high priority as a strategic point. The loss of it could deny the Indians with a southern approach to relieving Poonch at a future stage. The militias bypassed Naushera and lack of artillery and air support ensured that Naushera remained in Indian hands. Failure of the Militia to capture and hold Naushera proved to be the first Indian stepping stone to the final relief of Poonch. Commencing 14th March, the Indian force under Brigadier Usman, with armour and artillery support, recaptured Jhangar on 17th March, 1948. The invaders, then attacked Naushera unsuccessfully and made a series of unsuccessful attacks on Uri. In the south a minor Indian attack secured Chamb (Sinha, 2002; Amin, 1999).

Loss of Jhangar and withdrawal of Azad forces besieging Nowshera cut off the raiders holding Rajauri and blocked their reinforcement from Bhimber. The Indians made much greater progress in area Jammu- Jhangar- Rajauri area because the terrain favoured effective employment of armour and regular units. There being no armour, artillery or regular troops on the other side, the Indians captured Rajauri on 12th April 1948 with a tank squadron of the Central India Horse. However, despite favourable terrain and the absence of an organized and properly equipped enemy their progress in the south was not as fast as it should have been. The absence of Pakistan Army support between October 1947 and May 1948 ensured that Indians occupied the entire area between Naushera and Poonch.


War to the North and East

To the north and east of the Valley, in the large waste-lands of Gilgit, Baltistan, and Ladakh the war began on 31st October, 1947 when, interestingly, the Gilgit Scouts, under Major W.A. Brown and Capt A.S. Mathieson mutinied against the Maharaja. The rebels also had the support of the locals with whom the Maharaja's regime was never very popular. The uprising soon flared up to Skardu, a major town on the Gilgit-Leh road. Skardu was besieged on 15th February 1948. Kargil and Dras fell on 10th May and 6th June 1948 respectively. The Srinagar-Leh route was blocked. They also captured the heights dominating the Zojila defile, besieging the Zojila garrison (Brown, 1998; Sinha, 2002; Dani, 2001).

A force of around 500 Pathans, Chitralis and mutineers from J & K forces, reinforced by a contingent of Gilgit Scouts, reached Nimmu and controlled the Nubra Valley, threatening Leh. For the Indian Army, the major access routes to Leh were foot-tracks from Manali via Keylong over the 17,000-foot-high Bara Lacha La and Taglang La passes, and the route from Jammu via Kishtwar and Zaskar. Two Indian attempts to relieve Skardu failed and the town fell on 14th August 1948 (Sinha, 2002).

Zojila is located at an elevation of 3529 meters (11578 feet) and about 102 kilometers east of Srinagar. It is the main pass on the route connecting Leh to Srinagar. For the Indians, recapture of Zojila was essential to secure the Srinagar-Leh road, a distance of 365 km. This could only be possible by retaking Dras and Kargil and clearing the raiders from their positions around Zojila before winter set in (Sinha, 2002).

Map 2.4



Indian army launched 77 Para Brigade on 1st September 1948 to attack Zojila heights. The attack failed in the face of stiff resistance by the defenders. Appreciating that they needed additional firepower to evict the raiders from their defenses, the Indians decided to employ Stuart light tanks. The operation was held up for two weeks due to bad weather, and because the army engineers had to widen an eight-kilometer length of the track to bring in the tanks. The assault began on 1st November 1948. The tanks engaged the defenders occupying high pickets and holed up in caves while the infantry mopped up the slopes. This time, the attack was a success as the defenders did not have any anti-tank weapons. Having cleared the Zojila heights from the raiders, 77 Brigade had retaken the heights and the link up with Leh was completed (Sinha, 2002).

Ashraf (2007) narrates an interesting human angle to the war:

It is said that in 1948, the Pakistan Army (tribals, sic) had penetrated up to Padam in Zaskar Valley where they stayed for about six months. They were

popularly called the “Padam Party”. The Indian Army was at Karsha in the same Valley. After the ceasefire, the UN observers arranged a safe passage for the Pakistan Army to their side of the Line of Control (Cease-fire Line, sic). While departing, the Pak Army took few hundred young men from Padam with them who are now settled in Skardu area. They have all their relations on this side of the border and the only meeting point for them is the holy city of Makkah in Saudi Arabia. The two sides coincide their visits to the holy places for Hajj or Umrah to see each other.

Pakistan Army Formally Intervenes

The Indian capture of Rajauri 45 kilometers north of Naushera (12th April, 1948), finally forced Gracey to conclude that unless the Pakistan Army intervened in Kashmir, Pakistan's security would be endangered and additionally Pakistan could face a serious refugee problem and a major loss of morale as far as the army's rank and file were concerned. Hence 7 Division commanded by Major General Loftus Tottenham was ordered into Kashmir. 7 Division had three brigades i.e. 10 Brigade (Abbottabad area), 101 Brigade (Kohat) and 25 Brigade (Rawalpindi). Pakistan's 101 Brigade was the first regular army formation to enter Kashmir in May 1948, followed by 25 Brigade, which was inducted in area Mirpur the same month. One battalion each from 101 Brigade went to Uri and Muzaffarabad-Kohala-Bagh area, while one company (later replaced by a battalion) went to Tithwal. Initially, 101 Brigade was looking after both Tithwal and Uri sectors, but soon 10 Brigade took over Tithwal Sector while 101 Brigade area of responsibility was confined to Bagh-Uri sector.

Indian Spring Offensive


In May 1948, Thimaya, the Indian 19 Division Commander, planned an offensive against Muzaffarabad employing two brigades; i.e. 161 Brigade on Uri - Domel axis and the newly formed 163 Brigade on axis Kupwara-Chowkibal-Tithwal.

Amin (1999) writes:

“Advance of the (Indian) 163 Brigade which commenced from 18/19 May was rapid since the militia was not expecting a brigade across a 9,000 ft high mountain, however, the advance made no progress after having reached Tithwal which was captured on 23rd May. The only troops in front of the 163 Brigade's leading battalion was a regular company of Pakistan Army This was, however, soon reinforced by two more companies and

finally by the whole 10 Brigade by 30th May .Thus the chances of any further Indian advance on this axis were frustrated”.

Map 2.5



Harbaksh Singh (2000), by then promoted brigadier and commanding 163 Brigade, acknowledges that the Indians were fighting a rag tag and ill-trained force (a regular company of Pakistan's 10 Brigade plus some irregulars). Tithwal was captured by the Indians on 23rd May 1948 whereas the bulk of Pakistan's 10 Brigade arrived in the area on 30th May. Narrating the Tithwal operation, He wrote:

“..... For an irregular force, the estimated strength of 1650 was quite considerable. The enemy was, however, known to be scattered in small parties and, provided a complete surprise was achieved, he was not expected to put up any organized and concerted opposition. Once he was on the run, it was speed and not strength that was required on our part. So it was not the numbers that were opposing us in the area that were important as the strength that might be thrown against us at Tithwal after its capture.....About this time, an hour and a half before the time of start of the Handwara column, a hare was raised by Officer Commanding, 1 Madras. He just had a report, he said, from his platoon at Nagi picket that the enemy was registering with 3-inch mortars, the road through the defile,

half a mile from Zachaldor. He had fired as many as ten bombs in the area..... I assured the Commanding Officer that this so called 'registration' was no registration at all; for I knew that it had occurred many a time before. All that the enemy was trying to do, I pointed out, was to bomb Nagi picket from the feature on the opposite side of the defile, and the bombs that fell in the road-area were only a few 'shorts'."

The Indians continued to attack in the Neelam Valley sector driving north to capture Keran and Gurais.

The Indian thrust along Uri-Domel axis made limited progress. Here they were opposed by a regular Pakistan Army formation, i.e. the 101 Brigade. The Indians Succeeded in capturing Pandu, which was 9178 ft high, on 25th May, 1948. Pandu feature dominated the Pakistani-held position at Chakothi on the main Uri-Domel road. The 101 Brigade executed a brilliant attack by infiltration in which two Pakistani infantry units completed infiltration in two days and recaptured Pandu on 24th July 1948. Beyond Pandu the Indian advance petered out and nothing of any strategic consequence was gained as far as the Indian 19 Division offensive was concerned. Thimaya inducted the third brigade i.e. the 77 Para Brigade also but little was accomplished.

The Parting Kick

By December 1948 the Indian Army was firmly in control of the Jhelum Valley, Poonch, and Ladakh. Pakistani political and military leadership now feared that emboldened by their successes, the Indians would try to eliminate the sliver of Jammu & Kashmir territory which still remained with Pakistan. They were particularly concerned about a likely Indian advance towards Mirpur and Bhimber. Gracey presented a plan to meet this threat. Called Operation Venus, the plan envisaged a counter stroke involving an armoured brigade and an infantry brigade attacking from Bhimbhar area to control Beri Pattan road which was the Indian line of communications to Naushera, Poonch, and Jhangar. A subsidiary operation aimed at capturing the two hills overlooking the area was not launched for some flimsy reason, or deferred to wait for the next Indian move in this area. On 14th December 1948 a watered down Operation Venus involving only heavy artillery shelling in the Beri Pattan area, without any physical attack, was executed. The shelling continued for two days and temporarily disrupted the movement of Indian supply convoys on road Akhnur-Naushera. At 23:59 hours on 1st January 1949 Pakistan accepted the cease-fire.

During all the operations National Conference volunteers, particularly in the Valley, acted as guides, spies, and the political commissars for the Indian Army. They would sneak into the villages, motivate the villagers to support the Indians, and tie up the logistics for the projected operations. On the heels of every major Indian attack followed Sheikh Abdullah, Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad, D.P. Dhar, and other National Conference stalwarts to give pep talks to the inhabitants of the villages secured by the Indians (Singh, 2000). Despite this, the ordinary Kashmiris were confused and wary of both the tribesmen as well as the Indians. A large number of them had run away and taken refuge in the forests. Both the sides had planted horrible stories against each other. And both the sides used the locals as forced labour for carrying the stores, repairing bridges and improving mountain tracks. Whereas the tribesmen vented their wrath on the Hindu and Sikh population, the Indian Army was not left behind in heavily punishing the Kashmiri Muslims suspected of being sympathetic to the enemy. The Sikh units, particularly, had some old scores to settle with the inhabitants of the Afghan villages (Singh, 2000).

Analysis

Crying over Missed Opportunities

After the war, the high commands on both the sides lamented over lost opportunities. According to the Indians, given their numerical superiority, had the spring offensive been launched in April 1949, the Indian Army would have recovered the whole of Azad Kashmir and the Northern areas by the autumn the same year. On the other hand, the Pakistanis maintain that if Operation Venus had been launched as it was initially planned, Indian defences in J&K would have collapsed.

The Army and its High Command

This war heralded the birth of Pakistan's doctrine of Borrowed Power. The doctrine owes its evolution partially to Pakistan's inability, as a lesser power, to militarily solve its territorial disputes with India, and partially to a shaky political and military leadership. There are valid arguments both in favour and against the manner in which Pakistan's civil and military leadership handled this war. According to Pakistan Army's official website:

“The original agreement called for the armed forces and other assets to be divided to the ratio of 64% for India and 36% for Pakistan, but Pakistan

was later forced to accept an 1/3 share of assets. Of the total 46 training establishments; only nine were located in Pakistan; all of the 17 ordnance factories were located in India, as were most of the ordnance depots and engineer store depots. In addition to Pakistan receiving far less stores than originally stipulated, most of the stores received were of general nature, perishable, unwanted and obsolete. The move of 150,000 Pakistani personnel as well as 508 units and sub units of various sizes was to be carried out by rail through Indian Punjab and Sikh Princely States”.

“Against an estimated requirement for about 4,000 officers, Pakistan had initially only about 2,300 - the gap being filled up on Quaid-e-Azam's appeal, to some extent, by 484 experienced and qualified British officers, who volunteered to stay and help Pakistan and the Pakistan Army in difficult times. Many Polish and Hungarian officers also volunteered for the medical corps. Prior to August 1947, the most senior Pakistani (and Indian) officers were in ranks of brigadiers; after independence, the command of Army units had to be given to officers in their early 30s with eighteen years service, many of whom had combat experience and had won battlefield awards in World War II. Similarly, brigade commanders had 13-15 years service and division commanders 19-20 years”.

“By October 1947, guarding 5,000 miles of West and East Pakistan's frontiers were, about ten infantry brigades at less than 50% strength, and an armoured brigade with only 13 running Stuart tanks. The Army had ammunition reserves for less than one week. In a Joint Defence Council meeting, both Mountbatten and Supreme Commander Auchinleck had made it clear to Pakistan that, in case of war with India, no other member of the Commonwealth would come to Pakistan's help.”

The Pakistan Army was indeed in a bad shape as far as manpower, equipment, ordnance stores, and supplies were concerned. But the information provided by the Army website should be taken with a pinch of salt. For example, if the ammunition reserves were sufficient for less than one week only, how did the irregulars, heavily dependent on Pakistan Army for ammunition, fight the Indian Army for more than a year?

There was a strong lobby, comprising both Hindu and Muslim officers of the armed forces, Congress leaders, and the British administration, which was vehemently opposed to the division of the British Indian Army into the Dominion Armies of India and Pakistan. The army officers were motivated to retain the

integrity of the Indian Army due to their peculiar background which nurtures institutional loyalty, esprit-de-corps, and cohesion above everything else.

Some of them were of the view that an undivided army, at least for a transitional period, would be of great help in overseeing the peaceful and orderly transfer of population when the partition of Punjab and Bengal and demarcation of the boundaries of the undivided provinces were announced. Mountbatten was also strongly in favour of keeping the Indian Army united, primarily because the Radcliffe Award was to be announced only after partition and he had planned to thoroughly engineer the delineation of the international boundaries in India's favour. Mountbatten stressed his argument by stating that it would be a minimum of five years before the present Indian Army could be efficient and stand up on its feet without the help of the British officers. These ideas were rebuffed by Jinnah.

The Supreme Command of Indian Armed Forces was established to oversee the division of the British Indian Army (Khanduri, 2007). It had the following charter of duties:-

Supreme Commander

1. The Supreme commander will be responsible for the general administration of law and discipline.
2. The Supreme Commander will maintain control over the British officers and other ranks on all matters of discipline, promotion, etc and will protect their interests.
3. British officers opting to serve on will not be able to choose which dominion they wish to go, but will serve where ordered by the Supreme Commander.
4. The Supreme commander will be responsible for the general condition and maintenance of the two armies and for those establishments serving both dominions jointly, but will have no operational control except for the Punjab Boundary Force and possible Bengal Boundary Force. The staff of the Supreme Commander will be entirely British in order to release in officers for their respective dominion armies.

Dominion Commanders

- a. No new units are to be raised without the prior approval of the Supreme Commander.
- b. 1st April 1948 has been set as target date for the reconstitution after which Dominion Commanders may make such alterations etc as they please.

Did they owe allegiance to Pakistan Army or to the Supreme Command was the question that agitated the minds of the senior Pakistan Army officers even when the war in Kashmir was proceeding with full speed? To clear the ambiguity Jinnah addressed the officers at the Command and Staff College on 14th June, 1948(C&SC Museum). Try to read what was on Jinnah's mind when he said:

“.....One thing more, I am persuaded to say this because during my talks with one or two very high ranking officers, I discovered that they did not know the implications of the oath taken by the troops of Pakistan. Of course, an oath is only a matter of form. What is more important is the true spirit and the heart. But it is an important form and I would like to take the opportunity of refreshing your memory by reading the prescribed oath to you.

‘I solemnly affirm, in the presence of the Almighty God, that I owe allegiance to the constitution and the Dominion of Pakistan (mark the words constitution and the Government of the Dominion of Pakistan) and that I will, as in duty bound honestly and faithfully, serve in the Dominion of Pakistan forces and go within the terms of my enrollment wherever I may be ordered by air, land or sea, and that I will observe and obey all commands of any officer set over me.’

“As I have said just now, the spirit is what really matters. I should like you to study the constitution which is in force in Pakistan at present and understand its true constitutional and legal implications when you say that you will be faithful to the constitution of the Dominion”.

“I want you to remember, and if you have time enough you should study the Government of India Act, as adapted for use in Pakistan, which is our present constitution, that the executive authority flows from the head of the Government of Pakistan, who is Governor General, and therefore, any command or orders that may come to you cannot come without the sanction of the executive head. This is the legal position.....”

The confusion in the minds of senior Pakistan Army officers about the chain of command, combined with the constraint not to annoy the Supreme Commander lest he withdrew the British officers, were the main reasons the political leadership vacillated in employing the army. Presumably, they lacked the self-confidence that the army, if led by Pakistani officers, could fight and win a war in Jammu & Kashmir. Hence the strategy to fight a covert war by relying on

irregulars led by army officers ostensibly on leave. Fighting this way was a poor man's choice which afforded economy of effort and resources. But it failed to achieve Pakistan's military and political objectives which were to launch a covert operation to liberate Jammu and Kashmir and integrate it with Pakistan. The irregular forces employed to achieve these objectives did not have the punch to exhaust the well organized, disciplined, and trained Indian Army. The political leadership delegated the conduct of operations to a motley of local politicians from Poonch, hotheads like Qayyum Khan (Chief Minister of NWFP), and a few ex-INA officers. The members of this group did not cut much ice with each other, a factor that would result in major military setbacks throughout the war (Khan, 1975).

Despite its military weakness, Pakistan could have cobbled together, through bleeding the ten available infantry brigades, at least two brigades to invade Jammu & Kashmir. As for the threat of a likely Indian counter move, it was worth taking the gamble. In any case, the Indian Army was also in a state of flux. As the subsequent events proved, whichever army reached Srinagar first would have prevailed. It is very difficult to dislodge a trained defender in a mountainous terrain. At the end of the war when Pakistan had openly inducted the depleted 7 and 8 divisions, Indian attempts to dislodge Pakistani forces from the positions occupied by them failed and Indian army had to call off its final offensive to recover Muzaffarabad, Domel, and Neelum Valley. Even if two brigades could not be spared, there was Messervy's prescription of sending a battalion in plain clothes (why plain clothes?) who would have been there within hours – a battalion less two companies at the airfield in Srinagar and two companies at Banihal Pass.

The Two Colonels

As mentioned earlier, the war was masterminded by two serving colonels of the Pakistan army. These two, in turn, played the role of the phantom character – “General Tariq”. Reporting directly to the prime minister, these two officers acted as the quartermaster general and the director general military operations, rolled into one, of the ghost Azad Forces HQ. As mentioned earlier, when the war started, colonels Akbar Khan and Sher Khan were serving as Director Weapons & Equipment and Deputy Director Military Intelligence respectively at GHQ Pakistan Army. It was Colonel Akbar Khan, who was first contacted by the cabal, comprising politicians, retired INA officers, and senior bureaucrats, to plan, organize, and lead the covert war to secure Jammu & Kashmir for Pakistan while the government, including GHQ, looked the other way. According to Amin (1999) Akbar Khan was the architect of philosophy of armed insurrection by employing

non-state actors as state proxies. His ideas about the use of non-state actors as advanced in his writings were picked up by others much later and practised in Afghanistan and NEFA.

Whereas Akbar Khan busied himself with cobbling together the disparate elements of the projected invasion, Sher Khan was the brain who, through his incisive appreciation formulated its strategy. As the war uncoiled, the duo kept adjusting the military aim to reconcile with the ground realities. The initial aim was to create a situation in which the Maharaja would be forced to accept a plebiscite in the state. After the arrival of Indian troops, the aim was changed to make operations prohibitive for India and force her to agree to a plebiscite. To achieve this, it was intended to drag the operations, initially till December 1947. When the objective could not be achieved within the stipulated time frame, the date was extended until April 1948.

Akbar Khan, wearing the mantle of General Tariq, remained in-charge of the operation until mid- February 1948 when he was, on his request to Pakistan's prime minister, replaced by Sher Khan. Akbar Khan, besides organizing the invasion force and looking after its logistics, had to deal with the Byzantine politics and infighting within the various segments of the invasion force. He remained bitter about how the invaders lost the race to reach Srinagar as the Kashmiri politicians led by Sardar Ibrahim, retired army and INA officers, and tribesmen haggled about who would lead the victory march into the state capital.

Both these officers, despite the obvious handicaps, kept the pot boiling and bleeding the well oiled Indian army till Pakistani government, fearing that the Indian army, in due course of time, would recover the wedge of mountain barrier still controlled by the invaders, decided to induct the Pakistan army and hold the line Uri-Poonch-Naushera.

Auchinleck and Gracey

The reported opposition, by Auchinleck and Gracey, to the employment of Pakistan Army in Jammu & Kashmir needs to be interpreted in a different context. It appears that the governor general of Pakistan and his prime minister were not thinking in a similar way. It was more due to the vacillation on part of the political leadership of Pakistan, rather than intransigence by the British top brass of Pakistan Army, which prevented materialization of Jinnah's orders. There was nothing wrong in Gracey conveying Jinnah's orders to Auchinleck. He was only following the channel of command agreed to by both the dominions. As the events

proved later, Gracey would have followed Jinnah's orders had the latter persisted. The idea of keeping the army high command in the dark and using non-state actors to secure Jammu & Kashmir for Pakistan was, to a great extent, prime minister's, supported by his cabinet members.

By the first week of December 1947, when the raiders were withdrawing from the Valley and embroiled in battles in Poonch and farther to the southwest, General Messervy allowed volunteer officers from the Pakistan Army to lead the irregular troops fighting in the state. In February 1948, according to Akbar Khan's appreciation, India had three infantry divisions (with some integral armour, reconnaissance and artillery complement), facing two depleted Pakistani infantry divisions along the Messervy Line. It was in March 1948 when Messervy prodded the political leadership to employ the Pakistan Army for preventing the Indian Army from advancing beyond the line Uri-Poonch-Naushera. Even if the British officers were withdrawn, Pakistan Army could fight the war with its own officers.

The Tribals

The tribals, feeling let down by the government of Pakistan and an indifferent army high command, vented their frustrations on the civil population of Pakistan after retreating from Jammu & Kashmir. Brigadier Ingall, the British Commandant and founder of the Pakistan Military Academy wrote:

“The tribesmen, meanwhile, drifted slowly back to their homelands bordering Afghanistan, some of them passing through Abbottabad. Totally undisciplined - their maliks (leaders) had little or no control of them - they arrived in bands of a hundred or so, firing their rifles in the streets and at one point commandeering the bazaar, helping themselves to whatever they fancied. The local police, under-strength and with few experienced senior officers, were incapable of tackling these tough bandits. For a while it looked as if they might raid Kakul as well, a mere five miles away. But gradually most moved on, heading for their homelands. The local people, however, the Shinwaris, had been unsettled by all these events. Some of them staged a minor raid on Kakul. I happened to be away at the time, and it was not till the next day that I found out what happened.....” (Ingall, 1988).

Pakistani leadership can be forgiven for the lopsided manner in which the first Kashmir war was fought. The founder of Pakistan was terminally ill, the prime minister had his hands full dealing with the influx of refugees and creating some semblance of governance when the state treasury did not have funds even to pay for salaries to the government servants, and the army was still in a state of flux.

Still, with meager resources and by cobbling together a ragtag army of Kashmiri volunteers, tribals, and ex-servicemen commanded by officers loaned by the army, Pakistan managed to recover a slice of the Valley and a huge wasteland to the north. It was after the war that, instead of taking stock of the things and crafting a workable strategy to dispassionately deal with the Kashmir problem, the Pakistani leadership resorted to hoodwinking the masses by hiding behind clichés and empty slogans.

Major Conclusions

1. Integration of Jammu and Kashmir state with Pakistan was not possible without taking the risk of employing Pakistan Army.
2. Non –state actors may create a lot of nuisance, but lack the discipline and resilience to achieve military objectives.
3. Relying on multiple centres of gravity is counterproductive. Akbar Khan, disillusioned by the political and military leadership, joined the communists and tried to topple the government in the famous Rawalpindi Conspiracy. This was the beginning of Bonapartism in Pakistan.
4. Having wrested the Kashmir Valley, the plum in the cake, Nehru wanted an end to the war because prolonging the war was tarnishing his image as an emerging world leader.
5. Pakistani civil and military leadership was mentally exhausted by the war and also wanted an end to it.
6. Any future attempt by Pakistan to attack the Indian-controlled Kashmir will result in an Indian response across the international border (During the 65 and Kargil Wars, Pakistan repeated the mistakes it had committed during the Colonels' War – it used non-state actors to achieve its military objectives, and failing to do so, knocked at the door of the United Nations (White House in case of the Kargil War).

Finally, the Colonels' War reinforced the collective civil and military psyche to lean on to the United States and (later) China and attempt at using Borrowed Power to resolve its disputes with India.

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III

COLD WAR YEARS

Pakistan had lost Kashmir between 23rd October 1947, when the invaders crossed over into the Jhelum Valley, and 27th October 1947 when India airlifted its troops to Srinagar. Somewhere between these five fateful days, the raiders stayed in Baramula (55 kilometers from Srinagar), looting, plundering, and squabbling over who would lead the victory march into the state's capital.

India fought the first Kashmir war with a well thought out and integrated plan incorporating its army and air force. It had a clear and well-defined national strategy into which the military objectives were nicely dovetailed. The plan allowed for the optimal exercise of command at all levels. This, along with a superior force level, paid dividends. At the end of the day when the dust had settled down, India was in possession of two-thirds of the disputed state. On the other hand, Pakistan fought the war in a mysterious and hush, hush manner, relying mainly on non-state actors. Due to the absence of ownership of the Kashmir operation by the government of Pakistan, a truncated and broken chain of command, and lack of resources, for Pakistan this war had essentially become a series of disjointed battles fought by the local commanders without any higher direction. Pakistan Army formally entered the war much later only to stop the Indian Army from breaking the line Uri-Poonch-Naushera. It goes to the credit of these local commanders that, with all the handicaps, they kept at bay a much larger and well oiled Indian Army.

The First Kashmir War had highlighted three weaknesses: 1) Lack of self-confidence among the politicians, praetorians, and bureaucrats to wage the war independently, without employing British officers. 2) The existence of multiple centres of gravity resulting in the dissipation of the decision-making process. 3) Heavy reliance on non-state actors to achieve military objectives. Interestingly, instead of addressing these weaknesses, Pakistani civil and military leadership exhibited the propensity to repeat the same mistakes time and again.

How Relevant was the Kashmiri Leadership?

Besides the communal rivalry, there were strong undercurrents of ethnic tensions within the Muslim community as well. The people of the Valley possess a condescending air towards the Highlanders inhabiting the areas west of Pir Panjal. They consider themselves more sophisticated and cultured than their co-religionists in Jammu and the adjoining region of Poonch (Abdullah, 1985). During the twilight years of the British rule in India, political struggle in Jammu and Kashmir revolved around the quest for eminence between Sheikh Abdullah and Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas. Sheikh Abdullah, the “Lion of Kashmir”, was a firebrand Kashmiri nationalist from the Valley. Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas, hailing from the Hindu-dominated Jammu was inclined towards Jinnah’s philosophy. He, however lacked Abdullah’s charisma and populist appeal. In his biography, Sheikh Abdullah, while emphasizing the essentially secular psyche of the Muslim majority population of the Valley, attributes the communal leanings of the Muslims of Jammu to their inferiority complex and the resultant lack of self- confidence vis- a-vis Jammu’s Hindu majority.

Abdullah was not born a secularist. In 1932, he created the All Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference, the first political party in the state. The party was renamed National Conference in 1939 to suit, according to the Sheikh, the secular nature of the Kashmiri culture. This born again political party wished to create a secular, democratic and independent Kashmir with close ties to British India. Creation of the National Conference coincided with Jawaharlal Nehru becoming the president of the States’ Peoples Conference. Created in 1927, the avowed aim of this forum was to urge the princes to grant civil liberties to their people and introduce democratic representative government. In 1938 the Congress defined its goal of independence, which included the independence of princely states. Sheikh Abdullah, who had developed a strong chemistry with Nehru, affiliated his National Conference with The States’ Peoples Conference. He himself was elected its president in 1947, the year of the Sub- Continent’s partition. As the future events would prove, Nehru used the States’ Peoples Conference as an effective tool to annex the princely states, specifically Jammu & Kashmir, with India (Abdullah, 1985).

In response to Abdullah’s ideological reincarnation, in 1941 the minority faction

headed by Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas, with Jinnah's blessings, revived the erstwhile Muslim Conference. On 19th July, 1947 a convention of the resurrected All Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference adopted a resolution demanding the state's accession to Pakistan. Here, again the ethnic fault line separating the Muslim leadership of Jammu & Kashmir is clearly visible – the National Conference dominated the Valley whereas The Muslim Conference held sway in Jammu and Poonch. As for Ladakh, Gilgit and Baltistan, these regions were sucked into the vortex only after the fighting had started in the Kashmir Valley, Poonch, and Jammu region.

Jinnah made a mistake by ignoring Sheikh Abdullah. A realist that he was, Sheikh Abdullah had been trying feverishly to cultivate good relationships with both the Congress and the League. He had tried to make friends with Jinnah in 1944 when the latter was on a visit to Kashmir. During this visit, Jinnah was given a public reception by various political parties of the state. The Sheikh personally welcomed him to the Valley and had long private talks with him. Knowing full well that the Sheikh was in cohort with the Congress, Jinnah asked Abdullah at a huge public gathering at Jamia Masjid, Srinagar to wind up his National Conference and merge it with the Muslim Conference, Muslim League's main ally in the state. Since then relations between the two had remained strained (Abdullah, 1985).

The Sheikh had anticipated that the political vacuum that was being created in Jammu & Kashmir due to the ineffectiveness of Maharaja's rule would ultimately be filled by his National Conference. According to Taseer (1986), hard on the heels of partition Abdullah had dispatched his two lieutenants, Ghulam Mohammed Sadiq and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, to Lahore. They were to act as his emissaries and contact Muslim League leaders and Communist supporters of Pakistan, with whom they had a good rapport, to bring about reconciliation between Sheikh Abdullah and Jinnah. However, they failed in their mission as Jinnah did not agree to meet Sheikh Abdullah (or, perhaps, Liaqat Ali Khan prevented him from doing so). When the tribesmen entered the Valley, Abdullah called Bakshi and Sadiq back.

Taseer's (1986) story is corroborated by what Sheikh Abdullah said on 5th February 1948 during his address at the United Nations Security Council. He said:

"Immediately we were liberated from the prison we were faced with the important

question of whether Kashmir should accede to Pakistan, accede to India, or remain independent... We could not decide this all important issue before achieving our own liberation, and our slogan became "Freedom before accession." Some friends from Pakistan met me in Srinagar. I had a heart-to-heart discussion with them and explained my point of view.... While I was engaged in these conversations and negotiations with friends from Pakistan, I sent one of my colleagues to Lahore, where he met the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, and other high dignitaries of the West Punjab Government. He placed the same point of view before them and requested that they should allow us time to consider this vital question, first helping us to achieve our liberation instead of forcing us to declare our decision one way or the other. Then, one fine morning while these negotiations were proceeding, I received news that a full-fledged attack had been carried out by the raiders on Muzaffarabad, frontier town in the Kashmir Province...."

Even after the failure of Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad's secret mission to Lahore, almost the entire leadership of the National Conference, with the exception of Sheikh Abdullah and a few of the party's working committee members, were for a settlement with Pakistan. Destiny makes strange bedfellows. As cited earlier, even the communists of Kashmir, under the directive of the Communist Party of India, were prepared for Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. It was the Sheikh who, having been turned down by the Pakistani leadership was desperately in favor of the State's accession to India (Raina, 1990). After the tribal forays into the Valley, he pleaded with Nehru to accept the Maharaja's request for accession and send the Indian Army to Srinagar.

The Lemon

After losing Kashmir to India, Pakistani politicians, praetorians (when in power), and diplomats have regularly used the United Nations as a Wailing Wall in front of which they ritually lament and bash their heads at the indifference of the world powers (particularly the United States) for not coming to their help in getting Kashmir vacated from India.

Having failed in securing Jammu & Kashmir for Pakistan by force, subsequent Pakistani governments had to console their people by hiding behind the United Nations resolutions. In fact, the United Nations has never taken its resolutions

seriously unless the national interests of the permanent members of the Security Council are involved. What was the United Nations' role in the Kashmir imbroglio?

The United Nations Security Council first took cognizance of the Jammu and Kashmir issue in December 1947 at India's behest. India's request to the Security Council, cleverly conceived, said,

"Such a situation now exists between India and Pakistan owing to the aid which invaders, consisting of nationals of Pakistan and of tribesmen from the territory immediately adjoining Pakistan on the North West, are drawing from Pakistan for operations against Jammu & Kashmir, a state which has acceded to the Dominion of India and is part of India...The Government of India request the Security Council to call upon Pakistan to put an end immediately to the giving of such assistance which is an act of aggression against India."

India thus became the 'complainant' before the Security Council against 'aggression' by Pakistan.

The United Nations Security Council appointed a United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). The UNCIP, taking note of the developments, adopted a resolution on 13th August, 1948, divided into three parts. The first part called for a cease-fire. The second part called for Pakistan to withdraw its nationals and tribesmen and to vacate the territory occupied by it. Then after the above stipulation had been implemented, India was to withdraw the bulk of its forces from the State, leaving an adequate number behind to ensure that the Government of Jammu & Kashmir maintained law and order, providing India a legal lacuna to claim that the UNCIP believed that Jammu and Kashmir was a part of India. The third part of the resolution, to be implemented after the implementation of the first and second parts, stated that both India and Pakistan had reaffirmed their wish that the future status of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people.

In American slang, a "lemon" is a car that causes more trouble than it is worth, as in "I bought a car from that dealership, but it turned out to be a lemon." That is what the UNCIP resolution was - a lemon. Let us examine this much talked about resolution. The first part calling for a cease-fire was implemented, leaving India in

possession of two- thirds of Jammu and Kashmir while Pakistan controlled the remaining one- third. As for the second part, would Pakistan ever think of vacating Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas in preparation for and to facilitate a plebiscite in the disputed state? Had Pakistan vacated these areas, Indian Army would have quickly occupied them. The very idea of Indians sitting on the Kohala bridge and policing Gilgit and Baltistan is unacceptable to Pakistan. So Pakistan did a wise thing by not withdrawing from these areas. But in doing so it also technically violated the second part of the UNCIP resolution. Unless the second part was implemented how would the contenders move ahead?

Let us see what would have happened if both India and Pakistan called each other's bluff and agreed to a simultaneous withdrawal. Such a possibility presented itself twice or thrice when Owen Dixon tried to bring both the parties to the negotiation table to facilitate a settlement. Sheikh Abdullah, in his biography, *Atish- e- Chinari*, states that whenever such a possibility arose the intellect of Pakistani leaders (borrowing an Urdu expression) "went grazing grass" and they squabbled over whether, prior to the plebiscite, the Indian Army should be allowed to keep two divisions or just one division in the state . Not that the Indians were eager to peacefully settle this dispute (India calls it "issue") Hence the perpetual stalemate which suits the leadership in both the countries.

Let us consider this from the enemy's point of view.

According to Rikhye (2014):

"India's acceptance of the United Nations resolution calling for a plebiscite in Jammu & Kashmir was contingent on a withdrawal of the Pakistan Army from Kashmir. Since Pakistan violated the withdrawal clause, India is no longer bound to honour the resolution". Rikhye reinforces his argument by claiming that *Pakistan demands right to self determination only for the Kashmiris living in Indian administered Jammu & Kashmir while it is not prepared to grant the same right to the people of Pakistani Kashmir. Moreover, Pakistan has not only integrated Gilgit & Baltistan but had, in 1963, ceded Shaksgam Valley belonging to Jammu & Kashmir, to China.* According to Rikhye, *whereas in the past some Kashmiris may have wanted to join Pakistan, at present an overwhelming majority clamors for independence.* He fears *"if India were to permit secession, within 12- hours the Pakistan Army will have rolled in and taken over the new country".*

Though Pakistanis and Indians vehemently dismiss each other's point of view, how close they are in their fears!

A Disease Called Pactitus

With a backward industrial base and a weak economy, Pakistan needed foreign economic and military assistance to meet the challenges it was facing. According to Bhutto (1969), during the period immediately after WW2 the Soviet Union had little time to spare for the Sub-Continent as it was more concerned about post-war alignments in Europe and the Pacific. The United States, one of the two nascent superpowers, was still dependent on Britain in evolving its world view. A united India fit well in this emerging world-view as America agreed with the British assessment of the dangers to Western interests of a partitioned India. After independence, the United States made many overtures to India and, only when it became clear that Nehru was not prepared to involve India in superpower rivalry (though it developed strong military and economic ties with the Soviet Union), was Pakistan cajoled into the defence pacts in 1954 and extended military assistance.

After WW2 the United States, a novice in the great game, needed new enemies, even as it needed new friends. It rightly perceived the Soviet Union as the greatest threat to its interests though the magnitude of the threat was gradually blown out of proportion. Initially, the United States wanted Nationalist China and India as its policemen in Asia and the Pacific. When China was "lost" to the communists the United States pinned its hopes on India, but India under Nehru was intent on enjoying the best of both the worlds by sitting on the fence under the anachronistic concept of non-alignment. In fact, non-alignment was the bogey the Soviet Union used throughout the Cold War to counter the United States. Hence the US sponsored military pacts which were aimed at propping up local satraps in the Near East, South Asia, and South East Asia. Speaking in New Delhi in January 1962, Henry Kissinger remarked that the United States conjured up these pacts because "at that time America was suffering from a disease called 'Pactitus' (Bhutto, 1969).

Pakistan had to borrow power from the United States, and later from China to achieve a parity of sorts in dealing with India. That the United States did provide military and economic aid to Pakistan during the Cold War period should have

been enough for Pakistan to build up its national power by addressing all its four determinants – internal stability, economic power, military power, and level of science and technology. As discussed in the subsequent chapters, we will see how, instead of utilizing borrowed power as a stop-gap measure, Pakistani leadership corrupted the very dynamics of national power and used it as a stunt and an excuse to justify their failures.

The United States had made it clear on many occasions that assistance will be provided only to the countries taking part in America's struggle against communism, and that it will not waste its weapons and munitions on countries which might use them in conflicts in which the United States were not engaged. That the United States did provide economic and military assistance to Pakistan despite the latter's refusal to join the American war effort in Korea and Vietnam could be attributed to Pakistan's willingness to allow American bases on its soil, and because Pakistan joined the US sponsored military pacts "ostensibly" to fight the American perceived communist threat. Thus, from the very beginning, it was a marriage of convenience for both the sides.

Pakistan, right from day one was torn by multiple problems. The biggest problem it had to grapple with was how to rehabilitate millions of refugees pouring in from India when the state exchequer was empty. But Jinnah, the founder of this poor and shattered country, was a proud and self-reliant person. An excerpt from the book written by his personal physician sheds light on Jinnah's psyche:

Talking of cigarettes, he liked to smoke Craven A's, but they were then unobtainable at Quetta. I preferred State Express 555, but happened to have some tins of his favourite brand which I smoked when I could not get those of my choice, and these I offered to send him. To prevent excessive smoking I decided on second thought, however, to send him only one tin to begin with, and when I met him again the same evening asked if it was fresh. He thought it was all right, but the next morning he complained of its staleness and enquired if I could get him some fresh ones from Lahore. I undertook to procure them, but felt surprised how the cigarettes had suddenly lost their freshness. Soon, however, it occurred to me that the meticulously proper Quaid-e-Azam wished to avoid being under an obligation to me. This was characteristic of him: he never accepted anything from anybody without paying for it. I remember when I returned from Lahore on the 6th of August, Begum Muhammad Akbar Khan sent some grapes for him from Quetta with me. He liked them very much, and asked where I had bought them. I told him

they had been sent by Begum Muhammad Akbar Khan who could send some daily if he cared for them, but, while appreciating the Begum's kindness, he politely declined to accept any more. I can recall another incident of the same kind. One day I went to a private garden with General Muhammad Akbar Khan. There I was shown some green roses not known to me. The General plucked some and asked me to present them to the Quaid-e-Azam and tell him if he liked these and other flowers he could arrange to have them sent daily. He accepted the roses thankfully, but said that he did not wish to give the General the trouble of sending him anymore (Bakhsh, 1949).

It was another matter to seek foreign assistance as a tactical measure to address Pakistan's problems. However, successive leaders, both civilian and military, showed a great inclination towards the concept of borrowed power as a strategic instrument. Today's Pakistan, despite slogging through the minefield of history for more than six decades, is in a much better shape than it was at the dawn of its independence. However, the propensity of its leaders to lean on outsiders does not show any sign of slackening.

Why did they do it? It appears that Pakistani decision makers contrived an intricate cobweb of clichés, self-serving theories, and dicey relationships in order to remain in power. At the centre of this cobweb sits the Kashmir dispute with India, which, over a period of time, has been turned into a stunt. There are three options for the resolution of this dispute: 1) war with India; 2) peaceful dialogue; 3) maintaining the status quo. Pakistani decision makers have tried all the three options, but failed because of their half-hearted approach. They want this dispute to linger on in order to perpetuate themselves. To do so they have always tried to hide behind the UN resolutions which they have misinterpreted to their people.

The inclination of the Pakistani rulers towards the inclusion of foreign powers for addressing Pakistan's domestic issues and regional conflicts can be attributed to their lack of confidence and, more importantly, as a ploy to drag their feet in the resolution of these very issues. This is because, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, they want to keep the pot boiling as it facilitates self-perpetuation. Towards this end, they allow external forces to play an exaggerated role in Pakistan's domestic politics. Even a superpower cannot meddle in the internal affairs of a small state unless it is invited to do so. Egypt under Nasser was a Soviet client state, but despite the Soviet pressure Nasser refused to remove restrictions on the Egyptian communist party. This was different in the case of

Pakistan where the American diplomats were gradually allowed to play the role of kingmakers.

According to Hussain (1993), in an assessment prepared by the United States embassy in Karachi in March 1955, four years before Pakistan formally granted bases to the US,

“ the US felt that after more than two years of crises , political power in Pakistan has been openly assumed by a small group of British –trained administrators and military leaders centering around Governor General Ghulam Muhammad and his two principal associates, General Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan.... The regime favors a strong central government, economic development through austerity measures and foreign aid, and close alignment with the U.S..... We believe that the present leadership would be favorably inclined towards US peacetime development of airbases for U.S use.” (Paras. 9–14, 21)

Once they were allowed to meddle in Pakistan’s internal affairs, the Americans grew arrogant and assumed an imperial, rather insulting, tone towards their Pakistani tenants. In an August 1955 dispatch to the State Department, ambassador Hildreth states:

“Ambassador has told Iskander Mirza, and it will be made clear to Suharwardy and others, that the United States has no objection to inclusion of Suharwardy in a high cabinet post.....While fully understanding the necessity to avoid US involvement in internal politics through any public stand, the fact is that US relationship is so important to Pakistan that complete non-involvement is impossible. If embassy officers ignore Suharwardy , for example, for the next two weeks this may well be interpreted here as official policy indicative of disapproval of his inclusion in cabinet. If he is cultivated by the embassy even on a purely social basis, an interpretation of US approval may be placed on such actions. Conclusions, (1) we should encourage Suharwardy through third parties to take a cabinet post under the new prime minister, protecting our public position at all times.(2)embassy officers should make some effort to maintain pleasant personal social contacts with Suharwardy” (Hussain,1993).

The biggest indicator of poor and weak leadership is when a leader starts talking against his subordinates in front of others. It becomes even more reprehensible

when he does so in front of strangers. According to a September 1956 dispatch by Hildreth, Iskander Mirza showed Hildreth and his British counterpart a copy of a four-page letter regarding foreign policy that he had drafted but had not yet sent to Suharwardy. In other words, the president of Pakistan showed a confidential official communication addressed to his prime minister to the foreign ambassadors even before it was seen by the prime minister (Hussain, 1993).

Perhaps even more unbecoming than this breach of security was Iskander Mirza's assessment of his other prime minister (Ch. Muhammad Ali) which he conveyed to ambassador Hildreth and which the ambassador sent to Washington in a telegram in February 1956. Calling Ch. Muhammad Ali timid, weak, and perhaps cowardly, he even went to the extent of telling Hildreth to advise US Secretary of State Dulles to

“talk very bluntly with the prime minister and scold him for allowing an official of the foreign office for publicly saying that the reception given to Chinese vice president Madame Sun Yat Sen was greater than that given to vice president Nixon” (Hussain, 1993). This was the same Hildreth who once called Pakistani diplomats *“prostitutes”*.

The subsequent Pakistani rulers have proven themselves even better boot-lickers to the Americans than their predecessors. The people of Pakistan deserved better than what was delivered to them by their leaders, political as well as praetorian. While fretting over the rot that has become Pakistan's fate, one is reminded of the movie Terminator II where Sarah Connor, one of the leading characters, leaves a message etched on the table with a knife. It reads “No fate, except what we make”. This country is what the collective consciousness of its leadership has turned it into, for the masses are powerless and directionless.

It is interesting to note that both India, a Non-Aligned country taunted by Dulles for “sitting on the fence”, and Pakistan, “the most allied ally of the United States”, continued to get American military and economic assistance throughout the Cold War period. After the Korean War, the USA created and equipped Pakistan's armed forces virtually from the scratch (particularly the army and the air force). Between 1954 and 1965, Pakistan received over a billion dollars in military aid from the United States. This aid greatly enhanced Pakistan's defense capability as new equipment and weapons were brought into the armed forces, new military

bases were created, existing ones were expanded and upgraded, and two new corps commands were formed. Shahid M. Amin, a retired Pakistani diplomat, writes in his book *Pakistan's foreign policy: A reappraisal*:

"It is also a fact, that these pacts did undoubtedly secure very substantial US military and economic assistance for Pakistan in its nascent years and significantly strengthened it in facing India, as seen in the 1965 war."

American and British advisers trained Pakistani personnel and the USA was allowed to set up bases within Pakistan's borders to spy on the Soviet Union. During this period, many future generals went to American and British military academies. The Pakistani Army, which was already following the British model, also benefitted from American Army's training practices and tactical doctrines.

There was a marked variance though in the objectives and perspectives of Pakistan and the United States due to which military assistance was provided to Pakistan for one set of reasons and received for another. Pakistan needed foreign military assistance to offset Indian military superiority whereas the United States armed Pakistan on condition that it entered into military alliances in recognition of the communist danger and would be prepared to be a part of the worldwide encirclement of the Soviet Union and China, with the common and collective purpose of containing communism, if necessary, with the use of force. Apparently, Pakistan agreed to these conditions without a reciprocal American commitment with regard to its security against India. However, till the early 1960s America did consider maintaining some sort of military balance in South Asia. According to Ayub Khan (1962), Kennedy had assured him that Pakistan's military problems would not be made difficult, and if and when arms aid was given in this region Pakistan would be consulted.

Who was taking whom for a ride? Both the United States and Pakistan were clear about their respective national objectives. However, both winked when they tried to interpret the mutual relationship. Was it unwise and immoral for Pakistan to enter into a strategic relationship with the United States? With a backward industrial base and, according to Chester Bowles, 'split into two halves and divided by 1,000 miles of Indian territory' entering into US sponsored military alliances was a good stop gap measure, a breathing space till the country became

self-reliant. Even India, six times larger than Pakistan, while remaining non-aligned, did not mind receiving significant military and economic assistance from the United States during the same period. So far this makes sense. However, expecting the United States to take Pakistan's side in Indo-Pakistan territorial disputes, was living in a Cuckoo World. America would never support Pakistan at the risk of alienating India.

The Kashmir dispute notwithstanding, the United States did come to Pakistan's help in resolving, to a large extent, its dispute with India over water sharing of the Indus River Basin. In 1951, David Lilienthal, former chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority and a former chairman of the US Atomic Energy Commission, suggested that India and Pakistan work out a programme jointly to develop and operate the Indus Basin river system upon which both nations were dependent for irrigation water. Inspired by this idea, the World Bank brokered the Indus Basin Treaty between the two countries. The World Bank, however, felt that an ideal approach to joint development of an integrated plan for the Indus Basin as proposed by David Lilienthal was impossible. The treaty thus allocated the three Eastern rivers (Ravi-Beas, Sutlej) to India and the three Western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) largely to Pakistan. It permitted India to draw water from the Western rivers for irrigation of 642,000 Acres that existed on the date of the treaty and in addition an entitlement to irrigate an Irrigated Cropped Area (ICA) of 701,000 acres. Under the World Bank plan, Pakistan was helped to construct barrages and canals to divert the Western river waters to compensate the loss of Eastern rivers on the Pakistani side.

Pakistanis keep lamenting about America's totally indifferent stance towards Pakistan during the 65 and 71 wars. Pakistan joined the US sponsored Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1955. Indo-US strategic cooperation started in 1956 (before China formally annexed Tibet in 1959) when the CIA established a base camp at Kalimpong, near India's border with Tibet, to recruit Tibetan guerrillas to fight Chinese troops. Soon thereafter the CIA trained militias in the eastern Kham region started fighting the Chinese.

Similarly, after the 1962 Sino-India border war, when Non-Aligned India was caught in the no man's land, the United States and Britain provided India \$ 120 million worth of military aid. The programme included a variety of military equipment, but its central feature was the raising of six Indian mountain divisions (Bhutto, 1969). So during the Cold war period, both India and Pakistan had been milking Uncle Sam. It has been stated earlier that the 1962 Sino-Indian War

provided the United States an opportunity to increase American influence over India without coercing the latter into a formal and declared pact.

It is worthwhile to mention here that in October 1965, a few days after the cease-fire between India and Pakistan, the CIA, with logistics support from India's Intelligence Bureau, planted a nuclear powered remote sensing device atop the 25,645 foot mountain feature Nanda Devi, located in India's Uttarkhand state. Soon thereafter, another device was planted by the Americans on Nanda Kot, a nearby feature. Both the devices were planted to spy on China's long- range ballistic missile programme. Such was the extent of the US- India strategic relationship during the period Pakistan had been touted as America's "most allied ally". For details see Chapter V.

Accepting the Status Quo

After the First Kashmir War, subsequent Pakistani governments did try to find an amicable solution to the problem which suited both the countries. Noteworthy were the efforts made by Ayub Khan. According to Noorani (2010), Ayub Khan was of the view that all the three parties to the question of Kashmir: India, Pakistan and the people of Kashmir, must be satisfied. On 30th June , 1960, during a meeting with the Jan Sangh's Raghu Vira, MP, Ayub Khan conveyed that he no longer insisted on a plebiscite, but sought any "mutually acceptable" way that would "save the face" of both sides. An integrative bargaining approach, creating a win-win situation for both the sides, would have opened a profitable market in Pakistan for Kashmiri goods while tourism in Kashmir could be opened to Pakistanis. In response, Nehru offered to maintain the status quo, something that Pakistan already had. Nehru also criticized Pakistan for settling its boundary with China by accepting China's view that this boundary had never been delimited and demarcated in history and Pakistan's willingness to demarcate it now. Noorani wraps up the discussion by commenting:

India wants to exact Pakistan's acknowledgement of the intrinsic power relationship between the two countries, a relationship that tilts towards India because of its size, population, and GDP.

First Blood

Some years after the First Kashmir War, air forces of both the countries started violating each other's airspace by sending aircraft on photo reconnaissance missions. PAF B-57s had been going on such missions deep into Indian airspace as far as Agra, but always escaped. Indians were not that lucky. IAF's earlier incursions had been shallow, allowing the intruders to escape into the safety of their own airspace before PAF interceptors could close in for an engagement. This, coupled with the inadequacy of PAF's obsolete radar cover, emboldened the Indians to take advantage of the festive mood on an Eid-ul-Fitr holiday by making a deep reconnaissance foray into Pakistan. On 10th April 1959, an IAF Canberra photo reconnaissance aircraft sneaked into Pakistan's airspace to photograph sensitive installations.

The intruding Canberra was detected by a radar unit deployed at Wagowal, an abandoned airstrip near Sargodha. The WW II vintage Type 15 mobile radar was hooked up to a makeshift Sector Operations Centre (SOC) located in the Tiwana House in Sargodha cantonment. Pilot Officer Rab Nawaz, the duty air defence controller in the operations cabin, succeeded in manoeuvring the two hunting Sabres into visual contact with the bogey, whose contrails no doubt played an important part in this interception.

When the chasing Sabres were at 41,000 ft, the trails could be identified as a single Canberra flying at a steady northerly heading, clearly oblivious of any threat to it. Overhead Gujrat, it appeared to be at about 50,000 ft. The Sabre leader called for clearance to shoot and, for a moment, Rab Nawaz debated whether to go through the full standard procedure for obtaining permission. But that would very likely cause enough delay to allow the positively identified Canberra to slip away - such a close encounter may not occur again in a long time. Rab Nawaz quickly proceeded to clear the Sabres to shoot.

Presently, the Canberra turned right and then, as if he had seen the Sabres, quickly reversed. On that side, he must have spotted the leader, for he seemed to panic and tightened his turn, which of course caused him to lose height rapidly. Flight Lieutenant Yunus saw his chance and put a bead on the Canberra's right engine - immediately he could see his bullets impacting on the bogey's engine. The doomed

Canberra whipped into a spiral and subsequently hit the impact point.

As Yunus approached Peshawar, according to his own account later, he was sorely tempted to do a victory roll over the base, and barely resisted the temptation - this may have been providential because two sorties later this aircraft had an aileron-jam malfunction which the pilot overcame only in the nick of time to avoid a crash. Both the crew of Canberra were found, relatively unharmed, by a ground party and after the usual interrogation and a written apology returned to India (Hali, 2000).

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IV

BREAKING INERTIA

The first Kashmir war did not end in a decisive solution for either of the contestants. Pakistanis felt frustrated and bitter while their leadership tried to hide behind the United Nations resolutions and similar excuses. On the other hand, Nehru, the man who had promoted himself as a person, symbolizing India, was generally content with what India had grabbed. For now, he appeared sated like a cat after it has polished off the mouse. For him, Pakistan held Kashmir could wait for another day. The Indian leadership, however, occasionally made noises about recovering the chunks of Kashmir India had lost to Pakistan.

Sajjad Hyder, a senior Pakistani diplomat, told of a meeting with Nehru during which the former tried to discuss Kashmir. Nehru started looking out the window. After a few moments of silence Nehru got up and said : “Let me show you the roses in prime minister’s house”. Then taking Hyder by the arm Nehru led him towards the main gate where he showed him freshly cultivated roses. Having done that, Hyder was seen off. Similarly, President Kennedy once remarked that whenever he tried to talk to Nehru about Kashmir the latter would lower his glance and start looking at his shoes (Bhutto, 1969). It is stupid to talk to the other side about regaining the territory you have lost in the war. However, short of bleating, Pakistan’s leaders and bureaucrats did nothing to seriously untangle the problem. Nevertheless, Jammu & Kashmir dispute (“issue” to the Indians) refused to die. It lingered on as a dysfunctional conflict, breeding frustrations and creating an overall hostile environment in the Subcontinent. The problem with a dysfunctional conflict is that it creates inertia which sometimes needs to be broken through negative and violent means.

Breaking the inertia was the main motive for Pakistan to move forward, hence the 65 War. There are many theories about the causes of this war. The boilerplate explanation by the Pakistani leadership is the refusal by India to grant the right of self-determination to the Kashmiris. According to the proponents of this theory the Valley was simmering with unrest due to the inept Kashmiri leadership, high-handedness of the occupation administration, and perhaps because Indian leadership was contemplating on withdrawing the special status accorded to the state under the Indian constitution. According to the Indian version, Pakistan Army, having received military aid from the United States during the Cold War, and encouraged by India’s defeat in the 1962 Sino-India border war, was longing for a showdown with India. Some Pakistani theorists point out to the growing

frustration and resentment when the people started getting fed up with Ayub Khan, particularly after his controversial success in the 1964 general elections. Ayub Khan was losing his grip on power as new power centres were emerging (Bhutto, the army itself, and Bengali autonomists). During the twilight years of his rule (1964-68) Ayub Khan did not entirely control the decision- making process in Pakistan.

Whatever the reason, Ayub Khan, unwittingly or in cohort with at least two power centres (Bhutto and some of the generals) took steps to break the inertia. There should be nothing to apologize about this and start a blame game. However, Ayub started a war without proper planning and with faulty appreciation. Presumably, Ayub based his calculations on two premises 1) a contrived insurgency will result in a major revolt against the Indian occupation. 2) The operations will remain localized to the disputed state. Bhutto's opponents accuse him of misguiding Ayub regarding the second premise. This does not, however, exonerate Ayub from his responsibility.

The mindset of Pakistani civil and military leadership on hostilities remaining localized to Jammu & Kashmir reminds one as if we are still living in the eighteenth century, the age of the limited wars of the absolute kings. At the siege of Pizzighetone, in 1798, we are offered a glimpse of the concept of limited war:

“ A bridge thrown over the breach afforded a communication between the besiegers and the besieged: tables were spread in every quarter, and the officers entertained one another by turns: within and without, under tents and arbours, there was nothing but balls, entertainments and concerts. All the people of the environs flocked there on foot, on horseback, and in carriages: provisions arrived from every quarter, abundance was seen in a moment, and there was no want of stage doctors and tumblers. It was a charming fair, a delightful rendezvous”. (Memoirs of Goldoni, trans. John Black, 1814), vol I, p.207.

Escalation


Rann of Kutch, comprising an area of 30,000 square kilometers, is a seasonal salt marshland located between the Indian state of Gujarat and the southern tip of Pakistan's Sindh province. Due to its marshy nature the area was not regularly patrolled on the Pakistani side. In 1951, Sind Police Rangers (Later renamed Indus Rangers) established a few posts along a track approximately 15 kilometers south of track Rahimki Bazaar - Nohar Varo-Nagar Parkar (the so- called Customs

Track). In 1953, in pursuit of economy of force (an excuse for dodging responsibility and doing nothing), even these posts were abandoned and the Rangers withdrew to the Customs Track. Indians were quick to encroach and establish their claim. On night 24th /25th February, 1953 a company of Indian Reserve Police (predecessor to the Border Security Force) occupied Chadd Bed, a strip of semi-marshland located on Pakistan's side of the northern Rann. Customary noises were raised by the Pakistani mandarins while the leaders on both the sides tried to discuss the dispute (Nehru- Noon, 1958; Lt Gen Sheikh-Swaran Singh, 1960). Thereafter there was a long period of hibernation. In January 1965 the Indians woke up from their slumber, reinforced the area with approximately two BSF battalions, and their patrols started probing forward towards the Rangers posts located along the Customs Track.

There were accusations and counter accusations by both the sides about border violations. These were followed by attacks on each other's posts. Pakistanis blamed Indians of establishing new posts on their side of the border, particularly the Sardar Post which was established in March 1965 on a high ground located to the south-west of Rahimki Bazaar. The ensuing skirmishes remained localized and, harking back to the era of the limited wars, the two air chiefs agreed on keeping their respective air forces out of the conflict. Pakistan Army, while denying the Indian Army the possession of Rahimki Bazaar Post, captured Biar Bed, a strip of marshland to the south- west of the de facto international border. This was hailed as a great victory for Pakistan. Emboldened by the setback to the Indians, Major General Tikka Khan, GOC 8 Division, outlined a tactical plan called Plan Alpha to capture the northern half of the Rann. However, Ayub Khan did not allow such an offensive. Ayub Khan's critics think he had missed an opportunity to push India further to the south (Ali, 2009; Gauhar, 1993).

In June of 1965, at the behest of the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, both countries agreed to end hostilities and set up a tribunal to resolve the dispute. The clash had not resulted in a major gain for Pakistan. When the tribunal announced its award in 1968, Pakistan was awarded, against its claim of 9,100 square kilometers (3,500 square miles), approximately a marginal area of 910 square kilometers (350 square miles) to the south and east of Rahimki Bazaar including Chadd Bed. Indian claim on the whole of the Rann was rejected. The international boundary in this area was thus roughly delineated along the line that existed in 1953.

Map 4.1



For Ayub Khan the outcome of Rann of Kutch encounter was a victory for the Pakistan Army. This perceived victory made him draw wrong conclusions that the Indian Army would be unable to defend itself against a quick military move in Jammu & Kashmir even as it had failed to counter the Chinese onslaught in 1962. He was mistaken that the situation in the Indian-held Kashmir was ripe for a popular uprising. Ayub Khan also mistakenly concluded that America would come to Pakistan's assistance, even when the latter provoked a war with India. It is

surprising how he failed to register U.S. ambassador Walter Mc Conaughy's stern warning to Pakistan against using U.S. arms in a conflict with India (Gill, 2004).

Prerequisites to a Military Option

How serious was Ayub Khan in opting for a military solution to break the inertia? Such an option implied meeting the following pre-requisites:-

1. Formulating a national policy by identifying and merging the political and military objectives.
2. Neutralizing the pro-India J&K National Conference in IHK and cultivating a parallel pro-plebiscite leadership.
3. Nurturing political awareness in IHK conducive for an uprising in the state.
4. Exploiting the UN resolutions and international opinion to the hilt, wherever they suited Pakistan, without making them the sole instrument of conflict resolution.
5. Identifying the type of war required to achieve the military objectives and training for it.
6. Crafting a comprehensive plan aimed at achieving the military objectives across the Cease-fire Line while holding the enemy along the international border. This required abandoning the limited war mind-set.

Let us see to what extent the decision makers addressed the prerequisites to a military option to unfreeze the Kashmir dispute.

Pakistan's National Policy on Jammu and Kashmir?

Pakistan's national policy regarding Jammu & Kashmir is based on two broad precepts: 1) Kashmir is Pakistan's jugular vein. 2) The future of Jammu & Kashmir should be decided through a UN- sponsored plebiscite. Over the period of time, these precepts have been reduced to clichés. What were, and have remained all along, the thinking patterns of the Pakistani and Indian leadership? According to Nyla Ali Khan (2012):

“Sir Owen Dixon, the United Nations representative for India and Pakistan, noted in 1950 that the Kashmir issue was so tumultuous because Kashmir was not a holistic geographic, economic, or demographic entity but, on the contrary, was an aggregate of diverse territories brought under the rule of one Maharajah. Sir Owen Dixon propounded the trifurcation of the state along communal or regional lines or facilitating the secession of parts of the Jhelum Valley to Pakistan. Despite the bombastic statements and blustering

of the governments of India and Pakistan, the Indian government has all along perceived the inclusion of Pakistani administered Jammu and Kashmir and the Northern Areas in India as unfeasible. Likewise, the government of Pakistan has all along either implicitly or explicitly acknowledged the impracticality of including predominantly Buddhist Ladakh and predominantly Hindu Jammu as part of Pakistan. The coveted area that continues to generate irreconcilable differences between the two governments is the valley of Kashmir. Despite such obstructions, Sir Owen Dixon remained determined to formulate a viable solution to the Kashmir issue and suggested that a plebiscite be held only in the Kashmir valley subsequent to its demilitarization, which would be conducted by an administrative body of United Nations officials. Although, separatist movements have been surfacing and resurfacing in Indian administered Jammu and Kashmir and parts of Pakistani administered Kashmir since the accession of the state to India in 1947, the attempt to create a unitary cultural identity bolstered by nationalist politics has been subverted by regional political forces. The culturally, linguistically, and religiously diverse population of Indian and Pakistani administered Jammu and Kashmir has been unable to reach a consensus on the future of the land and the heterogeneous peoples of the state. The revolutionary act of demanding the right of self-determination and autonomy for Indian administered Jammu & Kashmir has not been able to nurture a unity amongst all regional groups and socioeconomic classes. Due to the regional sentiments that are so well entrenched in the psyche of the people, the attempt to create a unitary identity is still in a volatile stage. The symbols of nationhood in the former princely state, flag, anthem, and constitution, have thus far been unable to forge the process of nationalist self-imagining".

Whereas Pakistani leadership hoped against hope that someday, somehow the Kashmiris will be allowed by India to exercise their right to self-determination as a result of which IHK will become part of Pakistan, short of Quixotic adventurism like the one sponsored in 1947 through the tribal invasion, they had never seriously thought of a military solution. True, the Military Operations Directorate at the General Headquarters had ponderously made and kept updated contingency plans to recover the IHK, these plans were (and are even today) broad guidelines. No effort had been made to mesh these plans with the political strategy (How to transform the general resentment among Kashmiris into a meaningful insurgency? How to exploit the world opinion in favour of a projected Kashmiri uprising? How to deliver, in concert with a fomented Kashmiri revolt, the coup de grace on India? Etc.).

Planning and Preparation

Force Ratios

War plans are based on the threat assessment. Let us have a look at the relative force ratios before the war:

Table 4.1

Pakistan		India		
Infantry Divisions	Armoured Divisions	Pakistan Front	China Front	
7Div	1 Armd Div	7Div	1 Armd Div	2 Mtn 3 Mtn
			2 (I) Armd Bde	
			3(I) Armd Bde	
8 Div	6 Armd Div	10 Div		4 Mtn*
9 Div		9 Div#		5Mtn
10 Div		11 Div		6 Mtn*
11 Div		12 Div		8Mtn
12 Div		14 Div		17 Mtn
14 Div@		15 Div		20Mtn
15 Div		19 Div		23 Mtn*
		25 Div		27 Mtn
		26 Div		39 Mtn
		36 Div		57 Mtn
		54 Div		
Total:8x Inf Div	2xArmdDiv	12x Inf Div	1x ArmdDiv 2x (I) Armd Bde	12x Mtn Div
Combat Power :	13 (Excl 14 Div)	20 (Incl 3x Mtn Div)		

(Rikhye, 2014; Riza, 1984)

*Pulled out from China border to reinforce I and XI Corps

@ In East Pakistan

Indian 9 Infantry Division was based at Ranchi for East Pakistan.

Combat Power Values:

Inf/ Mtn Div – 1

Armd Div - 3

(I) Armd Bde – 2

Combat Power ratio (western front) at the start of the war was 2.3: 1 in India's favour

Another Lavon Affair?

The original plan for the operation code-named Gibraltar may have been prepared by the Pakistan Army as early as the 1950s, but, according to the folklore, was resurrected by Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, GOC 12 Division. During a meeting held in late May 1965 on the directive of Vice Chief of the General Staff (Major General Abid Bilgrami), General Akhtar revealed his plan to Colonel Syed Ghaffar Mehdi, Commander Special Services Group (SSG). The plan called for infiltrating groups of "Mujahideen" comprising regular army troops and irregulars into IHK for contriving a local uprising and unfreezing the issue without provoking a general war (Hali,2012). It was almost going to be a replay of the first Kashmir war. As mentioned earlier, the meeting between the two was arranged by Vice Chief of the General Staff. However, when asked by Mehdi if the Army High Command were on board, Akhtar responded that it was his plan. When asked further when he expected to launch the Mujahideen, Akhtar replied "July, the same year". According to Mehdi, he told Akhtar that the plan was a non-starter, but upon the latter's insistence, Mehdi left behind his three officers whom he had taken along for the meeting with Akhtar and "tasked them to do their best in the remaining four to six weeks". Was Operation Gibraltar Pakistan's Lavon Affair?

The Lavon Affair refers to a failed Israeli covert operation, code named Operation Susannah, conducted in Egypt in the summer of 1954. As part of the false flag operation, a group of Egyptian Jews were recruited by Israeli military intelligence to plant bombs inside Egyptian, American and British-owned civilian targets, cinemas, libraries and American educational centers. The bombs were timed to detonate several hours after closing time. The attacks were to be blamed on the Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian Communists, "unspecified malcontents" or "locals" and "nationalists" with the aim of creating a climate of sufficient violence and instability to induce the British government to retain its occupation troops in Egypt's Suez Canal zone. The operation caused no casualties, except for operative Philip Natanson, when a bomb he was taking to place in a movie theater ignited prematurely in his pocket; for two members of the cell who committed suicide after being captured; and for two operatives who were tried, convicted and executed by Egypt.

The operation ultimately became known as the Lavon Affair after the Israeli defense minister Pinhas Lavon, who was forced to resign as a consequence of the incident. Before Lavon's resignation, the incident had been euphemistically referred to in Israel as the "Unfortunate Affair" or "The Bad Business". After Israel

publicly denied any involvement in the incident for 51 years, the surviving agents were officially honored in 2005 by being awarded certificates of appreciation by the Israeli President Moshe Katzav.

Parallels can be drawn between how Lavon Affair and Operation Gibraltar evolved, except that in the latter case, Pakistan's president, his foreign minister, and army chief also had their fingers in the pie. It is generally believed that the plan was endorsed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the foreign minister. Bhutto had also assured Ayub Khan that fighting would be confined to Jammu & Kashmir and India would not attack across the international border. According to General Muhammad Musa, the Commander-in-Chief:

“.....the concept of sending infiltrators in the Indian held Kashmir, code named ‘Gibraltar’ was the brain-child of the ministry of Foreign Affairs, is the simple truth and nothing but the truth.. After the Government finally decided that deep raids should be launched in Indian-held Kashmir, I directed Commander 12 Division, Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, to prepare a draft plan for the operation, code-named Gibraltar in consultation with GHQ and within the broad concept we had specified. GHQ approved it after making certain changes in it. With the help of sand model, he went over the final plan in Murree before it was put into effect on 7 August, 1965 under our overall control. The Supreme Commander and his Military Secretary were present. He also agreed with it. I was accompanied by the CGS (Major General Malik Sher Bahadur) and the Directors of Military Operations and Intelligence (Brigadiers Gul Hasan and Irshad Ahmed Khan respectively). Broadly the plan envisaged, on a short-term basis, sabotage of military targets, disruptions of communications, etc. and, as a long-term measure, distribution of arms to the people of occupied Kashmir and initiation of a guerrilla movement there with a view to starting an uprising in the valley eventually. The push towards Akhnur was not part of it. However, it was considered as one of the likely operations that we might have to undertake, as we felt our activities would have an escalating effect.”

The mission assigned to the various infiltration groups was warfare in the enemy's rear with a view to creating conditions for an open revolt against the Indian occupation. Within the four to six weeks time frame available one can imagine what sort of training, ground work, coordination with the local Kashmiris and logistics planning would have been done. The total strength of the "Gibraltar Force" was not more than 5,000 to 7,000 men subdivided into nine forces. Operation Gibraltar surprised the Kashmiris more than the Indian Army. Instead of receiving help from the locals, most of the infiltrators were handed over to the Indian Army. Those who were not discovered were in a more pathetic state since rations, ammunition and supplies ran out.

Table 4.2

Name of Force	Area of Operations
Salahudin	Srinagar Valley
Ghaznavi	Mendhar-Rajauri
Tariq	Kargil - Drass
<u>Babur</u>	Nowshera-Sundarbani
Qasim	Bandipura-Sonarwain
Khalid	Qazinag-Naugam
Nusrat	Tithwal-Tangdhar
Sikandar	Gurais
Khilji	Kel-Minimarg

Holding the Enemy

Earlier, we had identified as an essential of military option

"Crafting a comprehensive plan aimed at achieving the military objectives across the Cease-fire Line while holding the enemy along the international border".

This required abandoning the limited war mind- set. Were the Indians going to sit idle? No. They would definitely retaliate by exploiting the weaknesses and gaps in Pakistani defences.

Nothing was done to reinforce the holding troops and plug the gaps in own defences. Alerted by the infiltration attempts and skirmishes with the Mujahideen, from 16th August onwards Indians increased their patrolling along the CFL. In the Kargil sector, Srinagar-Leh road, Indian Army's lifeline to Ladakh, was dominated by the heights held by Pakistan. Indian Army convoys traversing Srinagar – Leh road would frequently come under heavy fire from the Pakistani posts overlooking the road. Indians had the compulsion to keep the CFL as far away from this road as possible. Since 1948 Indians had been nibbling at the heights dominating this vital

road. Despite the constant Indian threat, this sector was thinly held by the scouts. Indians had, therefore, no difficulty in capturing, in late August, some scattered and isolated Pakistani posts (notably Kuru, Laila, and Majnun) in this area.

Between 25th August and 11th September Indians attacked and captured important Pakistani posts in Neelum and Jhelum valleys. It is not easy to capture a dominating feature held by a well-trained defender. Why were Pakistani defences in the area falling like nine pins? Let us try to find out by reading between the lines of the official history.

No. 1 Sector:

The sector (brigades in Azad Kashmir were called sectors till the 71 War) was responsible for Neelum and Jhelum valleys, a front of approximately 80 kilometers (50 miles). It was defended by:

5 Punjab*

9 AK

13 AK

16 AK

23 AK@

*Official history of Pakistan Army (Riza, 1985) tells us that 5 Punjab, the battalion holding Nausehri (42 Km northeast of Muzaffarabad) had moved from Lahore to Muzaffarabad in mid-August. Nausehri was attacked by the Indians on 29th August. The battalion held out.

@On the same day (29th August), General Akhtar had decided to reorganise No. 1 sector. He ordered the brigade commander (Brigadier Khilji) to infiltrate across the CFL and operate behind enemy positions in Tangdhar-Tithwal area. For this purpose, 23 AK was detached to command Khilji Force. Khilji Force comprised:

2AK (moved from Bhimber on 26th August)

23 AK (detached from No.1 Sector)

SSG elements

Elements ex Nusrat Force

No. 1 Sector was thus reconstituted as:

1 Punjab*

5 Punjab

8 AK*

9 AK

13 AK

16 AK


*Two new units (1 Punjab, and 8 AK) were regrouped with No.1 Sector whereas 23 AK was detached to command Khilji Force, leaving its prepared defences to operate behind the enemy lines. This was done despite the fact that, between 26th and 29th August important posts in the Neelam and Jhelum valleys, and the entire Haji Pir Pass were lost to the Indians.

On the day 23 AK was detached from No. 1 Sector (29th August), the situation became so precarious , as one after another post was captured by the Indians, that the Khilji Force was called back and ordered to counter attack some of the lost features.

No. 2 Sector:

The area of responsibility extended from Pir Kanthi (northern shoulder of Haji Pir Bulge) to Battal (south-east of Bandi Abbaspur). In short it was responsible for defending the whole of Haji Pir Bulge.

Map 4.2



The sector comprised

4 AK

6 AK

7 AK

10 AK*

*The official history does not include 10 AK in No.2 Sector's initial order of battle. However, it was very much part of this sector and located at Hillan Shumali (a village close to the CFL near Bandi Abbas Pur). We know this from the account of Lieutenant Lehrasab Khan (later lieutenant general) who was plucked from 1 East Bengal Regiment, his parent unit (at the time located in Kasur) and posted to 10 AK. He was to take part as a Mujahid in 10 AK operations in IHK (Hali, 2012).

On reaching 10 AK rear HQ located at Bandi Abbas Pur (the main body of the battalion had already left for its assigned area behind the enemy lines) Lehrasab was issued, like the other infiltrators, a rucksack, a sten gun, 200 x rounds, a blanket, Rs 5,000/- Indian currency and Rs. 5,000/- Pakistani currency by the officer commanding rear HQ. According to Lehrasab "The mission of the Battalion was "go to Dogi, across Pir Panjal, from Neel Kanth Gali, be on the other side and join the Gibraltar Force already operating in the area" (Hali, 2012).

10 AK was an amalgam of regular troops , local volunteers (mostly porters), and some tribals from Dir. Lehrasab also mentions that handpicked individuals from the battalion had already been sent ahead along with Nusrat Force, which was tasked to prepare the ground for the insurgency. The deficiency was made up by Mujahids who were given 8 weeks "rigorous" training and wore dark green shalwar kameez and PT shoes (to facilitate easy recognition by the enemy). This was how the infiltrators were thrown into held Kashmir. Three-four days later most of them had run out of rations and ammunition.

According to Lahrasab the tasking of 10 AK was suddenly changed on 26th August because the Indians had made swift progress towards the Haji Pir Pass and the battalion was asked to abandon the original mission and fall back to help defend own positions. Lahrasab's account is corroborated by the official history, which makes a passing reference that (probably) after the loss of the Haji Pir Pass, Commander No.2 Sector requested reinforcement and was given 10 AK (page 108).

Haji Pir Bulge was attacked by 68 Indian Brigade in a pincer move on 26th August. As the Indians continued their advance, No.2 Sector was reinforced by 20 Punjab.

On 20th August the battalion was engaged in watermanship training in Barakao, 19 kilometers north-east of Rawalpindi. At 1000 hours the same day the battalion received orders to move to Rawalakot (Headquarters No.2 Sector), where it reached at 2000 hours 20th August. Two of its companies were detached to command 6AK and 4AK. Battalion less two companies, after hopping up from one place to another, finally reached Sankh feature (a spur about 8 Km west of Haji Pir) on 29th August. Sankh was attacked and captured by the Indians on 30th August.

So during Operation Gibraltar whole infantry battalions were pulled out from their defensive positions by bleeding the holding brigades (Sectors) to beef up the infiltration forces. Some of the units were hastily moved into the area from their peacetime locations. When the Indians retaliated by attacking Pakistani posts all along the CFL, the infiltrating units were recalled and asked to counter attack. There was little time for preparation. In the confusion of battle, companies lost contact with each other and with their battalion headquarters. This was the state of planning to liberate Kashmir.

Operation Grand Slam

In order to ease the pressure on 12 Division, which was defending against repeated Indian attacks, and to guard against the threat to the important city of Muzaffarabad, which resulted from the gain by Indian forces of strategic areas like the Hajipir Pass, the Pakistan Army commenced Operation Grand Slam at 0500 hours on 1st September 1965.

Chamb was defended by the Indian 191 Infantry Brigade Group (provisionally under command 15 Division) and a squadron of AMX-13 tanks. The infantry was stretched thin along the border and the AMX-13 tanks, though possessing the same firepower as the Pakistani M47 and M48 Patton tanks, were outnumbered in this sector. For the operation, Major General Akhtar Husain Malik had set up his headquarters at Kharian. Forces under his command were 3x infantry brigades (No. 4 Sector, 10 Brigade, and 102 Brigade), 2x armoured regiments (ex 6 Armoured Division), and Artillery I Corps (Amin, 2000). Against a militarily stronger and larger Pakistani thrust, the Indian forces retreated from their defensive positions.

On the second day of the attack, Major General Akhtar Malik was replaced by GOC 7 Division, Major General Yahya Khan, which delayed the attack by one day. Not only did this decision cause confusion among the Pakistani officer cadre, the delay also permitted the Indians to rush reinforcements to the sector. When the attack recommenced on 3rd September, the Indian forces in the sector were

sufficiently reinforced to hold out for a few more days, but they did not have the strength to launch a counterattack. The Pakistani attack staggered for two more days without any significant gains in territory. To relieve pressure from Chamb and Akhnoor, on night 5th /6th September India attacked Pakistan along the Radcliffe Line. The advance of the Indian Army also threatened to cut across the right flank of the Pakistani attack. Realizing the gravity of the threat, the Pakistani Army stopped its thrust into Kashmir and diverted 7 Division to counter the Indian incursion.

Lahore Sector

Despite intelligence reports that had started trickling in as early as 15th August, clearly indicating that the Indian Army had started operational build up against West Pakistan, GHQ remained in a state of limbo. Even after the capture of Chamb and advance towards Akhnur no precautionary measures were taken due to the Foreign Office assurance that India would not start an all out war. On evening 4th September, referring to the Indian prime minister, All India Radio informed the listeners that the Pakistan Army was moving from Sialkot towards Jammu. Alarmed by the Indian fabrication, at around midnight 4th /5th September GHQ dispatched a signal to the field formations, directing them, in a vague manner, to “take necessary defensive measures”.

At the Lahore front Indian **XI Corps** began its operations by advancing on three axes –15 Division (three infantry brigades and an armour regiment) was to attack Lahore along Amritsar –Lahore axis (Wagah road), 7 Division (three infantry brigades and an armour regiment) to attack Burki along Khalra –Burki axis, and 4 Mountain Division (two mountain brigades and an armour regiment) advancing along Khem Karan- Kasur axis was to capture Kasur.

Facing the Indians along Amritsar-Lahore and Khalra- Burki axes was 10 Division (seven infantry battalions within three infantry brigades, and an armour regiment). Rann of Kutch clash had resulted in the forward deployment of troops along the international border. The official history tells us about troop deployment in early July. The defensive positions were strengthened with barbed wire and mines. In the last week of July, the troops were ordered to completely dismantle the defences and return to barracks. When the Indians attacked, there were no mines or barbed wire.

On persistence from his brigade commanders, GOC 10 Division permitted them to take up defensive positions during night 5th / 6th September, start time midnight. This implied that the troops would not be in position before 0400 hours and defensive positions could not be occupied before 0700 hours, 6th September. Resultantly, infantry battalions, under command armour elements, and line parties

of artillery observers bumped into the attackers while occupying the assigned forward defended localities/ artillery observation posts. None of the twenty odd bridges were prepared for demolition. These were haphazardly blown up belatedly in the face of the stiff enemy pressure. While the advance positions were overrun by the enemy, some elements ex 10 Division continued operating on the east bank of BRB till the cease-fire. All the enemy attacks on forward defended localities were beaten back, mainly by own artillery. The Indian claim that the invading divisions did not attempt to establish a bridgehead anywhere across the BRB Canal has been rejected by Singh and Rikhye (1991). According to these Indian defence analysts:

“Pakistan knows that it prevented the Indian Army from crossing the last defence before Lahore, the BRB (Ichogil) Canal just in time, and saved itself a very major defeat in the process. Much of the credit has deservedly gone to a single company of the 3 Baluch Regiment which held up the Indians for several hours. Only this battalion was in position because the rest of Pakistan 10 Infantry Division had not been alerted as Pakistan did not expect India to cross the international frontier. 10 Division, responsible for the defence of Lahore, was hosting football matches when India’s XI corps made its three pronged attack for Lahore.

But what few know is that the PAF also had a major role in stalling the Indians. But for the PAF, the weak Pakistani defence would have been overwhelmed and the Indian Army would have poured across the BRB Canal and into Lahore.

The lead brigade of Indian 15 Infantry Division was about to throw a bridgehead across the BRB Canal when it was attacked by the F-86s (of No 19 Squadron, sic) that strafed it and other elements of the Division up and down the Grand Trunk Road, throwing the Indians into confusion, delaying the advance, and thus allowing Pakistan’s 10 Division to assume its forward positions, which ended the hope of a quick victory”.

By 22nd September, Indians, while leaning on the water obstacle, had captured two major villages, Burki and Dograi, to the east of BRB.


Kasur Sector

In this sector BRB canal flows along a north-south alignment. Radcliffe Line runs to the east of BRB, almost parallel to the canal up to a place called Ballanwala. From there onward it takes a U- turn that forms the Indian Khem Karan enclave. Next to the enclave, an inverted U-turn forms the Pakistani Sehjra salient. Khem

Karan-Amritsar railway line divides the area between Ballanwala and Khem Karan. Immediately to the east of international border the area of operations was like an inverted horse shoe, its apex pointing towards Pakistan. To the north of the railway line, the area is bounded by Kasur Drain which meanders north-east to south-west between Bhikkiwind and Ballanwala.

To the south of the railway line Rohi Nullah, flowing in a south- easterly direction, finally drains into the Sutlej River. An all-weather road connects Khem Karan with Amritsar through Bhikkiwind. In 1965, Asal Uttar, Valtoha, and Dibbipura formed a major clutch of villages to the east of road Khem Karan – Bhikkiwind. Within the area flow two major canals, Kasur Branch and Sobraon Branch. The entire area can be easily inundated through these canals and their distributaries Cris- crossing its whole length and breadth. In 1965, fields of fire were available maximum up to 1000 meters and were generally restricted by thick vegetation and standing crops. Traffic-ability is poor and, during peacetime armour exercises, Mechanical Transport Officer (MTO) of the armoured regiment is a very busy man.

Map 4.3



Chakravorty (2014)

Here Pakistan's 11 Division (21, 52, and 106 Brigade), with under command 15 Lancers and 32 TDU*. was pitted against Indian 4 Mountain Division (7and 62 Mountain Brigade) with under command Deccan Horse. XI Corps reserve comprised 2 Independent Armoured Brigade (2x armour regiments).

* TDU or Tank Delivery Unit was a euphemism for "armour regiment" to circumvent the ceiling on raising of new armour regiments through U.S funding. These were not tank- destroyer units, as erroneously reported by the Indian authors.

Indians attacked all along the front on night 5th /6th September. Whereas Pakistan's 52 Brigade and 106 Brigade were to defend the Kasur Sector along the BRB canal, 21 Brigade was located at Luliani (northwest of Kasur along Road Lahore-Kasur) and was 11 Division reserve for the counter-attack. Between 5th and 6th September, this brigade was made to zig-zag feverishly from Luliani to Kharian (some 130 km north-east of Lahore), and back to Luliani via Shahdara-Balloki-Raiwind. Someone, somewhere, was losing his nerves.

At around 0500 hours, replicating 10 Division's chaotic response (due mainly to GHQ's fumbling) to the Indian attack in Lahore Sector, 11 Division units hurried up to occupy their defensive positions along the BRB canal just as the Indian offensive was unfurling itself. To the south of Ballanwala, Indian 62 Mountain Brigade (18 Rajputana Rifles, 9 J&K Rifles, and 13 Dogra) supported by squadron ex Deccan Horse captured Sehjra Salient and Rohi Nullah bund. To the north, 7 Mountain Brigade (4 Grenadiers, 7 Grenadiers, and 1/9 Gorkha Rifles), also supported by squadron ex Deccan Horse, failed to capture its assigned objectives – Ballanwala and the bridges to its north.

Fighting went on throughout the day. Counter-attacking all along the front, 11 Division regained balance, threw back the enemy and recovered the area on the far bank of BRB, including Sehjra Salient. During the battles on 6th September, 7 Grenadiers (7 Mountain Brigade) and 13 Dogra (62 Mountain Brigade) suffered such heavy casualties that they ceased to exist as cohesive units. Meanwhile 4 Mountain Division managed to withdraw to general area Asal Uttar. According to Chakravorty (2014):

"The withdrawal took place on September 07, and our troops were able to dig defences and lay mines. The three field companies laid the mines and the areas to the south and west of the defences were flooded. Pakistan allowed the division to prepare its defences methodically by not disturbing it on September 07".

Pakistan's 11 Division could not interfere because it was haltingly attempting to establish a bridgehead across Rohi Nullah.

Employment of Armour

The Armour Array

Table 4.3

<i>Kasur Sector</i>		<i>Sialkot Sector</i>	
Pakistan	India	Pakistan	India
<u>1Armd Div</u> 4 Cavalry 5 Horse 6 Lancers 24 Cavalry 19 Lancers 12 Cavalry (Recce Regt)	<u>2(I)Armd Bde</u> 3 Cavalry 8 Cavalry (Recce Regt) <u>4 Mtn Div</u> Deccan Horse	<u>6 Armd Div</u> 10 Cavalry 11 Cavalry* 22 Cavalry <u>15 Div</u> 33 TDU 25 Cavalry 31 TDU 20 Lancers	<u>1 Armd Div</u> 17 Horse 16 Cavalry 2 Lancers 62 Cavalry 4 Horse <u>14Div</u> Armd Regt? <u>26 Div</u> 18 Cavalry <u>3 (I) Armd Bde @</u> 2x Armd Regt

*Detached to command 7 Division for Operation Grand Slam

@Located in Jammu

The Battles of Asal Uttar

At that time Pakistan's 1 Armoured Division was the only armoured division in the Subcontinent with 3x armoured brigades (3, 4, and 5). Pakistani armour comprised a mix of M-47, M-48, and Chafee (recce regiment) tanks. Facing 1 Armoured Division (4 Cavalry, 5 Horse, 6 Lancers, 24 Cavalry, 19 Lancers, and 12 Cavalry) were Indian 2 Independent Armoured Brigade (3 Cavalry and 8 Cavalry) and 4 Mountain Division (2x mountain brigades and Deccan Horse). As for the infantry complement, 7 FF and 10 FF, were mechanized infantry battalions whereas 1FF was plain infantry. It should be kept in mind that mechanized infantry provides intimate infantry support to tanks. It assaults and clears the enemy defences overrun by tanks. If we assign an infantry division a value of 1, an armoured division a value of 3, and the independent armoured brigade a value of 2, we can calculate the relative combat power in Kasur sector as follows:

Table 4.4

India		Pakistan	
Formation	Cbt Pwr	Formation	Cbt Pwr
2(I)ArmdBde	2	1Armd Div	3
4 Mtn Div	.5*	-	-
Total Cbt Pwr	2.5		3

* Due to attrition caused during 72 hours of battling the 11 Division defences, on 8th September, the effective utilization of 4 Mountain Division was reduced to approximately four infantry battalions (we have not counted Pakistan's 11 Division because it was in the holding role).

Using Lanchester's equation, we square each side's combat power and get 6.25 for India and 9 for Pakistan or a 1.44 to 1 Pakistani superiority in Kasur sector.

Pakistan launched the counter-stroke with its 1 Armoured Division in Khem Karan area. According to the official history (Riza, 1984), 1 Armoured Division "was required to debouch from a bridgehead provided by 11 Division and cut Grand Trunk road in area Jullunder, an advance of approximately 100 miles into India". This aim was beyond the capability of 1 Armoured Division and was probably inserted into the operational instruction for psychological reasons, to raise the flagging morale of own rank and file. The actual motivation for launching the armoured division was to threaten Indian XI Corps left flank with a view to relieving pressure on 10 Division.

Indian war historians prefer to portray Asal Uttar as a monolithic battle where Pakistan's 1 Armoured Division was routed by Indian 4 Mountain Division and 2 Independent Armoured Brigade. In fact, a series of armour battles took place at and around Asal Uttar between 8th and 11th September. The bridgehead on Rohi Nullah was made during night 6th /7th September by 2FF, under command 52 Brigade. This was a holding brigade responsible for defending the area from inclusive road Kasur-Khem Karan to inclusive road Kasur-Ferozepur.


5 Armoured Brigade, the leading brigade, could not be inducted into the bridgehead on the same night because of engineers delay in the construction of the bridge on the nullah. When the bridge finally became operational, the leading tank (6 Lancers) hit the bridge railing and plunged into the nullah, blocking all the traffic across the bridge and delaying the induction of armour into the bridgehead. At about 1800 hours on 7th September, squadron 6 Lancers, followed by company 1 FF, still struggling on the far bank, broke out in an attempt to expand the bridgehead. Being plain infantry, 1 FF did not have mobility compatible with armour. Advancing approximately two miles ahead of the nullah, this force had to withdraw for the night leaguer.

An armoured formation breaking out of the bridgehead is always followed in zone by an infantry formation. At dusk the armour hands over the area up to the line of control (forward edge of the area cleared by the armour) to the follow in zone infantry formation which then establishes its defences along the line against enemy counter- attacks. Normally, the formation establishing the bridgehead also acts as follow in zone infantry after the armour has broken out. With the tasks given to 1 Armoured Division, there should have been an infantry division following in zone. We have seen that, what to talk about follow in zone infantry, in this sector, there was not even enough infantry to establish the bridgehead. Hence, between 8th and 11th September, 1 Armoured Division had been advancing into the enemy

territory, attacking the enemy, and then withdrawing at night due to the absence of infantry to hold ground won by the armour during the day. Talking about mechanized infantry, which followed own armour, it was sufficient only to clear minor enemy opposition. It also reinforced the night leaguer by deploying at its outer perimeter, or getting tucked into the gaps between the tank positions.

We have mentioned that, due to attrition caused during 72 hours of battling the 11 Division defences, the effective utilization of 4 Mountain Division was reduced to approximately four infantry battalions. These, along with the remnants of 7 Grenadiers and 13 Dogra, were now deployed in an all-round defence around Asal Uttar. Deccan Horse was deployed forward, to the southeast of divisional defences. As for 2 Independent Armoured Brigade, 3 Cavalry was deployed south of Dibbipura and west of the divisional gun area. Squadron, ex 8 Cavalry was located at Valtaha. The rest of the regiment was located a few kilometers northwest of Valtaha.

Map 4.4



Chakravorty (2014)

As mentioned earlier, in Phase 1 of the Pakistani offensive, 11 Division had already established a shallow bridgehead of sorts across Rohi Nullah with 2 FF ex 52 Brigade. Later on, the entire brigade was tasked to expand the bridgehead. The D day was delayed from 7th to 8th September due to the damage caused to the bridge on Rohi Nullah. In Phase 2, 1 Armoured Division was to breakout from the bridgehead along three axes: 4 Armoured Brigade to advance along Sobraon

Branch and capture the bridges on Beas. ; 5 Armoured Brigade to advance on road Khem Karan- Bhikkiwind-Amritsar, remaining west of Kasur Branch; 12 Cavalry (recce regiment) to advance along Kasur Branch and secure bridges en route; 3 Armoured Brigade to be in reserve.

Between 8th and 11th September, the brigades of 1 Armoured Division launched a series of attacks against the enemy dug up around Asal Uttar. 5 Armoured Brigade again broke out from the bridgehead at 0700 hours on 8th September. Under cover of artillery fire the advancing tanks moved within 900 meters of the enemy's defended area. At this point, they were engaged by tanks of Deccan Horse. The Pakistani armour broke up into smaller groups and tried to infiltrate the enemy defences by carrying out an outflanking move. The Indians employed their tanks like pillboxes. Utilizing standing crops, the attackers were engaged by Deccan Horse, artillery fire, and tank hunting teams. Suffering heavy losses, Pakistanis retreated. During most of the attacks, the tanks were disabled on the minefields and effectively engaged by artillery, anti-tank weapons, and Indian tanks lying in ambush under cover of sugar cane crops. Wherever they tried to outflank the defender, Pakistani tanks were either bogged down or were channelized by the inundations into killing areas where they were destroyed at leisure. "Do not reinforce a failure" is a constant refrain during the exercises yet this dictum is quite often thrown overboard during an actual war.

By 11th September, having suffered heavy casualties, and with CO 4 Cavalry captured along with many of his officers, 1 Armoured Division had lost its steam. According to Chakravorty (2014) Pakistan lost 97 tanks (including 32 tanks bogged down and captured in running condition) as against Indian losses of 5 tanks. According to Riza (1984), 24 Indian tanks were destroyed between 6th and 10th September, which appears to be a more realistic estimate. Indian tank losses are recorded below:

Table 4.5

Serial	Date	Time	Tanks Destroyed	Remarks
1.	6 Sep	0600 hrs	3	Hit while the Indian tanks started shooting 7 Punjab position at Nathuwala Siphon (52 Brigade area)
2.	7 Sep	1600 hrs	2	Shot up by 6 Lancers while attacking Khem Karan
3.	8 Sep	1030 hrs	5	Deccan Horse tanks shot up by 24 Cavalry
4.	9/10-Sep	Night	3	Destroyed at Asal Uttar
5.	10 Sep		9	Destroyed by 24 Cavalry at Chima
6.	10 Sep	1230 hrs	2	Destroyed by 4 Horse at Kalanjar Uttar
Total			24	

Notwithstanding the alleged superiority of Patton tanks, Pakistani and Indian armour, as discussed earlier, possessed almost equal combat power in Kasur sector. The combat power of Pakistani armour was further degraded by the channelized terrain where Indian armour had transitioned into a defensive posture.


“Why was the armoured division launched in an area unsuitable for armour?”

“Does an armoured division break out through a bridgehead made by one infantry battalion?”

(Reply by the commanding officers when General Hamid, Corps Commander of sorts, asked them on morning 11th September “what went wrong”?)

Sialkot Sector

Map 4.5



This sector is essentially the Ravi-Chenab corridor. Its western boundary is defined by River Chenab which enters Pakistan in the vicinity of Marala, north of Sialkot and, flowing northeast to southwest, cuts Grand Trunk road southwest of Gujrat. The eastern boundary of the corridor is marked by river Ravi. Here, the Radcliffe Line, running roughly parallel to the river, at places decides to cut right through it, creating a number of Pakistani and Indian enclaves on both the sides, notably the Pakistani enclave at Jassar and the adjacent Indian enclave at Dharam. Jassar enclave earned notoriety because of the confusion it created among Pakistan’s top brass during the 1965 Indian offensive in Sialkot sector.

North of Marala the border juts into India like a dagger, forming the so- called Chicken’s Neck. Immediately to the east of Chicken’s Neck the border, south of Jammu, dips into Pakistani territory and creates Charwa salient. Next to it is Pakistan’s Shakargarh salient. Between the two rivers, there are many tributaries of river Chenab flowing along the grain of the ground –from northeast to

southwest. These are in the form of seasonal nullahs which further divide the corridor into mini-corridors that inhibit lateral movement.

A good armour approach emanates from Ramnagar, to the east of Jammu and, passing through the gap between Sialkot and Jassar, traverses the Pakistani villages of Phillora and Chawinda (northeast of Pasrur), due west, hitting the Grand Trunk road in the vicinity of Gujranwala. The Grand Trunk road connects Gujranwala, a major communications hub south of Gujrat, with Lahore in the south and Rawalpindi in the north. Sialkot is the most important communications centre in the corridor which is linked by road with Jammu to the northeast and with important towns located along and in the vicinity of Grand Trunk road.

Following is an edited version of a very fine account of the operations in the Sialkot sector, written by Major Shamshad (2015):

In this sector Pakistan's 15 Division, consisting of four infantry brigades (24,101,104, and 115) and 6 Armoured Division, faced Indian I Corps, comprising 1 Armoured Division, 6 Mountain Division, 14 Division, and 26 Division. Pakistan's 6 Armoured Division was actually 100 Independent Armoured Brigade re-designated as armoured division. It was not a full strength division and consisted of divisional headquarters, two armoured regiments; 10 Cavalry, and 22 Cavalry (11 Cavalry was detached to command 7 division for the Chamb operation), two artillery regiments, two mechanized infantry battalions, and had no brigade headquarters. However, in the Sialkot sector, Pakistan Army also had four armour regiments under command 15 Division; 33 TDU, 25 Cavalry, 31 TDU, and 20 Lancers.

Indian 1 Armoured Division comprised 1 Armoured Brigade (17 Horse, 16 Cavalry and squadron, ex 62 Cavalry), 43 Lorried Brigade (2 Lancers, 62 Cavalry, less squadron, and 2x lorried infantry battalions), and Divisional Reserves (4 Horse and 2x lorried infantry battalions). Besides 1 Armoured Division, India also had the 3 Independent Armoured Brigade (2x armour regiments) located in Jammu, and an armour regiment each under 14 Division and 26 Division. It is said that the main malady with which the Indians suffered was having too much infantry and not knowing how to use it, while the Pakistani problem seems to have been having too many tanks and not knowing how to use them.

Notwithstanding the imbalances in 6 Armoured Division, if we combine its 2x armour regiments with 4x armour regiments under command 15 Division (31 TDU and 33 TDU though had second line tanks), we may roughly assign it the combat power of a fully fledged armoured division, i.e. a combat power value of 3. We also assign a combat power value of 1 to the 15 Division, a total value of 4.

Assigning Indian 1 Armoured Division a value of 3 , 3 independent Armoured Brigade a value of 2, and 6 Mountain Division , 14 Division , and 26 Division a combat value of 1 each, India gets a total combat power value of 8. Responding to the Indian assertion that the Pattons were superior to the Shermans (though the superiority had not been translated into physical gains in Kasur sector), instead of 8, lower the total Indian combat power to 7 (this would also take into account the fact that the Indian armoured division had a lorried brigade and a reserve comprising just one armour regiment with two lorried infantry battalions). Using Lanchester's equation, we square each side's combat power and get 49 for India and 16 for Pakistan or a 3 to 1 Indian superiority in Sialkot sector.

Table 4.6

India		Pakistan	
Formation	Cbt Pwr	Formation	Cbt Pwr
1 Armd Div	3	6 Armd Div:	3
3(I) Armd Bde	2	15 Div	1
6 Mtn Div	1		
14 Div	1		
26 Div	1		
Total Cbt Pwr	8*		4

*Make allowance to India for "superiority" of Patton tanks and lower its combat power to 7

Pakistan's 15 Division had deployed 101 Brigade covering the approach astride road Jammu-Sialkot. Ramnagar-Phillora-Chawinda approach was covered with 24 Brigade. Further east, 115 Brigade was to defend the area along River Ravi, with special emphasis on Jassar Bridge. On 6th September, 6 Armoured Division was in dispersal in Gujranwala-Nandipur area.

The aim of the Indian I Corps was to attack through Sialkot- Jassar approach along axis Ramnagar –Phillora –Chawinda – MR Link with 1 Armoured Division with a view to cut off Grand Trunk road north of Gujranwala and create a wedge between Lahore and Sialkot. For 1 Armoured Division's breakout, the bridgehead, extending to line Bhagowal-Phillorah, was to be secured by 6 Mountain Division (presumably this mountain division was also to follow in zone). The initial objectives of this attack were capturing Phillora-Chawinda-Pagowal areas.

26 Infantry Division (19 Brigade, 162 Brigade, and 168 Brigade) , with under command 18 Cavalry was the fixing force assigned the mission of containing Pakistani forces at Sialkot so that these could not create any problem on the northern flank of 1 Armoured Division's line of advance. The reserve (19 Brigade), it appears, was brought particularly against the Pakistani Marala salient.

The Side Show at Jassar

While the Indian 1 Armoured Division was ambling by east of Jammu, ready to debouch into the Sialkot area, some humour was being created to the east, at the Jassar enclave, by two opposing brigade commanders with equally jumpy nerves. The side show being enacted at Jassar was to grip the Pakistan Army's high command for two days, panicking it to feverishly relocate forces till reality dawned through the fog of war which had barely commenced.

At 0315 hours on night 5th /6th September, Indian artillery shelled the Pakistani 115 Brigade positions on both sides of the Jassar Bridge. Opposing 115 Brigade was Indian 29 Brigade ex 7 Infantry Division. The task assigned to 29 Brigade, originally from 7 Division but now operating in an independent role directly under Headquarters XI Corps, was to capture the Pakistani enclave across the river Ravi. The enclave was considered a potential Pakistani jump off point to threaten Amritsar. The Indians launched their attack at 0400 hours, 6th September and, by 0415 hours, reached the southern end of the Jassar Bridge, a few hundred yards from the border. 115 Brigade launched a counter attack, using tanks, and dislodged the Indians from the southern end of the bridge by 0800 hours the same day. Meanwhile, there was nervousness at Pakistan's 1 Corps Headquarters that the Indian attack was some deception. This prompted the GHQ to order 6 Armoured Division to move from Gujranwala- Nandipur area to Pasrur on night 6th /7th September.

The Indian brigade commander sent exaggerated reports about Pakistani local counter attack to Headquarters XI Corps and requested permission to withdraw. However, the corps headquarters prevailed upon the brigade commander, ordering him to launch another attack on night 6th /7th September. This attack was successful and the Indians recaptured the southern end of the bridge by 0800 hours, 7th September. In response to this development, 115 Brigade immediately blew up a span of the Jassar Bridge. The situation then stabilized; with river Ravi between both the opposing brigades positioned north and south of the river.

At 1130 hours, 7th September, 115 Brigade commander, without confirming, sent a report to 15 Division Headquarters that an enemy infantry battalion had crossed river Ravi and established a lodgment on its northern bank. This alarming report naturally caused grave apprehensions in the Pakistani high command, from 15 Division onwards till GHQ.

15 Division Headquarters dispatched 24 Brigade (defending the Chawinda approach) less one battalion, along with 25 Cavalry (a squadron, according to another account) to help control the situation at Jassar. On reaching Jassar, 25

Cavalry, leading the 24 Brigade's approach march, found that the situation was not as serious as reported by 115 Brigade. The retrieving force thus returned to its original positions by the early hours of 8th September. Meanwhile, 6 Armoured Division which had started moving from Gujranwala-Nandipur to Pasrur, and whose leading elements had already reached Pasrur, was ordered to return to Gujranwala.

The Fixing Force Attack

Indian 26 Division attack commenced two brigades up against the border villages of Niwe Wains, Bajragarhi, etc. from 2330 hours on night 7th /8th September. Both the brigades captured their insignificant objectives. In any case, the troops opposite Sialkot were too weak to interfere with the advance of the Indian attack. The Indians, however, remained obsessed with the defence of Jammu and, on 11th September brought a fourth brigade (52 Mountain Brigade).

The Main Attack

At 0600 hours, 8th September, Indian 1 Armoured Division broke out from the bridgehead established by 6 Mountain Division in general area Charwa. At about the same time, Pakistan's 24 Brigade, which had just returned to Pasrur from Jassar, received information that 3 FF, which was left at Charwa and deployed as a screen, was overrun by the leading brigades of 6 Mountain Division (69 Brigade and 99 Brigade). Commander 24 Brigade had no idea of the quantum of the troops opposite him. Knowing little about tank warfare, he asked CO 25 Cavalry to do something.

CO 25 Cavalry sent one of his squadrons to advance in line abreast formation towards Charwa, the reported point of enemy breakthrough. Meanwhile, he also alerted the remaining two squadrons to move towards Chawinda. By 1200 hours the whole of 25 Cavalry was deployed three squadrons up in line abreast formation opposite 1 Armoured Brigade leading the advance of Indian 1 Armoured Division. 1 Armoured Brigade was advancing two regiments up, with an inter-regiment gap of 3500 to 4000 meters. Each regiment was advancing one squadron up. Both the tank regiments had a clean run during the first 15 kilometers (6-7 kilometers according to Harbaksh Singh, sic) of their advance inside Pakistan. According to the Indian accounts, PAF attacked the leading Indian armour regiments at about 0840 hours at Chobara but was unable to hit any tank. 25 Cavalry tanks came in contact with Indian 16 Light Cavalry tanks, without a clue that they were up against Indian 1 Armoured Division.

A confused firefight followed in which both sides lost tanks. Both the Indian leading tank troop leaders were killed, thus leaving the leading squadron commander of 16 Light Cavalry clueless. CO 16 Light Cavalry tried to bring up another squadron, to outflank the Pakistani position in front from the east. Finally, the second squadron was also held up, having lost its squadron commander and unable to manoeuvre due to limited visibility and lack of manoeuvring space. As per General Gurcharan Singh, once the second squadron was held up, CO 16 Light Cavalry passed “exaggerated” reports to 1 Armoured Brigade commander, who in turn ordered 16 Light Cavalry not to advance any further.

In brief, 16 Light Cavalry’s advance was checked at Gadgor by 1000 hours, 8th September. 17 Poona Horse, which was advancing on the left towards Tharoah, commenced its advance two squadrons up, but soon changed to one squadron up because of the limited fields of fire and observation which made command and control extremely difficult. It came in contact with 25 Cavalry at 0945 hours in Tharoah area and was also checked like 16 Light Cavalry. According to Gurcharan Singh, some firing took place in between tanks of 16 Light Cavalry and 17 Poona Horse. This happened because the inter- regiment gap between both the regiments was too less.

C Squadron, 62 Cavalry, which was tasked to provide flank protection to 1 Armoured Division’s advance, was delayed as its tanks got bogged down while inside Indian territory. When half of this squadron finally got going and crossed the border at 1000 hours, by misunderstanding it crossed the Degh Nala and reached Zafarwal in Pakistani territory absolutely unopposed, and later re-crossed the Degh Nala. Once this squadron was re-crossing Degh Nala, it was engaged by an Indian artillery battery providing fire support to 1 Armoured Brigade, which, seeing it approach from south of Degh Nala, naturally mistook it for Pakistani tanks. In turn, this squadron also opened fire on the Indian battery which they thought to be a Pakistani battery, destroying many guns and vehicles.

By 1300 hours, commander 1 Armoured Brigade reached the conclusion that he was held up by at least two Patton regiments and that there was no possibility of advancing direct towards Phillora without suffering unacceptable losses. He was further unnerved by reports of a ‘raid’ by enemy tanks on artillery guns and soft vehicles (which, in reality, was the firing between 62 Cavalry tanks re-crossing Degh Nadi, and own artillery battery). He concluded that his line of communication was not secure and decided to adopt a defensive posture for the security of his command. At 1400 hours he issued orders for withdrawing the brigade into a box around Sabzpir crossroads. All this was happening when there was just 25 Cavalry in front of 1 Armoured Division.

It may be noted that 43 Lorried Brigade advance on the other axis also went disastrously , less due to the enemy opposition and more due to poor and inefficient execution. 43 Lorried Brigade led by 2 Lancers reached Sabzpir cross roads at 1530 hours, where tanks of 1 Armoured Brigade opened fire on them, mistaking them for Pakistani tanks. Thus 12 Lorried Brigade also harboured at Sabzpir crossroads.

Major General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu (1994) wrote:

‘The first day’s battle could not have got off to a worst start. The armoured brigade had been blocked by two squadrons of Pattons and in the first encounter the brigade had lost more tanks than the enemy had.... Whole of Icorps had gained a few kilometers... The worst consequence of the day’s battle was its paralyzing effect on the minds of the higher commanders. It took them another 48 hours to contemplate the next offensive move. This interval gave the Pakistanis time to move up and deploy their 6 Armoured Division with five additional armoured regiments. In fact the golden opportunity that fate had offered to the 1st Armoured Division to make worthwhile gains had been irretrievably lost’.

Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh (2012) also accurately summed up the Indian failure:

‘both 16 Cavalry and 17 Horse failed to determine the strength of the opposing armour and displayed little skill in out manoeuvring it... the Brigade Commander made the unfortunate decision to withdraw 17 Horse from Tharoah for countering an alleged serious tank threat on the Left flank. This was a grave error of judgment as 4 Horse which by this time had been released to the Brigade by GOC 1 Armoured Division, could have been used to meet any flank threat posed by the enemy armour. The blunder cost us dearly. We made an advance of only four miles beyond the bridgehead when a much deeper penetration could have been achieved. The fleeting chance that could have been exploited to gain a striking success, was lost forever.... and while we were fumbling about ineffectively in a chaotic situation of our own creation, the enemy had that vital breathing space so essential for a quick rally round from the stunning impact of surprise. We courted a serious setback through faulty decision and immature handling of armour which the enemy was not slow to exploit. From now onwards, the thrust intended to keep the enemy off balance and reeling until the final blow by sheer speed of advance, turned into a slow slogging match—a series of battering-ram actions’.

After 9th September when the Pakistani 6 Armoured Division , and later the 1 Armoured Division , beefed up Pakistani strength, it was no longer a question of valour or superior generalship, but simple, unimaginative frontal battle with both sides having an equal number of tanks.

Rajasthan Sector

During the second week of September, Indian Army attacked and captured Gadra Post in the Rajasthan sector. The Indian move was aimed at drawing the Pakistani forces to the south to relieve the pressure on the Indian Army in Punjab. In a counterattack, Pakistan Army recaptured Gadra post. It also captured Munabao railway station and while progressing ahead, the Kishangarh Fort.

Air and Naval Battles

Shukla (2014,2016) wrote:

To set the stage, the PAF in 1965 was a well-trained, American supplied air force of 17 squadrons (12-16 aircraft per squadron), which included a squadron of F-104 Star fighters, then the most formidable fighter in Asia; eight squadrons of F-86 Sabres; two squadrons of highly regarded B-57 bombers; and a high-altitude reconnaissance squadron of RB-57, including the secret RB-57F photo-recce aircraft that flew at 70,000 feet, beyond the reach of Indian fighters and anti-aircraft weapons. The PAF imaginatively used its two squadrons of light trainers for reconnaissance and ground attack.

The IAF, in contrast, had 48 squadrons, almost thrice the PAF's strength, although six Vampire and three Toofani fighter squadrons were clearly obsolescent. Furthermore, India retained a number of squadrons in the east to guard against China. With Indian quantity offset by PAF quality, the decks were evenly stacked.

On September 6,1965,The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) launched its first major air attacks into India. Ranging freely across the border, PAF fighters attacked multiple Indian Air Force (IAF) bases, destroying (according to Indian accounts) ten Indian fighters on the ground in Pathankot, damaging another three, and downing two IAF fighters protecting Halwara air base. The next day, another 12 Indian fighters were destroyed on the ground in

Kalaikunda air base, in West Bengal. The IAF remained on the back foot for the rest of the 1965 war.

We have mentioned earlier how, as reported by Singh and Rikhye (1991), on 6th September PAF No. 19 Squadron had prevented Indian 15 Division's leading brigade from establishing a bridgehead across BRB Canal, delaying the Indian advance and allowing Pakistan's 10 Division to occupy forward positions in the face of the enemy onslaught. According to the same authors, other PAF missions, which deserve special mention were: 1) PAF's successful defence of Sargodha on 7th September; 2) No. 14 Squadron's attacks on Kalaikunda on 7th September, destroying numerous Canberras lined up on the tarmac; 3) No.19 Squadron's raid on Pathankot in which IAF MiG 21's, Gnats, and Mysteres were caught off guard on the ground; 4) No. 4 Squadron's ill-fated strike over Halwara 6th September which ended in the loss of Squadron Leader Rafiqui but had far reaching consequences.

The only significant naval operation during the war was the Pakistan Navy's raid on Dwarka, 200 miles east of Karachi. This raid was more of a symbolic nature. However, it was significant in the sense that the smaller Pakistan Navy challenged its more powerful rival and demonstrated its sea control ability, at least in the Arabian Sea. The Indian Navy's throwing down the Pakistani challenge when at least one Indian frigate, INS Talwar, was in the vicinity, was enigmatic and the excuse that the Indian government had restrained its navy from operating west of Porbandar is superfluous.

A more valid explanation of the Indian Navy's mute response to Dwarka raid may be the threat posed by the Pakistani submarine Ghazi due to which most of the Indian Navy's western fleet, including the aircraft carrier Vikrant, was bottled up in Bombay port, ostensibly for retrofitting. This brings out an important conclusion that an aircraft carrier, without a potent on board air complement, instead of projecting sea power, is a sitting duck. Unlike the Pakistanis, the Indian military leaders are over cautious and do not take the plunge unless they are 100% sure of their success. The Indian Navy was not confident about the capabilities of Sea Hawk ground attack aircraft and Breguet Alize ASW aircraft on board Vikrant. Had the Indian Navy taken the risk, the Sea Hawk and Alize duo could have reduced Pakistan Navy's sea denial and limited sea control capabilities. After all, Sea Hawk had performed well during the Suez Crisis. Sea Hawk was sub-sonic, but so was Sabre, PAF's workhorse during 65 and 71 wars.

To sum up, Pakistan fought the 1965 War against India in a cavalier manner, based on a simplistic assumption that the war would remain confined to Jammu & Kashmir. As a total war with India had not been factored in the Pakistani war planning, panic ensued when India attacked across the international border, and the strategic reserves were prematurely committed. With 1 Armoured Division bogged down in Kasur sector, a stalemate in the Sialkot sector, and an American embargo clamped down on the Subcontinent, Pakistani leadership accused the United States of betraying an ally. That was the time when the Indian Chief of Army Staff came to Pakistan's help by telling his prime minister that the Indian Army had pooped up its ammunition and could not fight any longer.

Analysis

The Mindset

- The limited war scenario, as fancied by the Foreign Office, some generals, AyubKhan, and his army chief (in that order), proved wishful thinking. In case they were intent upon a military solution, the operational strategy should have, as pointed out earlier, hinged upon fostering, incubating and abetting an insurgency in the Valley for at least one year. We should have fully expected a backlash by India and, to counter it, maintained a defensive posture all along the CFL , the Working Boundary, and the Radcliffe Line, while holding the strategic defensive balance with 1 Armoured Division , 6 Armoured Division, and 9 Division.
- However, we started the war in the Valley and then reacted to the enemy's moves. India responded to Operation Gibraltar by occupying the heights in the Kargil sector, Neelam Valley, and the Haji Pir Bulge. Pakistan reacted with Operation Grand Slam in Chamb sector. India responded by attacking along the Radcliffe Line, and we lost our nerve. Many ifs and buts would be raised on the practicability of the suggested operational strategy. But given Pakistan's resources, war stamina, and its capability to garner international support, this was a better option as compared with the headstrong approach which was followed and which recoiled, to the utter embarrassment of those concerned.

Aims & Objectives

- The Indians claim that during the 1965 War they stopped short of Lahore because, by their own admission, they did not want to get embroiled with Pakistan Army and para-military forces in the city and its environs. But then you do not attack with a superior force, yet avoid suffering casualties. General Chaudhuri claimed that during the war Indian Army's aim was to destroy Pakistan's war machine instead of capturing territory. We know that Chaudhuri was giving a lame excuse because the destruction of enemy forces and equipment requires superiority in the air, armour, and artillery. IAF possessed more aircraft than PAF but failed to translate this superiority in the air. It was because, according to Shukla (2014), PAF's qualitative edge and superior training evenly matched IAF's numerical superiority. Indian armour was quantitatively and, to some extent, qualitatively inferior to Pakistani armour, and during the war only Pakistan had 155 mm heavy artillery. Yes, India had more infantry formations and we know that infantry is essentially employed not to destroy the enemy but to capture and hold ground.
- The Indians always come up with the excuse that, had the 1965 war been allowed to prolong for, say, another two weeks, Pakistan Army would have been defeated. They give the same excuse in case of the first Kashmir war. That both these wars ended in a stalemate was not due to India's magnanimity or improper appreciation by their civil and military leadership. Nor were they pressurized by the external powers. It was because, like Pakistan, their military machine had also lost its steam. Shastri had asked General Chaudhuri if he could continue the war for some more time. It was Chaudhuri, who buckled.
- The three weeks of fighting had resulted in a stalemate in both Ravi – Chenab and Ravi-Sutlej corridors. Pakistan had made a shallow penetration in Kasur sector, whereas the Indians had made gains in the Sialkot sector. In both these sectors, the new defensive lines were not based on any formidable obstacle, which means that the fighting stopped only when both the sides were exhausted. If we go by the logic that the Indian juggernaut, due to its sheer weight, would have rolled down the numerically inferior Pakistani forces in due course of time, this was not evident during those three weeks of fighting. Advancing through the Ravi-Chenab corridor, the Indians could not even contact the Grand Trunk road. And this happened when the Pakistan Army had stumbled into the war without any serious preparation.

- The Pakistani leaders approached the military option to recover J&K in a lukewarm manner. So, were they serious about a peaceful resolution of the problem? They were not because this entails give and take to which both Pakistan and India are averse. During the last 70 years, different approaches and governance models have been presented at various forums to address J&K imbroglio. Pakistan has forwarded the Chenab formula which has been countered by India with the Neelum formula. Then there was the Trieste model. All these formulas and models have failed because both the sides have used them as a ploy for foot-dragging.

Planning & Preparation

- Earlier, we had identified “crafting a comprehensive plan aimed at achieving the military objectives across the Cease-fire Line while holding the enemy along the Radcliffe Line (international border)” as one of the prerequisites for effectively de-freezing the Kashmir dispute. It seems Pakistan’s military planners were in an undue hurry to wage a war in Kashmir. They were confusing commando operations with guerrilla warfare. Had they given at least a year for incubating and maturing the insurgency in J&K through the creation of sleeper cells, tied up the loose ends by not succumbing to bleeding 12 Division for cobbling together the infiltration force, and factored India’s likely response along the international border, better results could have been achieved. Pakistan might not have recovered the whole of Indian-held Kashmir, but the offensive in Chamb would not have faltered the way it did. Ayub Khan, looking for quick fixes, played a gamble in which he miserably lost.
- The above-mentioned strategy would not be effective without the creation of a nimble but effective command infrastructure and logistics support network in the Valley. Combined teams comprising the locals, irregulars, and the Army, divided into small groups should have been created. Each team would be self-sufficient and armed with small arms, rocket launchers, heavy mortars, with further supplies hidden in the forests, tunnels, and mountain crevices. Such teams would have unrestrained freedom of action, facilitating quicker (relative to mountainous terrain) regrouping and response rate.
- By the end of the three weeks fighting, both sides were running low on ammunition. Pakistan was in worse shape because it started with only two

weeks general service reserves. However, Chinese small arms and ammunition had started coming in by air. Heavy arms and artillery ammunition were being shipped. Coming back to their dependence on borrowed power, once they bungled up on the battlefield due to their own naiveté and ineptitude, the Pakistani leaders started blaming the US for clamping an arms embargo. They should have known better and should not have waged the war if they were not confident of concluding it within the resources available. A then, the same ritual of raving and ranting before the Wailing Wall of the United Nations.

Force Ratios

- The United States made sure that the military assistance it was providing to Pakistan did not tilt the balance against India. In 1965, on the western border Pakistan had seven infantry divisions (14 Division was in East Pakistan) and two armoured divisions against India's twelve infantry divisions and one armoured division. However, India also had twelve mountain divisions deployed against China from where they pulled out three divisions (4 Mtn, 6 Mtn, and 23 Mtn) to beef up XI Corps and I Corps respectively. So actually there were 15x Indian infantry divisions arrayed against Pakistan's seven infantry divisions, a force ratio of 2.1:1.
- Northern Area Scouts were responsible for defending the area from Point NJ9842 in the extreme north to excluding Neelum Valley. They were supposed to fend for themselves, without heavy weapons and artillery support. The Indian Army exploited Pakistan's weakness in this sector and captured the commanding heights overlooking Kargil.
- From Neelum Valley inclusive in the north to Munawar down south the area was held by Azad Kashmir Regular Forces under 12 Division. AK units were a bottom priority in scales and quality of equipment. In map exercises, during peace time, the paramilitary forces and police were equated with regular troops. In deployment along the CFL there was an unhealthy mixture of regular and non-regular elements, right down to platoon and section levels.
- 15 Division, 10 Division, 11 Division, and 8 Division were the holding formations defending Sialkot, Lahore, Kasur, and Sindh sectors respectively. Before India attacked along the international border, 7 Division was already committed in Operation Grand Slam. What was left as strategic defensive balance? The two armoured divisions and 9 Division. Since an Indian response across the international border was not considered, the strategic reserves had to be committed prematurely.

- There should have been one infantry division following in zone each armoured division. Then there was a serious deficiency in command organization. While 11 Division and 1 Armoured Division were operating side by side, there was no corps HQ to control operations of the two divisions.
- Even then, it was not an impossible option if Pakistan's decision makers had wanted to solve the Kashmir problem militarily. As mentioned earlier, there were 15x Indian infantry divisions arrayed against Pakistan's seven infantry divisions, a force ratio of 2.1:1 in India's favour. However, let us not be misled by bland statistics. Pakistan possessed a superiority of 1.41 in combat power to India's 1 in Kasur sector, but its 1 Armoured division was defeated. On the other hand, India had 3:1 superiority in combat power in the Silakot sector. However, Indian offensive in this sector failed to achieve its objectives. Army leadership of both the countries did not know how to exploit their respective superiority in armour and infantry.
- The offensive at Chamb did not fritter away so much due to change in command than the fact that 7 Division had to be diverted when Indian XI Corps attacked Lahore and Sialkot.

Employment of Armour

- It is difficult to calculate the force ratio between armour, mainly because of the disparity in quality of tanks. A comparison between the characteristics of the tanks employed by both India and Pakistan is given below:

Table 4.7

Characteristics	Centurion	M47 Patton	M48 Patton	M4 Sherman	M24 Chafee	AMX-13
Main Armament	105 mm	90 mm	90 mm	75/76mm	75 mm	75mm
Secondary Armament	.30 cal Browning	2x .50 cal MG 1x .30 cal MG	2x .50 cal MG 1x .30 cal MG	1x.50 cal Browning 2x.30 cal Browning	1x.50 cal Browning 2x.30 cal Browning	7.5mm Coaxial MG 7.62 mm AAMG 2x Smk Gren Dischargers
Armour Protection	152 mm	101 mm	120 mm	93 mm -118 mm	15-38mm	10-40 mm
Weight	56 tons	44.1 ton	45 ton	30.3 ton	18.4 ton	14.5 ton
Power/weight r	13hp/ton	17.6 hp/ton	15.1 hp/ton	15.7 hp/ton	16.09 hp/ton	15 hp/ton
Power	650 hp	810hp	650 hp	470 hp	220 bhp	250 hp
Height	3.0 m	3.35 m	3.1m	2.74m	2.77m	2.35 m
Speed	34 kmp/h	60 kmp/h	48 kmp/h	40-48 km/h	56 kmp/h on road 40 kmp/h off road	60 kmp/h

- The Centurion's advantage lay in its superior firepower and armour protection as compared with the M47 and M48 Patton tanks. The Patton's armour could in fact be penetrated by the 75 mm gun of the AMX-13. In firepower, the Patton was inferior to the Centurion, though superior to the Sherman. However, the Patton had greater mobility and was easier to maintain. The M48 version had better hull armour than early models of the Centurion. Centurion's turret stow bins provided added protection against infantry handheld anti-tank weapons (Zaloga, 1999). In discussions, Indian defence analysts point out to the Patton's advantage in night fighting capability due to infrared devices. In fact, these devices had been removed by the Americans before the tanks were shipped to Pakistan. The Centurion was not to be shrugged off. Israelis had fought the 1967 and 1973 wars with this tank, and prevailed. While developing the Merkava, Israel's main battle tank, many features of the Centurion, particularly its suspension system, were retained. The Patton was held in reasonably high esteem by both sides and poor tactics were to blame for the debacle at Asal Uttar. In the category of light tanks equipping the recce regiments, AMX-13, Sherman, and Chafee almost had the same characteristics, though AMX-13 was sleek and looked like a sports version of tanks.

The Aftermath

- Declaring the line of control as the international boundary is the only option apparently acceptable to India. This option requires Pakistan to shelve the UN resolutions on Jammu & Kashmir, accept the division of the disputed state, and say goodbye to its stand on the historic rights of the people of this beleaguered region. A significant segment of Pakistani elite would heave a sigh of relief if this option materializes. But, do we have the moral courage to do so? And what would we say to the Kashmiris whom we have exploited with empty slogans during all these years. Then there is the question of the Indus waters. The sword of Indian throttling of these waters will always be dangling over Pakistan even if the line of control is converted into an international border through a peace treaty.
- Ironically, whereas both the sides stick to their respective positions, the line of control remains as it is – the line of control, but has assumed the status of a de-facto porous border.

The Lingering Syndrome

Talking to a Pakistani military delegation which had gone to China with a wish list of weapons and ammunition, Chou En Lai said that all the requirements on their list would be met. He then remarked that he had seen the list of items presented by the delegation but was not clear in his mind on what basis the quantity of ammunition had been calculated. One of the Pakistani generals replied that these were based on fourteen days general service reserves, which prompted Chou En Lai to ask what would happen after fourteen days. Fighting a war with India, would Pakistan achieve its military objectives in fourteen days?

The general replied that Pakistan hoped that, during that time, the Security Council would meet and call upon both countries to cease fire and withdraw armed forces to their respective borders. Astonished by the reply, Chou snapped back that if the outcome of a conflict has been predetermined to be a restoration of the status quo ante, then why fight at all? Why unnecessarily waste human lives and economic resources? Wars cannot be fought according to a time-table, and one has to be ready for a prolonged conflict. There was no reply from the Pakistani side.

“As your friend”, Chou continued, “ I would be interested to know if you have prepared the people of Pakistan to operate in the rear of the enemy, in the event of your first line of defence being broken, to cut the enemy’s lines of communications, disrupt his supplies and generally inflict damage. I am talking about a people’s militia, being based in every village and town. Since Pakistan lacks an industrial base to replenish supplies, this kind of defence is obviously suited to its needs.”

According to Sultan M. Khan, Pakistan’s ambassador to China, “there was a stunned silence among the generals. The concept of putting arms into the hands of the common man was totally alien to them; in fact, it was deemed a threat to law and order in Pakistan. The notion of a prolonged conflict involving the citizenry* of Pakistan was not part of the defence strategy planned by these professional soldiers.” (Khan, 2006).

*A popular army, based on universal conscription, is an attractive idea. Besides the former socialist countries, which called it “peoples army”, conscription is adopted by countries having a shortage of manpower, particularly Israel and Switzerland. However, fighting a “peoples war” by involving the citizenry, requires a very high degree of motivation through an equally strong and inspiring leadership. China, Vietnam, and Israel fought successful wars with popular armies. Peoples War, in context of the Sub-continent, is a misnomer because the political systems in vogue do not generate the national unity and motivation necessary for such a war. Besides, there is a misconception that a citizens army is more economical than a conventional army. On the contrary, it is more expensive because, in case of emergency, the armed forces have to be mobilized. The cost of mobilization is prohibitive.

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V

WASHING OFF HANDS**The Undercurrents**

There is a well known and much thrashed out political background to the 1971 War. We all know that the war resulted due to a struggle for power between Awami League, the Army, and Peoples Party. This power struggle degenerated into a civil war, which was exploited by India to dismember Pakistan. We shall briefly recollect certain facts from the past with a view to evolve a clear picture.

Barely three months before partition, at a conference held on 20th May 1947, Suharwardy, the Chief Minister of Bengal (and a future prime minister in independent Pakistan), with the support of Sarat Chandra Bose (brother of Subhash Chandra Bose), floated a plan for a sovereign united Bengal. The plan had the support of Bengal's British governor. Since Both Nehru and Patel were against the proposal, Mountbatten revised the partition plan to take away any option for independence either for Bengal or for any other province (Ali, 1983; Jafferlot, 2004).

After the creation of Pakistan, Suharwardy remained in West Bengal for more than a year before finally migrating to Pakistan. Relations between East Pakistan and Pakistan's central government, located in Karachi, came under strain soon after the independence when Bengalis demanded that their language, besides Urdu, should be made the national language of Pakistan. The language riots in East Pakistan laid the foundation for Bangladeshi nationalism.

The undercurrents of irritants between East and West Pakistan kept resurfacing time and again and, during the 1960s, President Ayub conveyed to the Bengali speaker of Pakistan's national assembly that East Pakistan could have independence if the Bengalis were not happy with living in a united Pakistan. Comes 1965, the war between India and Pakistan remained confined to the western theatre as India did not open a front in the east. Soon after the war, riots erupted in East Pakistan when Awami League demanded regional autonomy on the basis of Mujibur Rehman's six points. A secession plan known as the Agartala Conspiracy came to the fore, and Mujibur Rehman, along with some of his co-conspirators, was tried for treason. The aftershocks of the 1965 war resulted in Ayub Khan's ouster from power in 1969. General Yahya Khan, Ayub's successor, promised elections, which were held in 1970. In these elections Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Peoples Party had not fielded a single candidate from East Pakistan. On the other

hand, Sheikh Mujib's Awami League contested only 7 out of 138 seats in West Pakistan. Were the two wings of Pakistan wittingly or unwittingly moving towards separation?

As a result of the 1970 general elections, Awami League emerged as the majority party in the parliament, but it did not have even a single representative from West Pakistan. Likewise Peoples Party, the second largest party in the parliament, did not have any member from East Pakistan. In a mature democracy, handing over power to the majority party would have taken place without a hassle, provided there were no hidden motives. As the pre-poll strategy of the two largest parties suggests, the personal ambitions of Mujib and Bhutto had already reached a stage where they were not thinking in terms of a united Pakistan but nurturing ambitions of ruling their respective wing as their independent fief. There was a so-called Legal Framework Order (LFO) promulgated by Yahya Khan, which laid down the code of conduct for the elections. Both Awami League and Peoples Party had been blatantly violating the LFO by basing their election campaign on parochialism and hatred. That Yahya Khan remained indifferent to these violations amply shows that he had his own hidden agenda. Probably he was thinking that he would exploit the differences between the two politicians to perpetuate his rule.

Awami League's six points election manifesto suggested a loose federation where the central government would not have the power to levy taxes. The central government in such a setup would be completely dependent on the constituent units for running its day to day and long duration affairs. It was essentially a blueprint for, initially a confederation, and subsequently outright independence. Pakistan was carved out of India when Jinnah, instead of beating around the bush, laid down his cards on the table and demanded independence for the Muslim majority provinces in the northwestern and eastern India. It was a bitter pill to swallow for the Congress leaders, but they agreed to India's partition instead of living in perpetual hostility with the Muslim separatists. Whereas both Mujib and Bhutto were working for Pakistan's division for the fruition of their personal ambitions, they did not have the moral courage and integrity of character to say so openly.

Their true intentions, though, slipped out occasionally. After the postponement of the national assembly's inaugural session, Mujib addressed a mammoth public meeting at Dhaka's Paltan Maidan. Responding to the crowd chanting slogans of independent Bangladesh, Mujib said "Independence, no! Not yet". In another public meeting held at Lahore, Bhutto made his famous remarks, "There are only three forces; Peoples Party, Awami League, and the Army". Then, addressing

Awami League, he said “Yahan Hum, Wahan Tum (We here, you there)”. Had Mujib and Bhutto, instead of a tongue in cheek attitude, possessed the moral courage to clearly express their intentions, the unpleasant but inevitable partition of Pakistan would have taken place peacefully. We could have followed the example of Singapore leaving Malaysia.

On 16th September 1963, Federation of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak, and Singapore formed a new political entity known as Malaysia. For Singapore, this marked the end of a 144 year British rule. Like East Pakistan and West Pakistan, the relations between Singapore and the federal government of Malaysia were marred by mistrust and economic, financial, and political differences. As a result, Singapore became independent on 9th August 1965. Taking a cue, the two wings of Pakistan could have honorably separated instead of going through a blood bath caused by a prolonged civil war, which drew India, Pakistan’s archenemy, into an armed conflict.

In the aftermath of the general elections, the situation in East Pakistan had become so critical, it needed a spark to explode into a raging fire. The politicians and the generals were not so gullible they did not appreciate the consequences of disturbing the political apple cart. However, Bhutto succeeded in taking Yahya Khan for a ride when the latter, on return from his trip to Dhaka, was invited to visit Bhutto’s ancestral home in Larkana. It was after his consultation with Bhutto at Larkana that Yahya Khan announced the postponement of the national assembly's inaugural session scheduled to be held at Dhaka. The riots, burning of Pakistani flags, and the killings of West Pakistanis that followed Yahya’s announcement clearly indicated that a united Pakistan was no longer an option for the Bengalis.

Pakistan Army had launched Operation Searchlight in March 1971 in a bid to control the mayhem caused by the Awami League in reaction to the postponement of the national assembly’s inaugural session. By mid-May, Pakistan Army had re-occupied all the major towns in East Pakistan and driven the battered remnants of the Mukti Bahini across the border into India, forcing the Mukti Bahini to seek training and guidance from the Indian Army for waging the insurgency in East Pakistan.

At the end of April 1971, Indira Gandhi asked General Sam Manekshaw during a high-level meeting if he were ready to attack East Pakistan. Manekshaw, showing resentment over not being consulted when Indira Gandhi’s “*comic-strip cowboys were helping and abetting the East Pakistani insurgents against Yahya Khan*”, refused to immediately attack East Pakistan. He told Indira Gandhi that the Indian

armoured division, located in Jhansi, had only 13 out of 197 tanks fit for war due to non-release of funds by the ministry of finance. Indian Army formations were dispersed as far away as Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu- Kerala. He had to restore the armoured division to war fitness as well as move all these formations to their respective concentration areas. This would require all the available trains and road space. As it was harvest time in Punjab, Haryana and U.P., prioritizing the rolling stock and road space for the army's movement would hamper the pending harvest and may cause a shortage of food in these states. The Himalayan passes were opening due to the warm weather and the likelihood of the Chinese threat had also to be taken into account. Finally, the area of projected operations would soon be flooded by the coming monsoons, making military operations in East Pakistan extremely difficult. At the conclusion of the meeting, Indira Gandhi asked Maneckshaw to stay back. During the one on one meeting with Indira, Maneckshaw offered to resign on the grounds she chose. When she declined but asked for his advice, he sought permission to prepare for the conflict, set the date, and said he would guarantee victory. She agreed and permitted the general to prepare in his own way*.

**Abstract of Maneckshaw's speech delivered at Ahmedabad, Gujarat (retrieved from www.deshgujarat.com)*

Though Maneckshaw had sought a couple of months from Indira Gandhi to attack Pakistan, the Indian army had actually started its preliminary operations against East Pakistan in May 1971. On 15th May the Indian Army started a coordinated operation codenamed Operation Jackpot. To facilitate this operation, the Indian Army, under Lt. Gen. J. S. Aurora, Commander Eastern Command, set up a network comprising six logistical sectors in the border areas around Bangladesh. Each sector was commanded by a brigadier from the Indian army. Through this network, Mukti Bahini forces communicated with the Mukti Bahini Headquarters, exiled in Kolkata, and coordinated all supply, training and operational efforts for the war. Overseen by Aurora, the operation was initially commanded by Major General Onkar Singh Kalkat and later by Major General B. N. 'Jimmy' Sarcar.

According to Clary (2013)

“East Pakistan was surrounded by India on three sides, resulting in a more than 4000 kilometer border between present-day Bangladesh and India. In such circumstances, shorter interior lines of communication can sometimes compensate for inferior numbers. In this case, the quantitative overmatch by Indian forces in the eastern theatre included six full divisions, portions of an

additional mountain division and several brigades, and the equivalent of three armoured regiments.

Pakistan faced this force with three infantry divisions (two of which were without their normal accompaniment of artillery and vehicles). Two additional divisions were raised on ad hoc basis out of spare brigades and division headquarters staff, and one regiment of light tanks (The terrain of East Pakistan substantially discounted the utility of tanks).

At the theatre level, it is easy to argue India enjoyed 2:1 superiority- even without assuming any combat power for the 50,000-100,000 Bengali guerrilla forces operating in Pakistan's eastern wing or on its periphery, a small portion of which had been organised into formal units by Indian trainers. Because Pakistani officials were wary that New Delhi would seize a portion of East Pakistan, from which they would announce a free Bangladesh state, the inferior Pakistan military force was arrayed along the perimeter of the eastern wing, rather than concentrating their forces in a smaller inner circle. The results were understandably catastrophic”.

The Opposing Forces

Eastern Theatre

Order of Battle

Table 5.1

S.No.	Area of Operations	Pakistan	India	Remarks
1.	Dhaka, Tangail, Mymensingh Distts.	36 Adhoc Div	<u>101 Comm Zone</u> 95 Mtn Bde FJ Sector Bde 167 Inf Bde 5 Mtn Bde	36 Adhoc Div had only 1x Inf Bde, and 1x Mor Bty.
2.	Sylhet, Comilla, Noakhali, Chittagong Distts.	14 Inf Div 39 Adhoc Div 97 (I) Inf Bde	<u>IV Corps</u> 8 Mtn Div 57 Mtn Div 23 Mtn Div	14 Inf Div & 39 Ad hoc Div had only 1x Fd Regt Arty each. 97 (I) Inf Bde was without arty.
3.	Rajshahi, Bogra, Dinajpur, Rangpur, Pabna Distts.	16 Inf Div	<u>XXXIII Corps</u> 20 Mtn Div 6 Mtn Div 50 (I) Para Bde 71 Mtn Bde MF Bde	16 Div had 2x Fd Regt Arty and 29 C (-)
4	Khulna, Jessore, Kushtia, Faridpur, Barisal, Patuakhali Distts.	9 Inf Div	<u>II Corps</u> 9 Inf Div 4 Mtn Div	9 Inf Div had 2x Inf Bdes, 1x Adhoc Bde, and 2x armd sqn.

Indian Eastern Command Reserve	6 Mountain Division less brigade HQ 2x Engineer Regiments and bomb disposal group
Airborne Forces	50 (I) ParaBrigade

Hence, the dice were so heavily loaded against Pakistan, and Maneckshaw was so confident of India's victory, that he had got the document of surrender prepared even before the start of war:

*"I was so sure that I will win that I had personally dictated the surrender document to headquarters Eastern Command and ordered them to make four copies .I asked them to give one copy to Jagjit Singh Sahib, one copy to Niazi, one copy to the government (of India, sic), and one copy I will keep in my office..... (After the ceasefire) I told Jagjit Singh 'this is a great day for you. Take your wife along (to accompany you at the surrender ceremony, sic)'. **

*Transcript of the interview given to Bharat Defence Kavach

China had clearly told Pakistan that in case of a war with India, it would not be able to help Pakistan. It had advised Pakistan to seek a political solution to the problem. According to Kissinger, the United States was favourably disposed towards the creation of Bangladesh, but in a peaceful manner. Under such a situation Yahya Khan should have 1) approached the United Nations as India did during the First Kashmir War, though Jammu & Kashmir was a disputed state, whereas East Pakistan was an integral part of Pakistan, and 2) initiated a dialogue with Mujibur Rehman, who was held in a Pakistani jail. And that was not the time to hold negotiations within the framework of a united Pakistan. If Mujib agreed to some form of linkage with the centre, that would be a bonus. Otherwise, it was time to let East Bengal go. In the eastern theatre, India enjoyed more than 2:1 superiority in ground forces and 10:1 superiority in the air. And it was spoiling for employing its sole aircraft carrier against the beleaguered Pakistani Eastern Command. In the western theatre, there was near parity of forces, but India had more infantry divisions. As in 1965, India had an additional advantage of transferring its mountain divisions from the China border to either of the war theatres, which it did. The Pakistan Army high command had no illusions about the outcome of the war in the east. What they were immensely bothered about was saving West

Pakistan when three Indian corps, freed from the eastern theatre, would shift to the west. Ostensibly, they decided to save West Pakistan. However, instead of seeking a dialogue with the Bengalis, they decided to wash their hands off East Pakistan. As for Bhutto, he aimed at getting rid of both the Bengalis as well as the Pakistan Army. Why? As his subsequent moves substantiated, Bhutto was wary that he could not come to power in a united Pakistan. He also believed that the army was the biggest hurdle in his quest for untrammelled power. It is alleged that Air Marshal Rahim Khan, the Air Chief, and Lieutenant General Gul Hassan Khan, Chief of the General Staff of the Pakistan Army, were in cahoots with Bhutto. After the war, Gul Hassan was promoted as Army Chief, but shortly thereafter forced to resign unceremoniously along with Rahim Khan. Later, both Gul Hassan and Rahim Khan were given ambassadorial assignments.

Western Theatre

Order of Battle - 3rd December 1971

Table 5.2

S.No	Area of Ops	Pakistan	India	Cbt Power	Remarks
1.	J&K	<u>Holding Role</u> 12Div, 23Div*(+) NA Scouts <u>Pen/CAttk Role</u> 2(I) Armd Bde(+);@;	<u>Western Comd</u> <u>XV Corps</u> 3,10,19,25, &27Inf Div; 1x (I) Inf Bde	1.5:1 in India's favour	*Under Comd Bde ex 17 Div @Under Comd 2x Armd Regts ex 6 Armd Div.
2.	Ravi-Chenab	<u>Holding Role</u> 8Div,15Div <u>C Pen/ C Attk Role</u> 6 Armd Div(-), 17 Div(-) 8(I)Armd Bde	<u>I Corps</u> 36,39, &54 Inf Div; 2(I)Armd Bde, 16(I)Armd Bde	3.5:1 in India's favour	
3.	Ravi-Sutlej	<u>Holding Role</u> 10 Div,11 Div; <u>C Pen/C Attk Role</u> 3(I) Armd Bde, 105 (I) Inf Bde Gp	<u>XI Corps</u> 15 Div,7Div,Foxtrot Div(adhoc); 1x(I) Armd Bde	1.5:1 in India's favour	
4.	South of Sutlej	<u>Holding Role</u> 18 Div	<u>Southern Comd*</u> 11Div,12Div; 2x(I)Armd Sqns; 1xMsl regt	4:1 in India's favour	*Jaisalmer-Longewala (excl Reti-Ubairu)
5.	Strategic Reserves	1Armd Div; 7Div,33 Div	1 Armd Div; 14 Div	1.5:1 in Pakistan's favour	To be launched opposite Ganganagar-Anupgarh

Sources: Amin (1999); Katoch (2011)

Summary

Table 5.3

Formation	Pakistan	India	Remarks
Inf Div	10	14*	*1xDiv deployed against Tibet
Armd Div	2	1	
Indep Armd Bde	3	3	
Indep Inf Bde	1	1	

Notes:

1. Brigade ex 17 Div Detached to Command 23 Div.
2. 2x regts ex 6 Armd Div Detached to Command 8 (I) Armd Bde.
3. Indian I Corps Sector stretched from Samba till short of the Dera Baba Nanak Enclave on the Ravi River. This was initially held by a division and presented to Pakistan the weakest gap in the Indian defences in the event of a preemptive attack. Located in the hinterland, 1 Corps was to assume responsibility of this sector on arrival.

Escalation

Pakistan's military high command succumbed to the covert Indian misinformation that India was only interested in occupying a small chunk of East Pakistan to establish a government of independent Bangladesh in order to put pressure on Pakistan to abandon its Eastern wing. The original plan was therefore replaced by a new plan which called for dispersal of formations and their deployment along the border with India. These thinned out units were under orders to stand their ground until the very end. Meanwhile, the western front would be activated by Pakistan with the aim to divert Indian Army pressure away from East Pakistan.

Sajjad Hyder, Pakistan's High Commissioner to India, claims that in July 1971 he had sent the government a copy of the operational orders about the projected Indian army offensive against East Pakistan. The orders spelled out the date of commencement and the timeframe within which the operation was to be completed. Sajjad claims that in September 1971, when on a visit to West Pakistan, he went to see Gul Hassan, who dismissed the entire information as "airy-fairy tales" (Hyder, 1987).

On the other hand, Gul Hassan mentions that when, in November 1971, information started pouring in from the Eastern Command and other sources that the Indians had amassed eight to ten divisions around East Pakistan, Gul Hassan went to see Yahya Khan on 16th November, and the latter, having heard Gul

Hassan, replied, not for the first time, that he and Gen Niazi were both fully in the picture and hence there was no need to issue any further instructions. However, a couple of days later, at the behest of General Hamid (COS), a signal was sent to headquarters Eastern Command, warning it “to be on its toes as there was information about an impending Indian attack on East Pakistan on 21st November (Khan, 1993).

According to Gul Hassan, after the signal was dispatched, the DMO and DMI asked him that, in view of the gravity of the situation, COS should be urged to order Eastern Command to discard the political objective given to it by HQ CMLA and redeploy to meet the impending Indian aggression. Gul Hassan had another session with the COS, but the latter did not agree to change the Eastern Command deployment plan (Khan, 1994).

According to Lt Gen Niazi, his COS (Brig Baqir Siddiqui), who was at GHQ, was told by the CGS to rush back to Dacca as Indian invasion was expected on 21st November. On 21st November, Brig Baqir rang up Major General Qureshi, Vice Chief of the General Staff at GHQ, and followed with a written signal about the Indian invasion. Niazi tried to speak to Gul Hassan, but he had gone to Lahore to celebrate Eid “knowing full well that the Indians were going to attack East Pakistan on 21st November.”

“I tried to contact Gen Hamid, COS. He too was not available. I learnt later that both he and President had left for Sialkot, ostensibly to visit troops but actually for a partridge shoot. The callous attitude of the three senior most officers of the Army shows that they were in the least interested in the affairs of East Pakistan or the integrity of Pakistan. This did not upset me because I had guessed their intentions and had inkling through my COS that they had decided to quit East Pakistan and abandon us.” (Niazi, 1998)

Indian forces crossing the border, launched a full-scale invasion in East Pakistan on night 20th /21st November 1971, attacking simultaneously as many as 23 salients along the border. The purpose of these attacks was to knock the Pakistani forces away from the border and gain space for the establishment of firm bases to be used subsequently for launching major attacks. At many places, these attacks were beaten back by the defenders. However, the much larger Indian forces kept the defenders embroiled. The Government of Pakistan just issued a proclamation of a state of emergency.

Gul Hassan further writes:

“On 22 November, in the afternoon, (the Air Chief and I) met the President on his return from Sialkot. I went straight up to him and told him that events in East Pakistan had reached the danger level and that he must come to GHQ as some vital decisions had to be taken.... We all drove to GHQ where he was brought up to date. He gave no decisions but told us to meet him at his residence at 6 p.m. as by then he would have time to think over the problem. “

“The assembly (at his residence) included some civil servants, COS and Air Chief. The president addressed me, asking what should be done to deal with the situation. I replied that this as well as previous governments had directed GHQ that, in case of an attack on East Pakistan, it should plan to rescue that part by an offensive from the West”.

“On 30 November, Yahya held a conference in GHQ, which the COS, Air C-in -C, CGS and I attended. Yahya told us he had bent over backwards to meet all of India’s demands on the so-called refugee problem, but India refused to accept any of our proposals and wanted war. He had also hoped that pressure from the UN, US, and Russia would stop India from committing aggression. However, India had not listened to anyone and attacked East Pakistan. He said he had consulted various politicians and they had all agreed that war was inevitable. However, he would have one more try to persuade India to stop her aggression against East Pakistan and settle whatever problems she had peacefully. If he failed, then he would go to war on 1st Dec 1971. The date was later changed to 3rd December, for reasons I do not know” (Khan, 1993).

Kissinger (2011) writes:

“For eleven days he had stood by while Indian forces pressed deeper and deeper into East Pakistan, in effect dismembering his country... On December 3 he launched his army into an attack in the West. The reaction in our government was to use the Pakistani attack as a perfect excuse to defer the statement attacking Indian transgressions”.

Conduct of Operations

In his Order of the Day, broadcast on morning 4th December 1971, Maneckshaw spelled out two Indian military objectives: 1) Capture of East Pakistan, and 2) Destruction of Pakistan’s military machine. Indian strategy was to remain on the

defensive on the western front till its eastern command achieved its objective of reducing East Pakistan.

On the eastern front, the enemy overwhelmed the Pakistani defences by superior forces, armour, artillery, and air. When most of the defences could not be overrun, the Indian forces after suffering heavy casualties resorted to outflanking moves. Resultantly, till the cease-fire on 16th December, the Indians did not capture a single town except Jessore, which was not defended for strategic reasons. At Khulna, heavy fighting continued till 17th December and ceased only after repeated orders by the surrendering Eastern command.

The war in the western theatre began when, on the evening of 3rd December 1971, Pakistan Air Force launched a series of half-hearted attacks on the Indian airfields. About fifty aircraft were employed and the attacks failed to do any significant damage. This was followed by limited offensives the same night by the holding formations to secure footholds in the enemy territory. Both the armies held back from launching their main offensive and waited for the other side to make the major move. From Pakistan, no major operation was launched for fear that if territorial gains were made in the west, they might result in exchange for possible losses in East Pakistan, something that went against the strategy of letting East Pakistan go. Poonch was attacked by Pakistan Army on night 3rd /4th December through an infiltration operation. The Indian garrison at Poonch consisted of an infantry brigade (93 Brigade) while 12 Division had planned to infiltrate with two infantry brigades. The plan was practicable, but failed because of irresolution at divisional level, loss of surprise, poor logistic arrangements and stiff resistance by the Indian forces (Amin, 2002; Katoch, 2011).

The attack on Chamb, by 23 Division, was also launched on night 3rd /4th December. It was partially successful with Pakistan reaching up to the Munawar Tawi. Thereafter, the division established a bridgehead opposite Pallanwala across the Tawi to conduct further operations against Jaurian. However, Pakistan's attempt to secure a bridgehead was halted on 10th December when Major General Iftikhar, GOC 23 Division, was killed from injuries suffered in a helicopter crash, and the defences were stabilised along the Munawar Tawi.

In the Sialkot sector, Indian forces advanced up to Basantar Nala and, after fourteen days of fighting, contacted the town of Shakargarh (approximately 20 kilometers from the international border).

Map 5.1



In the Jammu Region, the Chicken's Neck area was captured by the Indians. Pakistan's 4 Corps, holding the Ravi- Sutlej Corridor with two divisions against an equal number of Indian divisions, captured the Indian enclave opposite Hussainiwala Headworks. Pakistan's 105 Brigade carried out a small- scale but highly aggressive operation in Sulaimanke area opposite the Indian town of Fazilka, capturing the Bund ahead of Sabuna Distributary and ensuring the safety of Pakistan's most crucial Sulaimanke Canal Headworks which was just 1,500 metres from the border. The Northern Areas, defended by scouts, were given very low priority. The Indians were, therefore, able to capture important posts overlooking Kargil-Leh Road and in Partapur Sector.

Air and Naval Battles

According to Singh and Rikhye (1991):

The PAF had a one point programme: survival, hopefully living to fight another day. Pakistan believed that India was going to make this a final war. Accordingly, it withheld four of its 13 or 14 squadrons in the West from

combat, to be conserved for the support of Tikka Khan's last ditch II Corps offensive.


The PAF's attack capability in 1971 consisted of exactly 16 B-57s and 20 Mirage IIIEP, but the latter were trained and utilized for air superiority, so that it had a negligible capability in this area. There could, then, be no question of an offensive strategy. Nonetheless, since no air force would like to fight just a defensive battle, Pakistani strategy called for a pre-emptive strike to reduce the odds, and throughout the war it continued to send B-57s singly or in pairs for harassing attacks to keep the Indian defences on its toes.

Since the strategy was just survival, the PAF succeeded in this sense. On December 17, at the time of cease-fire, it was still strong enough to protect itself against the superior IAF. Had the war continued, of course, it would have been wiped out. But it was a limited war, and surviving was good enough.

Nonetheless, otherwise the IAF succeeded. It achieved and maintained complete air supremacy in the East. It had local air superiority in the west where required, for example, over Karachi, Sind, and Shakargarh where Indian 1 Corps was making its big push. It prevented the PAF from damaging in any meaningful manner any of its airbases or infrastructure.

Air power played a significant role only in the battle of Longewala where the Indian air force harassed a Pakistani infantry brigade group (51 Brigade with under command 22 Cavalry). This force was launched into action without air cover and was without even troop carrying vehicles (TCVs) for the infantry. The author says it with certainty because his own unit was part of the attacking brigade and, due to non-availability of TCVs, it had to commandeer tractor trolleys from the locals. Moving those trolleys over the sand dunes was a nightmare, so they were abandoned well short of the international border. IAF action disabled 50% of the enemy tanks (around 20) and many vehicles carrying ammunition and POL. A large number of surviving soft vehicles had to be abandoned as they got bogged down in deep sand.

Map 5.2



According to Clary (2013), before the Hunters could reach Longewala, the Pakistani attack had already been repulsed by the Indian ground forces. Baweja (2008) counters this by asserting how could a company minus (around 100 persons), along with a lone recoilless rifle, stop an infantry brigade group. More than three decades later the Indian Army and Air Force were locked in a battle over which service should get the credit for repulsing the Pakistani attack. Baweja writes that the Indian 12 Infantry Division had not even expected trouble on this western part of the border. The likelihood of a Pakistani infantry brigade with under command armour regiment crossing the international border and advancing deep inside Indian territory was unpalatable for the Indian Army top brass. Instead, they had laboured over an extensive counteroffensive plan to cross over into Pakistan and go all the way up to Rahimyar Khan. The opposite happened.

IAF claims that there was no ground battle at Longewala (the subject of an Indian blockbuster movie), it was their show all the way, and that India was saved from humiliation because of the four Hunters that blunted Pakistani thrust entirely by air action. Rebutting the Indian Army's narrative, the War Diary of IAF's 14 Care and Maintenance Unit based at Jaisalmer records that on 4th December 1971 when 12 Division was building up in its concentration area for advance towards Rahimyar

Khan, the enemy sneaked in with an infantry brigade and an armour regiment from Gabbar, via BP 638, towards Longewala. The leading armour bypassed Longewala post and was seen advancing towards Ramgarh past midnight. The enemy movement was passed by the company commander at Longewala to 12 Division Headquarters (via his battalion Headquarters), but the same appeared to be discarded. According to Baweja (2008), the advancing armoured column reached the outskirts of Ramgarh but had to recoil as it had lost contact with its rear. The force, thus withdrew all the way to Longewala. The company commander at Longewala again reported to the division headquarters about more tanks rolling in. On receipt of this message, the GOC tried to get through to the base commander at Jaisalmer but he found that Mujahids had cut the telephone line at Ramgarh. The radio relay link was established between the GOC and the base Commander in the early hours of 5th December. At around 0715 hours, the enemy was engaged by the IAF aircraft. As a result of the Pakistani raid, 12 Division's offensive (Operation Dare Devil) was postponed till the Indians, smarting over what would have happened if the Pakistani force had entered Ramgarh, regained balance. Ramgarh, we are told, was without any defences whatsoever.

Before the 71 War, the Soviet Union had offered Ossa missile boats to Pakistan. These were rejected by the Pakistan Navy due to their limited range, which, according to the naval top brass, would have reduced Pakistan Navy to a coastal defence force. In 71 War the same missile boats were employed by the Indian Navy in an imaginative manner for bombarding the Karachi port. They towed these missile boats behind frigates and, when in the vicinity of Karachi, used them to sink PN destroyer Khyber and two other non-combatant ships, though sections of Pakistan Navy still maintain that Khyber was sunk by a Soviet submarine.

A naval task force under Admiral Vladimir Kruglyakov had reportedly left Vladivostok on 3rd December 1971. It comprised a Kynda anti-ship missile cruiser, a diesel-electric submarine (possibly the Juliet class), an anti-aircraft missile destroyer, and a Foxtrot class (diesel-electric) attack submarine already in the Indian Ocean. After the war, Admiral Kruglyakov, in an interview, stated that he had orders to stop the U.S. fleet from interfering with Indian Navy's operations. (www.history.stackexchange.com). In his interview, Admiral Kruglyakov makes contradictory claims. He says that his task force had entered the Bay of Bengal three days after the arrival of USS Enterprise which, given the distance from Vladivostok to the Bay of Bengal, seems true. On the other hand, he says that on arrival, he had ordered his submarines to surface and make their presence felt to the American task force. By that time Pakistani forces had already surrendered and fighting had ceased in the Eastern theatre. With the fighting, all the chances of

USS Enterprise helping in the evacuation of the Pakistani garrison had also ceased. Hence there was no requirement for a show of force by Admiral Kruglyakov's task force*. So, if the Soviet task force had started off from Vladivostok on 3rd December, it could not possibly sink PNS Khyber on 4th December (when the Indian Navy launched Operation Trident against Karachi harbour). However, the Foxtrot class Soviet submarine, which was already in the Indian Ocean (we do not know which group it belonged to before being regrouped with Kruglyakov's flotilla), could have regrouped with the Indian Navy's task force and taken part in Operation Trident. Foxtrot class submarines were armed with 10x torpedo tubes (6x bow, 4x stem) and carried 22 torpedoes. The claim by a Pakistan Navy source is based on submarine signatures. Prior to the 71 War, Indian Navy had no experience in employing missile boats. Was Operation Trident a joint Indo-Soviet Operation?

*The US Task Force 74 was led by the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise. Performing its routine duties in the Gulf of Tonkin, the task force was ordered into the Indian Ocean on 14th December, 1971, crossed Malacca Straits on night 14th -15th December and entered the Bay of Bengal on the morning of 15th December. The surrender of Pakistani forces took place on 16th December. Going by Kruglyakov's account the flotilla commanded by him reached the Bay of Bengal on the morning of 18th December.

PAF responded to the attack by bombing Okha, from where the Indian naval task force had commenced operations against Karachi, the next night. However, the Indians had already withdrawn their naval assets to Bombay. PN's response to the Indian raid on Karachi was sinking of Indian frigate Khukri by submarine Hangor, the first sinking of a surface ship by a submarine since WW2. Contrary to Indian perceptions, what to talk of a submarine base at Gwadar, in 1971 Pakistan Navy did not have any naval presence west of Karachi. Gwadar, at that time, was a sleepy fishermen's village (despite the construction of some jetties, not much has changed to date). It was only after the 71 war when a surface ship was deployed at Gwadar. If Indian Navy had any plans to attack Gwadar, it shelved them after the sinking of Khukri. We also heard about Indian plans to land a brigade minus at or near Gwadar. Without any logistical support, how long would such a task force survive?

Talking of Vikrant, it remained elusive during the 71 War also, till submarine Ghazi was sunk, accidentally, or by the Indian Navy, as claimed by them. Fearing Ghazi, Vikrant was moved from Bombay to Vishakapatnam, and thence to the Andamans. Only when it was confirmed that Ghazi had been sunk was Vikrant moved to the Bay of Bengal. Never before was an aircraft carrier relegated to the role of attacking enemy gunboats, merchant navy ships, and cargo ships. In the absence of PAF and PN, Vikrant threw a naval blockade of East Pakistan and its Sea Hawk aircraft destroyed about a dozen Pakistani improvised gunboats and

civilian ships. However, PNS Rajshahi, the only proper Pakistani gunboat in the Bay of Bengal, slipped through the blockade and reached West Pakistan some time after the war. According to the Indians, the Sea Hawks emerged unscathed, achieving the highest kill ratio for any aircraft in the entire war". They had to. As for the Ghazi, India refused the US and Soviet offers to salvage the wreck of Ghazi. Perhaps salvaging it would have confirmed if Ghazi were sunk by a depth charge fired by INS Rajput, as the Indians claimed, or as a result of hitting one of the mines it had laid in Vishakapatnam's navigation channel.

The most debatable question about 71 War's naval dimension remains if Indian Navy could have slapped a naval blockade on West Pakistan. Given the Indian ambitions to destroy West Pakistan's military machine also after the fall of East Pakistan, it would have taken Vikrant more than a week to reach the western seaboard from the Bay of Bengal. Even if Indian Navy had deployed all its naval combatants to block Pakistan's sea lanes of communications, the likely Pakistani response would have been to deploy its three remaining submarines in an arc south of Karachi where, due to the shallow waters of the Arabian Sea, they would be very difficult to detect by the Indian Navy's frigates and Alize ASW aircraft. Lying there quietly, they could very effectively ambush any intruding enemy ship. Thus, it would have been easier for Pakistan to deny India control of its sea lanes of communication, than for India to establish and maintain positive sea control.

Unlike the 65 War, PAF possessed Mirages against which the Sea Hawks on board Vikrant would be no match. If we go by the thesis that Pakistan's military junta and Bhutto had relinquished East Pakistan even before the war, it makes sense that the PAF had used its Mirages very sparingly during the war, saving them for the final round in case India attempted to destroy West Pakistan also.

Without a potent organic air capability to counter Pakistani Mirages, the Indian navy would be forced to rely on the IAF, or to deploy at sea without adequate air cover. Going by Clary's (2014) argument, with the IAF engaged in support of land operations, it is doubtful if it could provide meaningful air cover to the Indian Navy, calling the Indian sea control efforts into serious doubt. India's ability to successfully interdict vessels would weaken further west because of the decrease in air cover and because of the dangers of hitting neutral shipping coming out of the Gulf of Oman.

Analysis

Aims & Objectives

- If Pakistan's military leadership were serious about East Pakistan, it would have pre-empted India before the Indian Army had fully mobilized and the Himalayan passes had not become snow bound. It could have done this by attacking India in May or September 1971 in the Ravi-Chenab Corridor. The area between Samba and Dera Baba Nanak was initially held by a division and presented to Pakistan the weakest gap in the Indian defences for launching a pre-emptive attack. Located in the hinterland, 1 Corps was to assume responsibility in this sector on arrival (Amin, 1999; Katoch, 2011).
- According to Major General Sukhwant Singh (2015):
I met K.K.Singh (Commander I Corps) near the Thakurpur ferry in the middle of October (1971), when his leading elements had just moved in and the rest of his corps was trickling in at an agonizingly slow pace. He smiled and commented: 'Our weakest hour is now, another four days and Yahya would have missed his opportunity.' Yahya did exactly that, and by the third week of October K K was firmly poised in his defensive posture...
According to Amin (2002),

Indian Western Command C in C Candeth admitted the fact that all Indian plans to attack Pakistan would have gone to winds had Pakistan attacked in October 1971. Thus Candeth's remark that "Yahya Khan had tarried too long and had missed the boat".

- After the fall of Dhaka, Indira Gandhi, ostensibly under pressure from the Soviets and America, declared a unilateral ceasefire in the west also. Since then, a spirited discussion has ensued in the Indian, international as well as Pakistani circles that had the superpowers not intervened, Indian Army would have finished West Pakistan also. In this discussion, which is continuing to date, praetorians, defence analysts, diplomats, and media persons, particularly from India have propounded various theories. J.N. Dixit, an Indian diplomat, remarked that, if ordered, Indian Army would have marched into Rawalpindi. After reading various Indian analyses, the author has identified three common Indian war objectives:-
 - a. Defeating Pakistan Army in East Pakistan and creating Bangladesh.
 - b. Destroying Pakistan's war potential for a period (depending upon the analyst) from a few years to half a century.

c. Capturing Azad Kashmir, or at least it's southern portion.

- That the superpowers played a role in bringing about a cease-fire in the western theatre also is beyond doubt. India was successful in achieving the first objective. As discussed earlier, Pakistani military and political leadership, due to its contorted thinking, helped India in achieving this objective. The Soviet Union, India's ally in the war, wanted to keep it under leash, hence the Soviet pressure. India had to pay the price of borrowing Soviet power. The United States had to make some cosmetic gesture to avoid being labeled as an impotent superpower, so it also made some noises. As for destroying Pakistan's war potential and "recovering Azad Kashmir", was the Indian Army capable of achieving these objectives? It could have if it were prepared for a protracted war and the sacrifices such a war demanded, not for a period of weeks, but for more than a year, maybe longer. Let us have a look at the psyche of the Indian civil and military leadership.
- During the first Kashmir war, Indian Army fought essentially against a ragtag force of tribesmen, locals and retired/serving army personnel on leave. Pakistan Army entered the fray only when the Indian Army was threatening to advance beyond line Uri- Poonch- Naushera. Indians captured two-thirds of the disputed state but failed to get the mountain barrier separating the Valley from the Potohar plateau vacated from the raiders/Pakistan Army. It also could not dislodge the enemy from Gilgit and Baltistan. Even when the things were going in favour of the Indian Army, Nehru, being a very cautious man, knocked at the United Nations door. After the war, the Indian generals claimed that had they been given a few more weeks, they would have driven Pakistan out of Jammu & Kashmir. Similar claims were made by the Pakistani generals – had they been allowed to go ahead with Operation Venus, they would have liberated the Valley.
- According to Rikhye (1988), India's operational strategy on the western front was 1) I Corps to eliminate the entire Sialkot salient, prior to turning north to outflank Azad Kashmir. In conjunction with frontal attacks by 19 and 25 Divisions in Kashmir, this would have cracked the front and Azad Kashmir would have fallen. 2) XI corps to remain in a defensive role in the Lahore sector to conserve strength before attacking the enormously strong Lahore defenses. 3) Southern Command to launch a corps size operation in Sindh to i) cut the line of communication between Karachi and Lahore at Hyderabad and Rahim Yar Khan to ease the pressure on Indian forces operating in the north, and, ii) to occupy maximum territory in Sindh for future bargaining.

- After the surrender at Dhaka, India had started moving its forces to the western front. The table below shows the comparative strengths after the cease-fire in the east:

Table5.3

India		Pakistan	Remarks
3 Dec	17 Dec		
15x Inf Divs	16x Inf Divs*	10x Inf Divs	*9Div HQ along with 3x bdes had been transferred to the west.
1x Armd Div	1x Armd Div	2x Armd Divs	
2x (I) Inf Bdes	2x (I) Inf Bde	1x (I) Inf Bde	
1x (I) Armd Bde	1x (I) Armd Bde	3x (I) Armd Bdes	

Rikhye (2014)

Outflanking Azad Kashmir

- In Sialkot Sector, Indian I Corps moved very slowly in the face of determined Pakistani opposition. After fourteen days of fighting, Indian forces were still on the eastern outskirts of the town of Shakargarh, meaning they had gained territory only at a pace of about one kilometer a day (Clary, 2013). This was not the way if they had aimed at eliminating the Sialkot salient prior to turning north to outflank Azad Kashmir.
- Talking of outflanking Azad Kashmir from the south. It looks very neat on paper, and impressive in a model discussion, but ground realities are different. The Indians had to first clear the Sialkot salient, and they had barely contacted Shakargarh town. Swinging north after contacting G.T road involved attacking with armour, infantry following in zone. In Ravi-Chenab Corridor, Indians had three infantry divisions (36, 39, and 34) and two independent armoured brigades (2 and 16). Pitted against the Indians in this corridor were Pakistan's 8 and 15 Divisions and 8(I) Armd Bde. Moreover, after the fall of Chamb, brigades ex 6 Armd Div and 17 Div, detached to command 23 Div and 2 (I) Armd Bde, had reverted to command their parent formations. So the final tally was Indian 3x inf divs and 2x (I) armd bdes against Pakistan's 3x inf divs (8,15, and 17), 1x armd div, and 1x (I) armd bde. These Pakistani formations were attrited during the war, so were the Indian formations. The Indians had an advantage that they could move additional divisions to this area from the China front. Switching of Indian forces from the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor (say, 1 (I) Armd Bde) would have

created imbalance in that sector. We have seen how Pakistan's 7 Division slipping to the south had unnerved the Indians. We agree that the only fresh formations available to Indian Army would come either from the China front or the eastern theatre (available after three weeks).

- Swinging north to outflank Pakistani defences, Indian Army would have to:
 - 1) advance west of the foothills to first reach the Grand Trunk Road. This was necessary to create space west of the international border for launching a large offensive. In such an eventuality Pakistan's 17 Division would occupy a new defensive line on the northern bank of River Chenab, north of Gujrat, whereas 6 Armoured Division and 111 Brigade* would have constituted the reserve in general area Jhelum. In case the Indians tried to probe west of G.T. Road, Pakistan had 8(I) Armd Bde which could have been employed in a delaying role.

*111 Brigade, located at Rawalpindi, is actually a brigade plus. This brigade, along with the line of communication troops deployed between Jhelum and Rawalpindi, constitutes a division. Besides, elements from FC and other paramilitary outfits would be available in and around Rawalpindi.

2) Cross Chenab River in an encounter/deliberate crossing, depending upon how quickly the defender organised his defences on the northern bank.

3) Invest Gujrat, Lalamusa, and Kharian. These towns/Kharian cantonment cannot be bypassed. Even if the Indian Army managed to bypass any of these towns, there was no Mukti Bahini to protect their rear.

4) Cross River Jhelum south of Jhelum city in an encounter/deliberate crossing.

5) Invest Jhelum.

6) Negotiate the Tarraki Ridge (an extension of the Salt Range) north of Jhelum. The Tarraki defile zig zags along a gorge and can be easily defended with a small force.

7) All the time protect the eastern flank from Pakistani 23 Div and 12 Div. There were chances the Indian flank protection force (minimum one infantry division) would be sucked in by 23 and 12 Divisions.

Map 5.3



- Had the Indian Army instead of swinging north after reaching the G.T. road, tried to roll down Pakistan's 23 and 12 Division defences by remaining close to the mountains, hopping from one mountain feature to another, it would be another slogging match. Trying to dislodge the enemy from its prepared defences would be a very time-consuming and frustrating experience. Besides, the Indians would have to negotiate Chenab and Jhelum Rivers anyway.
- So, 12 Division and 23 Division would not abandon their defences to save Rawalpindi, Pakistani front in Azad Kashmir would not crack, and Indian attempt at outflanking from the south would get bogged down somewhere between Gujrat and Lala Musa. Having said this, the author would like to

ask this fellow J.N. Dixit if he has ever heard a blast other than one from a tire burst?

Conserving Strength before Attacking Lahore

- It is said that the Indian XI corps remained in a defensive role in the Lahore sector to conserve strength before attacking the enormously strong Lahore defenses. The Indians claim that during the 1965 war, they had deliberately stopped at the BRB canal because entering Lahore was a prohibitive option. This claim has been rebutted by Pushpinder and Rikhye (1991). They would know that in 1965 Pakistan had deployed troops from the Frontier Constabulary in Lahore and other major cities. Fighting a prolonged war was not a palatable option for Pakistani military top brass, yet they had deployed the Frontier Constabulary to embroil the attacking Indians in a war of attrition had the Indians entered Lahore. In 1971, the military junta and Bhutto had written off East Pakistan, but Pakistanis had to fight for their very survival in case the Indians tried to absorb West Pakistan. In 1982, the Israelis had stopped short of entering Beirut, which was held by the PLO. Would the Indians take the risk of entering Lahore?

Cutting Pakistan's Line of Communications

- And lastly about operations in the south. The Indian Southern Command was to launch a corps size operation in Sindh to cut Pakistan's line of communications between Karachi and Lahore and to occupy maximum territory in Sindh for future bargaining. The Indian Army did take large areas in the deserts along the southern border, capturing 7,500 square kilometers of Pakistani territory. Even so, the Indian Army penetrated approximately 50 kilometers during the two-week conflict, at a rate of four kilometers per day. Most of the territory was gained against essentially no Pakistani opposition and the strength of the Indian attack had dissipated considerably by the end of the war when it finally did face Pakistani forces. It is doubtful that future gains would have been at a similar rate. In the south, the Indian offensive was stopped well before it reached the valuable irrigated greenbelt areas to the east of the Pakistani city of Hyderabad (Clary, 2013).

The Aftermath

- We have discussed it in detail how the outcome of the war in the eastern theatre was foretold. A beleaguered eastern command of Pakistan Army, cut off from its logistics base in West Pakistan, devoid of air cover, with a hostile population breathing down its neck, had two options 1) fight till death 2) surrender. It did not choose the first option because GHQ had ordered the eastern command to lay down arms, otherwise West Pakistan would also be lost (?). Till it was the fighting in East Pakistan, it was fine with India. But they were not sure about the outcome of war in the western theatre. As mentioned earlier Maneckshaw, in his order of the day on commencement of hostilities in the western theatre, had committed himself to destroying Pakistan's war machine. However, in the west, Pakistan had held its hand and kept its powder dry. PAF was still a potent force, so was the army. And Pakistan navy still had three submarines. Most of all, there was no friendly population and Mukti Bahini to augment the Indian war effort. It has already been discussed why the Indian Army could not out flank Azad Kashmir by attempting to roll down Pakistani defences from south to north.
- Once the defender is fighting for its survival, the invader cannot be sure if capture of this or that territory will break the front. Had Indian Army even contacted G.T. Road, the only way to break the rest of Pakistan was to threaten Rawalpindi-Pakistan Army's nerve centre. We have discussed this possibility in detail and proved it impracticable.

The Polish Resolution

On 14th December the most talked about and debated Polish resolution (S/10453/Res-1) was tabled before the Security Council. It said:-

The SECURITY COUNCIL, GRAVELY CONCERNED over the military conflict on the Indian sub-continent, which constitutes an immediate threat to international peace and security

HAVING HEARD the statements by the Foreign Minister of India and the Deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan, DECIDES that:

1. In the eastern theatre of conflict, the power will be peacefully transferred to the lawfully elected representatives of the people headed by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who would immediately be released;
2. after the immediate commencement of the initial period of cease-fire, the Pakistan armed forces will start withdrawal to the pre-set locations in the eastern theatre of conflict with a view to evacuation from the eastern theatre of conflict;
3. similarly, the entire West Pakistan civilian personnel and other persons willing to return to West Pakistan, as well as the entire East Pakistan civilian personnel and other persons in West Pakistan willing to return home, will be given an opportunity to do so under the supervision of the United Nations, with the guarantee on the part of all appropriate authorities concerned that nobody will be subjected to repressions;
4. As soon as within the period of 72 hours the withdrawal of the Pakistan troops and their concentration for that purpose will have started, the cease-fire will become permanent. As soon as the evacuation of the West Pakistan armed forces will have started, actually upon consultations with the newly established authorities organised as a result of the transfer of power to the lawfully elected representatives of the people headed by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman;
5. Recognizing the principle according to which territorial acquisitions made through the use of force will not be retained by either party to the conflict, The Governments of India and Pakistan will immediately begin consultations through appropriate representatives of their armed forces with a view to the speediest possible implementation of this principle in the western theatre of military operations.

Commenting on the resolution, A.G Noorani (2012) writes:

“The Revised version of the next day, 15 December, was substantially identical except for one significant change. References to the release of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and to the government headed by him were dropped. This could not have been done to please India. It was done to persuade Pakistan. If it had shown any interest at all, more concessions might have followed. It was preeminently a formula for negotiations and was eminently negotiable..... Tersely put, the Resolution provided for a direct transfer of power from Islamabad to Dhaka; for the withdrawal of Pakistan’s forces as well as India’s forces and a return to the status quo ante bellum. Not a single prisoner of war would have been held by either side nor an inch of the territory of the adversary state. The cease-fire line

would have stayed put. There would have been no surrender of Pakistan's forces to the Indian Command. And there would have been no Simla Agreement, either".

Noorani quotes an excerpt from Sher Baz Mazari's book (A Journey to Disillusionment; Oxford University Press; p. 217):

If the Polish resolution had been accepted, the ignominy of 17 December (surrender) would have been avoided. The fact that it demanded the transfer of power to the elected representatives rankled Bhutto. It meant a return of Mujib and the Awami League. Bhutto would then have been reduced in political rank. As a parliamentary minority leader, he would have been relegated to the peripheries of power".

Conclusion

Starting 1947, the elite in both the wings had gradually lost their romance with a united Pakistan and were looking for an excuse to get rid of each other. The separatist tendency in East Pakistan found open expression and was translated by the Bengali intelligentsia into a popular movement, abetted strongly by India. That the West Pakistani centres of power, particularly the Punjabi and Sindhi feudal, had also gravitated towards separating the two wings, is generally ignored.

The outcome of the 1971 War was foretold. Pakistani leadership had been divorced from reality. No Borrowed Power was available to Pakistan, either from the United States or from China, whereas India enjoyed full support from the Soviet Union. The dice were heavily loaded against Pakistan. That was the time when the Pakistani decision makers, instead of remaining in a state of limbo, should have tried to reach a rapprochement with Sheikh Mujibur Rehman who was in a Pakistani jail. Instead, they waited for a hallucinatory Seventh Fleet. The author has read the transcripts of the telephone conversations between Nixon and Kissinger during the 71 War. He appreciates the magnanimity of the United States when Nixon told Kissinger to expedite the transfer of a few F-5 fighter aircraft from Jordan to Pakistan. For the Pakistani public, however, nothing else could have created a greater humour. And the language Nixon used in these conversations against Indira Gandhi was unbecoming of any self-respecting man.

During the 1971 War, India used the instrument of psychological war to subvert East Pakistan, which was 1000 miles away from West Pakistan with a sea in between and surrounded by India from three sides. But for the Indian military

trained 2,87,000 strong Bengali rebels who engaged Pakistani forces in high intensity insurgency for nine months, all out support of the former Soviet Union and the deleterious role of USA, Indian ten divisions together with 32 BSF battalions and Mukti Bahinis backed by massive artillery, tank, air and naval support could not have defeated the marooned force of 34,000 regular troops and 11,000 paramilitary forces devoid of air and armour support and cut off from rest of the world. In order to glamorize its so-called victory, Indian writers have been repeatedly mentioning a false figure of 90,000 Pakistani soldiers surrendering to Indian forces.

Brigadier A.R. Siddiqui mentions that, upon hearing of the surrender in Dhaka, General Riza leaned on his shoulder and started crying. This episode reminds the author of a piece from M.J. Akbar's book. Mentioning the fall of the last Moorish fortress in Spain, Akbar (2002) writes:

“In 1491 the Castilians laid siege to the last Muslim Fortress in Spain, and the most glorious of them all, Alhambra. In December the terms of surrender were negotiated. On the first day of 1492 Christian troops entered the castle. On the morning of 2 January, 1492 Boabdil (the Last Moor, sic) handed over the keys of Alhambra. From the summit of a hill, now known as El Suspiro Del Moro, or the Last Sigh of the Moor, as he turned, in tears, to take a last look at Alhambra, Ayesha told her defeated son: “Do not weep as a woman for what you could not hold as a man”.

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VI

STEALING FIRE

Bracing for the Blackmail

Soon after assuming power, Indira Gandhi, in an interview with a foreign correspondent, had termed Jawaharlal Nehru a failed politician because he had succumbed, along with the elder Gandhi and other Congress party stalwarts, to Jinnah's demand for partition of the Sub-continent. She had likened the partition to amputation of the arm from a human body. India would have attacked East Pakistan in April/May 1971 had it not been for Manekshaw's realism and restraint. After the fall of Dhaka, Indira would have gone ahead to finish off West Pakistan militarily if the Indian Army were prepared to take the risks which, given the casualties involved, it was not. Hence the recourse to an indirect approach.

Indian political and military leadership might have been reluctant to continue the war in the west, but they did indeed nurture the ambition of further fragmenting Pakistan by other means. In her official statement in the Indian parliament after the fall of Dhaka, Indira Gandhi had made a fleeting reference about "human rights abuses in Balochistan", implicitly threatening Indian covert and overt interference in the troubled province (this has since been dubbed out from the official records but can be verified from AIR transcripts). The Soviet leadership had also warned Bhutto that if a Bangladesh like situation emerged again, the Soviet Union would act exactly as it did during the 1971 War.

Some weeks after the May 1974 Indian nuclear explosion Indira was given a briefing by the Indian intelligence (on the face of it, by the Atomic Energy Department) in which she was told that it would take Pakistan six years to construct a dedicated nuclear reactor for military applications. This time-frame did not include the period to put up a plutonium reprocessing plant and other installations required to cobble up a nuclear device if Pakistan were to follow the plutonium path. So, perhaps India had more than a decade in which to impose a Pax Indica on the Sub-continent and bring all the South Asian countries (After 71, India had started claiming that Afghanistan was also part of the Sub-continent) into the matrix of Indian security. Indira did not know what Bhutto's mind was conjuring up. However, the Indian assessment about the six years time frame proved correct in another way. Starting 1974, within six years or thereabouts, Pakistan had the bomb.

Events were evolving very fast and it was obvious that India and the Soviet Union had embarked on an indirect approach to further break up what had remained of Pakistan. At midnight, 9th February 1973, the government claimed intercepting a weapons shipment smuggled from the Soviet Union with Iraqi assistance. The next day a team of Special Services Group and Rangers stormed the Iraqi embassy and found a cache of Soviet arms and ammunition along with a large amount of money that was to be distributed among Balochi separatist groups. Bhutto asserted that the arms and money were intended to provide military and financial aid to Balochi nationalists fighting against Pakistan and Iran.

Bhutto also had his frictions with the military. On 2nd March 1972, hardly a little more than two months after assuming power, he sacked Gul Hassan and Rahim Khan, the army and air chief respectively, accusing them of Bonapartism. In April 1973, many army and air force officers were arrested on charges of toppling the Bhutto regime and tried by courts martial at Attock and Badaber. According to Ali (2010) “Bhutto saw this as an excellent opportunity to teach a lasting lesson to anyone else in the armed forces who might think of acting against him”.

What had forced these officers to conspire against Bhutto? Cowasjee (2004), citing Brigadier F.B.Ali, wrote:

“The emotions that drove these young officers to contemplate such a drastic step, involving grave risks, and then to stoically suffer such harsh consequences, were poignantly expressed by Major Saeed Akhtar Malik in his address to the Attock court martial trying him for his life. He said ‘When the war became imminent, I took leave from the PMA and joined my unit,.... Thanks to the CO who requisitioned my services. The next day the war started. But instead of glory I found only disillusionment. The truth was that we were a defeated army even before a shot was fired. This was a very bitter truth. With each corpse that I saw, my revulsion increased for the men who had signed the death warrants of so many very fine men. Yes, fine men but poor soldiers, who were never given the chance to fight back. When they should have been training for war, they were performing the role of labourers, farmers or herdsmen, anything but the role of soldiers. This was not ‘shahadat’. This was cold-blooded murder. Who was responsible for this? I was responsible! But more than me were responsible. What were some of these men, these callous inhuman degenerates, doing when their only job was to prepare the army for war? Were these men not grabbing lands and building houses? Did it not appear in foreign magazines that some of them were pimping for their bloated grandmaster? Yes, generals, wearing that uniform (he pointed at the court’s president) pimping and whoremongering”.*

*Major Saeed Akhtar Malik and many other platoon commanders did not get leave from PMA. They just left PMA and joined their respective units, leaving behind notes about their departure.

True to their army upbringing, they did not blame Bhutto, but those who had played into his hands.

Even before Bangladesh, Indian leadership had used Pakhtunistan bogey to destabilize Pakistan. During the 1950's Sardar Daud, a cousin of King Zahir Shah, had served as prime minister of Afghanistan. Daud's tenure as prime minister was marked by his pro-Soviet policies. In 1960 Daud had sent Afghan forces in Pakistan's Bajaur Agency, across the Durand Line, to press for his claim on the Pakhtun lands east of the Line. His adventure failed as Afghan forces were routed by Pakistan Army. In July 1973, Daud toppled Zahir Shah's government, abolished the monarchy, and declared himself president of Afghanistan. After assuming power Daud reiterated his claim on Pakistan's North West Frontier Province, contiguous to Kashmir. The Soviet Union, in cohort with India, had positioned its pawn in Pakistan's backyard.

After the 1971 War, Indira had promised the Indians of another good news in March 1972. People in Pakistan interpreted Indira's statement in different ways. The common speculation was that in March 1972 India would carry out a nuclear test. However the chairman of the Pakistan atomic energy commission down played these speculations by stating that India had been attempting for the last many years to carry out an underground nuclear test, but failed. The test came in May 1973. It changed the dynamics of power in the Sub-Continent. Bhutto understood its implications for Pakistan's security. When he said that a nuclear bomb is an instrument of deterrence, not meant to be used, he fully grasped the nature of the Indian challenge – henceforth India would use the indirect approach to nibble at Pakistan, using nuclear blackmail to settle its scores. He prepared to meet the blackmail head on.

Bhutto had assumed power on 20th December 1971. He had the inklings of these internal and external threats in mind when on 20th January 1972 he summoned a meeting of Pakistani nuclear scientists at Quetta. He was a man in a hurry. After a day or two the venue was shifted to Multan due to Quetta's extremely cold weather. During the meeting, Bhutto asked the scientists how much time they needed to build a bomb. When they gave a long time frame, he raised his three fingers, telling them that he needed the bomb within three years.

During the Ayub era, Pakistan had a modest nuclear research programme which catered for peaceful application of nuclear science. Under the Atoms for Peace

programme, the United States had provided Pakistan with a zero megawatt research reactor which became critical in 1965. Located near Islamabad, the reactor was used for producing radio-isotopes to be used in medical and agricultural research. Pakistan groped for a nuclear weapons capability only in the aftermath of the 1971 War.

To the commoners, the uranium enrichment facility at Kahuta, 30 km southeast of Rawalpindi, is known as “Atom Bomb Factory”. And that is what actually it is, a factory to enrich enough uranium for mass producing nuclear bombs. Subsequently, when the plutonium reactor would be commissioned, it would supplement the Kahuta facility and also help miniaturize nuclear warheads. A few bombs would have sufficed to achieve nuclear deterrence against India. Why was Bhutto intent upon mass producing atomic bombs? This can only be explained if he had wanted to create a nuclear triad, with the land, air and sea components, to give Pakistan a second strike capability, thus squarely countering the Indian nuclear blackmail.

Pakistan’s quest for nuclear power was in itself a sort of deterrence. It kept the world, particularly India and the United States, guessing and grappling with their options to de-fang Pakistan. While the United States was exhausting itself over in preventing France from delivering a plutonium reprocessing plant to Pakistan, PAF C-130s were busy transporting planeloads of US dollars from Gaddafi’s coffers in Libya to Pakistan (for financing the bomb), and airlifting a complete uranium hexafluoride gasification plant from Switzerland to Dera Ghazi Khan, a sleepy and dusty town located at the tri-junction of Punjab, Sindh, and Balochistan. This would have continued undetected had Khalid Hassan, Bhutto’s press secretary, not spilled the beans before some US spooks. Khalid Hassan was an innocent looking, well-intentioned and patriotic Pakistani. But then a person is very unpredictable when he is in his cups. The world, thence, came to know about the uranium enrichment path headed by one Dr. Qadeer, which Pakistan was following parallel to the overt plutonium reprocessing path to achieve nuclear weapons capability (Weismann& Krosney, 1981).

Before France finally cancelled, under US pressure, the reprocessing plant deal, it had already supplied most of the machinery to Pakistan, except some high-pressure vessels. These were also subsequently provided through sub-contractors. So Pakistan had access to both the technologies, though uranium enrichment path got the maximum media footage. It was reported that while the reprocessing plant was sitting inside a French warehouse, waiting to be shipped to Pakistan, it was bombed and partially damaged by some obscure underground group calling itself

“Front for Nuclear Nonproliferation in South Asia” (Weisman & Krosney, 1981) (read Mossad). But the horses had already left the barns.

We can accuse Bhutto of wittingly or unwittingly supporting the dismemberment of Pakistan. We can call him a two- timer. But we cannot deny him the credit for standing up to India’s nuclear blackmail and single-mindedly framing a plan to achieve nuclear deterrence for Pakistan in the shortest possible time frame. At its zenith, Pakistan’s nuclear programme employed hundreds of scientists and engineers, and thousands of technicians, something unthinkable for a country which could not make even a decent bicycle. And the budget for this programme exceeded Pakistan’s national budget.

Bhutto supplemented his nuclear policy with conventional diplomacy. In 1975, Bangladesh Army toppled Mujibur Rehman’s government on charges of corruption and victimization of his political opponents, killing him and his entire family, except his daughter Hasina Wajid, who at that time, along with her husband, was residing in India. Bhutto immediately recognized the new Bangladeshi government and provided it some help in the form of rice and coarse cloth. Indira Gandhi, while condemning the coup, remained on the sidelines, probably because her intelligence agencies had updated her on how unpopular Mujib had become among his people. Bhutto also started cultivating Afghanistan’s Gulbadin Hikmatyar to destabilize Daud’s government. This happened before Afghanistan’s Saur Revolution as a result of which Daud was eliminated and power was assumed by a group of Marxist ideologues who, due to their extreme revolutionary fervor, embarrassed even the Soviet Union.

In the truncated Pakistan ruled by Bhutto, the quest for nuclear capability had replaced the need for borrowing power – it addressed Pakistan’s conventional asymmetry with India and underwrote Pakistan’s security. It also enhanced Bhutto’s confidence while dealing with the army and his political opponents. While providing deterrence against India, the bomb also promised to reduce the Army’s clout in Pakistan’s internal politics. We have discussed earlier how the power struggle between the generals and the politicians had resulted in the creation of multiple centres of gravity in Pakistan. The post Ayub political struggle that resulted in the civil war in East Pakistan was essentially a power struggle between three centres of gravity - Awami League, the Army, and People’s Party. Conventional asymmetry with India was, therefore, as much a driver for Pakistan’s nuclear programme as Bhutto’s own sense of insecurity against the Army. Bhutto hoped that, with a nuclear deterrence achieved against India, he would have a strong case to reduce the Army.

Did Bhutto's quest for nuclear weapons capability cost him his life? We can only speculate. We do not have first-hand information to verify if Henry Kissinger did indeed threaten to make Bhutto a "horrible example", as Bhutto alleged. Similarly, we cannot verify if Richard Armitage, some three decades later, threatened Pervez Musharraf to "bomb Pakistan into stone age", if it did not side with the USA after Nine Eleven. However, there is no denying that Bhutto had made intractable enemies by persecuting his political opponents, at least one of whom was sodomized by police on Bhutto's orders (the gentleman also alleged that he was later raped by prostitutes while a provincial minister peeped through a ventilator). And these internal enemies had lusted for Bhutto's blood.

Third world leaders crave for symbols of the geopolitical aristocracy, a nuclear bomb being one of them. In the past, Nehru considered India the successor to the British Raj and hence, right from the beginning, craved for such symbols – an aircraft carrier, a nascent nuclear programme with a military dimension, and even a power bloc of his own known as the Nonaligned Movement. And India's quest for joining the nuclear club did not have a China –centric origin, it started much before China became a nuclear power.

Talking of the Nonaligned Movement, it was one of the many Trojan horses sponsored by either of the superpowers during the Cold War. Nonaligned Movement was led by Nehru, Tito, and Nasser. Nasser was a Soviet client through and through. Tito remained a Soviet protégé till rebuffed by Khrushchev. Nehru managed to perform a balancing act like a trapeze dancer, occasionally voting against the Soviet Union in world forums while trying to make the best of both the worlds.

Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC, initially known as the Islamic Conference) was another such Trojan horse created by one Sher Ali Patodi, Yahya Khan's information minister. Sher Ali was virally anti- Bhutto, hence the strongest opposition against OIC came from Bhutto, who alleged it was one of the CIA's many front organizations. Ironically, it was the same Bhutto, who, after assuming power, exploited OIC as an instrument to further his political interests. In his book "If I am Assassinated" Bhutto (1979) claims Pakistan's nuclear programme and holding of the OIC summit meeting in Lahore among two of his biggest achievements. The summit meeting, attended besides others, by King Faisal, Muammar Gaddafi, Anwar Sadaat, Houari Boumédiène, Idi Amin, and Bhutto's nemesis, Mujibur Rehman, was reportedly convened after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War to express solidarity with the Arab world. Actually, Bhutto had cleverly contrived the meeting to recognize Bangladesh and close the East Pakistan chapter

forever. OIC remains, even today, a useless organization oblivious of the sufferings of starving Muslims all over the world while pandering to the interests of overfed, mentally retarded, lethargic, and corrupt rulers of the Muslim world.

During Bhutto's rule, Pakistan was struggling to master the nuclear fuel cycle. Pakistani nuclear scientists, engineers, and technicians played a very appreciable role during this period. However, the scientific community was divided into two camps – those headed by Dr. Qadeer Khan, at the Kahuta enrichment plant, and the atomic energy commission, headed by Dr. Munir Ahmed Khan, and later Dr. Ashfaq Ahmed and Dr. Mubarak Mund. They remained at loggerheads all along, washing their dirty linen in front of the world and calling each other nincompoops. Dr. Munir Ahmed was accused of working for foreign intelligence agencies (Tirmazi, 1995). Dr. Abdus Salam, the Nobel laureate, was also considered a dicey character, feeling more at ease with the Americans than with his fellow Pakistanis. Dr. Qadeer, a metallurgist who brought uranium enrichment technology to Pakistan, was reportedly living beyond his means and had amassed a huge fortune. Despite their flaws, each one of these gentlemen, one way or the other, contributed towards making Pakistan a nuclear power. But they should not have held the nation hostage to their inflated egos, claiming that without them Pakistan's nuclear bomb would have remained a fantasy. For their services, they were paid fat salaries from the tax payer's money (the best that a starving nation could do). Anyone knowing a little bit about the scientific community (and the intellectual community at large) understands their perks and tantrums – attending conferences in foreign countries, not always geared towards intellectual pursuits; staying at seven-star hotels; wining and dining at tax payer's expense. The moral of this story is – do not be mean by telling the world that you have done a favour to your country.

Interestingly, when Bhutto was overthrown, nuclear deterrence remained as potent an instrument of power in the hands of generals as it was with the political forces. Zia also used nuclear deterrence as a dimension of borrowed power to underwrite his rule. This does not suggest that nuclear deterrence did not underwrite Pakistan's security. It did, but it also enhanced Zia's self-confidence while dealing with his internal and external foes. Zia further consolidated the nuclear programme and exploited the differences between the atomic energy commission and Dr. Qadeer's set up by assigning each one of them the task of independently designing and fabricating a nuclear device. Designing the bomb was no problem. Pakistani scientists possessed the know-how to do this. They were also helped by the declassified US documents about the Manhattan Project. A lab test was conducted, and Zia declared before a select audience that Pakistan would have the

bomb by end 1980. This was a year after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. About this time work on the tunnels for carrying out underground nuclear tests was also started. Americans had no option but to look the other way. They needed Pakistan's help to, in Zbigniew Brzezinski's words, "sow shit in Russia's backyard". To further enhance America's vested interest in keeping a friendly Pakistan, Zia offered military bases to the Americans.

Nevertheless, Americans kept a close watch on the activities at Kahuta and elsewhere by recruiting moles and infiltrating them into Pakistan's nuclear weapons facilities. So did the Indians, Soviets, Israelis, French, and many others. A French diplomat was intercepted while travelling on Rawalpindi-Kahuta road and thoroughly beaten up. Later on, Zia rang up the diplomat after he was evacuated to his residence, with many of his ribs broken. Zia consoled the diplomat with his characteristic modesty and promised to bring the culprits to book. Indians were not so lucky and, whenever caught, were terminated after being brutally beaten up. Monitoring and sniffing devices were planted by the CIA in the vicinity of the enrichment facility. Many of these devices were found out by the security personnel, and disabled. However, through some of the undetected sniffing devices, and through their moles, the Americans were able to ascertain, from time to time, the level of uranium enrichment at Kahuta.

Indira Gandhi was hankering to take out Kahuta. She had ordered Indian Army and Air Force to prepare plans for attacking Pakistan's enrichment plant. She witnessed an army- air force demonstration featuring a mock attack on Kahuta. The Indians even contemplated a joint Indo-Israeli surgical strike on Kahuta, but chickened out when the Israelis demanded refueling facilities at the Jamnagar air force station, in India's Gujarat state. Why was Indira so wary of Pakistan's nuclear programme when India itself had become a nuclear weapons state? She knew that a nuclear balance between the two countries would neutralize India's ability to subject Pakistan with nuclear blackmail. Zia was one person who had responded to Indira's coercive policy and arm twisting, particularly her role in Sindh and Balochistan insurgencies, by supporting the Sikh uprising in East Punjab. And this had happened when Pakistan had not yet exploded a nuclear bomb.

By the 1980's, a nuclear deterrence regime had already been established in the Subcontinent. The ambiguous nature of Pakistan's nuclear programme played an important role in this development. This was the period when, under General Sunderji, the Indian army was rediscovering mechanized warfare. To the Indian Army, with a mindset geared towards infantry operations, Sunderji's concepts

about fighting with armoured combat groups sweeping across the deserts of Sindh and the plains of Pakistani Punjab with reorganised army plains divisions (RAPIDs) were very exciting. How much Sunderji succeeded in re-programming the thinking of Indian army officers is difficult to judge because there had been no war between India and Pakistan after 1971. However, the 1986 standoff, which resulted due to India's exercise Brasstacks, did demonstrate they had not got rid of their cautious thinking pattern. They were still shy of taking risks.

We have discussed how desperately India, USA, USSR, Israel, and the European Union countries had been trying to sabotage Pakistan's nuclear programme. Whereas each one of them had its own score to settle, India had specifically, all along tried its best to deny the nuclear deterrent to Pakistan because, after 1971, India's main aim was to reduce Pakistan to the status of Finland vs the Soviet Union. In this endeavour, India borrowed power from the Soviet Union to destabilize Pakistan and render it irrelevant in South Asia. Because China was itself struggling in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution and had serious security problems with the Soviet Union, it could not help Pakistan beyond a certain limit. The 1980s were, therefore, a very critical period for Pakistan.

According to Rikhye (1988), General Sunderji and Arun Singh (Indian defence minister), without prime minister Rajiv Gandhi's knowing, had embarked upon a plan to attack Pakistan and China and recover the territories India had lost during the first Kashmir war (1947-48), and the Sino-Indian border war (1962). According to the plan Indian Army, in concert with the other two services, would hold large-scale exercises – Brass Tacks along the Pakistan border, and Chequerboard along the China border, under the pretext of testing and validating Indian Army's new war doctrine. At an appropriate stage, when the Indian Army would have been deployed along the two borders, the exercises would be converted into operations to launch offensives across the Radcliffe Line, the Line of Control, and the Working Boundary (against Pakistan), and the Line of Actual Control (against China).

Pakistan Army responded by quickly mobilizing and locating its strategic reserves at the places from where they could threaten multiple Indian targets. When this happened, Sunderji requested his prime minister to intervene. About this time, Zia had expressed his desire to witness a cricket match at the Indian city Jaipur. An invitation to Zia was extended, not by the Indian government, but the Indian cricket board. After witnessing the match at Jaipur, Zia visited New Delhi and held talks with Rajiv Gandhi. On his way back to Pakistan, before boarding his plane, Zia took Rajiv to one side and threatened him with a nuclear response if India

attacked Pakistan. Soon thereafter, the direction of exercise Brass tacks was changed from east - west to north- south. Zia had successfully played the nuclear card.

Zia was killed, along with many of his generals and the American ambassador when the C-130 carrying his entourage exploded in mid- air shortly after taking off from Bahawalpur airport, in southern Punjab. He had gone there to witness a demonstration of American M-1 Abrams tank. Zia was killed because he had outlived his utility for some people, groups, or countries. Many conspiracy theories have been propounded about the plane crash. According to one such theory offered by Shahid Amin, an- ex ambassador, Zia was killed by the Soviets. He could, as well, have been killed by the Americans (sic). Anyway, Zia had played a very significant role in making Pakistan a nuclear power.

General Aslam Beg, Vice Chief of Army Staff who became Chief of Army Staff after Zia's death, in a recorded video speech which was played before the officers in all the garrisons, stated that after witnessing the tank demonstration in the Cholistan desert, Zia, along with the rest of the entourage, reached Bahawalpur airport. While they were standing on the tarmac, Zia asked Beg to accompany him in the C-130 which would fly him to Rawalpindi. Then, looking sideways, he noticed VCOAS' plane and remarked, "but of course you have your own plane", and moved towards the C-130. After seeing off Zia, Beg also boarded his plane and took off. A few minutes after the takeoff, Beg's pilot informed him that Bahawalpur air control tower had lost contact with the C-130. Beg ordered the pilot to turn back towards Bahawalpur. After some minutes they noticed smoke rising from the ground and, according to Beg "I knew that everything was lost. And because I would be required more at GHQ than Bahawalpur, I ordered the pilot to head for Rawalpindi". On reaching Rawalpindi, Beg held a meeting with the other two service chiefs and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. Thereafter they called Ishaque Khan, Chairman Senate, to GHQ and asked him to become the president. According to Beg, Ishaque Khan, addressing Beg, said: "General Sahib, you impose martial law and also become the president". Beg continued that, on his insistence, Ishaq Khan reluctantly became the president. The readers can draw their conclusions.

General elections were held soon thereafter and Benazir Bhutto became prime minister. She helped India in crushing the Sikh uprising by providing it information about Sikh insurgents. However, Pakistan acquired the nuclear delivery system during her rule. It is generally assumed that Pakistan's missile programme is based on Chinese and North Korean technologies. If we recollect,

American and Soviet missile programmes (add to them the French missile and jet engine technologies), in fact, their entire space programmes, were based on German technology and scientists. Dr Wernher von Braun, NASA's head who put US astronauts on the moon, was a German who had earlier worked for Hitler. Chinese, Indian, Pakistani, Iranian, and North Korean missiles, one way or the other, are derivatives of Russia's Scud missile which initially was a free flying rocket. Israel's Jericho-1, a very inaccurate and erratic missile, was developed with help from France. Israel fine-tuned the guidance systems of Jericho's later versions through technology stolen from the United States. There is a difference, though – unlike the other nuclear upstarts, Israel does not parade its missiles on the streets. Finally, Pakistan did get help from China and North Korea, but the collaboration was not one-sided. Chinese M-11 was improved through Pakistani inputs. Again, parallel missile development programmes were going on under Dr Abdul Qadeer, Dr Ashfaq Ahmed, and Dr. Samar Mubarak Mand.

Crossing the Rubicon

In response to the Indian tests, Pakistan carried out nuclear tests in May 1998. Was it a wise decision? Israel, having an arsenal of around two hundred nuclear warheads, is an undeclared nuclear power. It possesses the nuclear triad which allows it to deliver nuclear weapons from ground, air, and sea. Through the sanitized intelligence reports leaked to the media, Israel has, from time to time, revealed that, in the event of an existential threat to the Jewish state, Israel would unleash a massive nuclear attack on multiple targets which would cover the entire Middle East, including Iran, and perhaps Pakistan. During the Cold War period, Israel had leaked such sanitized reports to the Soviet Union also, telling it that Israel had targeted Soviet Union's southern republics – Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. However, Israel has not openly carried out a nuclear test and discussing the nuclear programme is taboo in Israel. The strength of Israel's nuclear deterrence lies in its ambiguity. Though possessing a large nuclear arsenal, Israel has declared many times that it would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Israelis are right. Nuclear submarines of the declared nuclear powers, stationed in the Mediterranean, had been carrying sea-launched nuclear missiles even before Israel got the bomb.

Pakistan carried out nuclear tests under prime minister Nawaz Sharif, apparently as a response to India's second round of nuclear tests. Why did India need these tests when it was already a de-facto nuclear power? We can speculate that the Indian leadership had one or more of the following motives for these tests:-

- a. Indians considered Pakistan's nuclear programme a bluff and wanted to call it.
- b. Nuclear explosions were a trap to make Pakistan show its hand, face international sanctions and, as a consequence, go bankrupt.
- c. Indian Prime Minister Vajpai, like his Pakistani counterpart, wanted the tests to gain political mileage and reinforce his position at home.
- d. Vajpai wanted to play it tough by carrying out nuclear explosions and prompting Pakistan to respond in kind. This would enhance Nawaz Sharif's self-confidence and facilitate in bringing him to the conference table where he would be cajoled to put Jammu & Kashmir on the back burner and make the Line of Control a porous, de-facto border.
- e. India required more nuclear tests to re-confirm performance parameters and miniaturize nuclear warheads.

As the events unrolled, Indians did come to know that Pakistan's nuclear programme was not a bluff. They also tricked Nawaz Sharif into carrying out nuclear explosions as a result of which international sanctions were slapped on it. India was also subjected to such sanctions, but its economy was resilient enough to face the music. We cannot say it with certainty about Vajpai, but Pakistan's nuclear explosions did give Nawaz Sharif a new sense of identity and enhanced his self-confidence. Unlike Zulfikar Bhutto, Zia ul Haq, and Benazir Bhutto, who had contributed significantly towards the advancement of the nuclear programme, Nawaz had done nothing. It can be said that he stumbled upon the bomb and made political mileage out of it. Like a sword wielded by a child, he wobbled while brandishing it before India and the rest of the world (more so, to awe-struck his own people). Pakistan is the only country where fiberglass monuments have been erected to celebrate the nuclear explosions, and where dummy missiles adorn the major road intersections.

Soon after the explosions, Vajpai visited Lahore where he and Nawaz Sharif vowed to find a respectable solution to the Jammu & Kashmir problem. Lastly, India had a valid reason to carry more nuclear tests to re-confirm the performance parameters and miniaturize its nuclear warheads. Though, since France stopped carrying out nuclear tests in the Pacific, technology has come a long way and perhaps these requirements can be met through laboratory and computer aided tests. There were rumours that, under cover of Indian tests, Israel had also got its

nuclear warheads tested. These rumors gained credence when India claimed that, besides fission devices, it had also tested fusion (neutron) devices.

The immediate consequence of the nuclear explosions was that the political leadership on both the sides became cockier. After the Indian explosions, a stalwart of India's ruling party demanded that Pakistan should vacate Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas, or else. Nawaz Sharif crowed that he had bested Vajpai by exploding five devices in response to India's four. On the sidelines, he ordered confiscation of the foreign currency deposits to meet the sanctions. Reportedly, his own family members and political friends remained untouched. He also declared going ahead with the construction of Kalabagh dam, a politicized and controversial project. His last pronouncement backfired.

Pakistan could have regularized its position as a nuclear weapons state by asking the International Atomic Energy Agency to send a team of nuclear scientists to Pakistan and showing them a few kilograms of enriched uranium, reprocessed plutonium, or depleted uranium which comes as a by-product during uranium enrichment. This would have conveyed to India, and to rest of the world, that Pakistan possessed the capability to fabricate a nuclear device. Or, like Israel, information showing a knocked down nuclear bomb could have been leaked to the press.

That nuclear deterrence did not prevent Pakistan from attacking the Kargil heights, nor did it deter India from counter attacking these heights, is ample proof that a conventional war under a nuclear overhang cannot be won unless the attacker possesses sufficient conventional punch. Akin to the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, India-Pakistan rivalry has shifted to a lower dimension where proxy operations against each other have replaced conventional warfare. In this scenario, nuclear deterrence acts as a stabilizer which prevents the events from getting escalated beyond a certain level. How reliable is this mechanism? We will try to find an answer to this by analyzing the respective nuclear doctrines of the two countries.

Pakistan does not have a declared nuclear doctrine except what we cull and presume by the pronouncements of various Pakistani mandarins and defence analysts. We are also helped in this regard by the developments on the ground. By putting the fragmented information together, we form a picture where Pakistan will respond to a conventional Indian onslaught, say an armour breakthrough in the Sialkot sector, by employing tactical nuclear weapons inside its own territory. According to Kidwai, Pakistan will also retaliate with nuclear weapons to an Indian attempt at a naval blockade. India has a comprehensive and published

nuclear doctrine which professes “no first use”, but claims a massive nuclear response in case of a nuclear attack by Pakistan. This doctrine panders more to the inhibitions of Indian political and military leadership and their fancy for status symbols by calling for hardened command posts and bunkers, and such like things. Both doctrines are flawed. There is no such thing as a tactical nuclear weapon. This is because a nuclear attack at the tactical level may have strategic implications, prompting the adversary to raise the level of response. If Pakistan retaliates against a conventional Indian onslaught with “tactical” nuclear weapons, India may counter with a strategic response. Now, according to international estimates, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is larger than India’s, which means that Pakistan will launch a second strike with an even greater force. Pakistan is experimenting with firing cruise missiles from its existing nuclear-capable submarines. It is also acquiring new submarines for this purpose from China. Where will it lead to?

Nuclear Conjecturing

Discussion on a future nuclear war hovers between fact and fiction. We cannot make an accurate forecast about a post- nuclear exchange scenario in the context of India and Pakistan because such an exchange will not take place in a linear fashion but unfold in multiple dimensions. However, what little the author knows about Indian and Pakistani psyche, he can safely predict that targeting the enemy with a single nuclear bomb will paralyze the decision-making apparatus of both these countries. Most likely, the central governments will cease to exist, or hide in their nuclear-hardened bunkers and, depending upon their staying power and the strength of their nerves, the military will continue fighting isolated battles. Then, before launching the second strike, both the sides would look for an excuse to draw in the U.N. and the world powers.

The nuclear debate is a fantastic industry in the West, involving billions of dollars. Like war gaming a conventional war, nuclear war gaming also deals with the problem in a mechanical manner, ignoring human behavior and various imponderables. In their discussions and writings, the experts would tend to behave as if they were playing a video game. What do they discuss about a set-piece nuclear exchange? The belligerents, having their respective nuclear thresholds crossed, launch their first strikes; the leadership and a select group of minions rush to the nuclear- hardened bunkers while the commoners face the brunt and killed like flies; isolated and largely scattered conventional fighting continues; after 2-3 weeks , when their respective countries have been laid waste and having fed up from their boredom, the belligerents launch their second strikes from the

nuclear/nuclear capable submarines. There are no survivors except the elite groups hiding under the layers of concrete. Whom are they going to rule? What will happen next? Perhaps a space ship had been reserved for such a contingency. This will transport the survivors to one of Jupiter's moons (Europa, if the author is right). Once inside the warm water ocean underneath the icy upper crust of Europa, the visitors from planet Earth will start it all over again. History begins!

There is another likely scenario where a terrorist group deployed inside Pakistan/Afghanistan launches a radiation bomb attack against India. A radiation bomb, also known as 'dirty bomb', is not a nuclear bomb. It is a radiological dispersion device (RDD): an easy to build conventional explosive packed with radioactive material. When such a bomb is exploded, it disperses radioactive material. A high dose of high energy radiation, such as X-rays emitted by radioactive dust, can induce cancer. Contamination will depend upon the size of the explosive, the amount and type of radioactive material, and weather conditions. Radioactive dust will settle on people, buildings, and roads. Winds and air circulation systems in buildings will spread the radioactive dust even more. Rain will wash the radioactivity into soil, sewer systems, and rivers.

The dirty bomb is not a myth. According to Hughes (2014):

There had been several incidents over the past many years which indicated that dirty bomb threat is real. For example, Chechen rebels directed a TV reporter to a park in central Moscow in 1995. When she reached there she found a package containing about 15 lbs of conventional explosives and Cesium-137, a radio-active element. This was the first known appearance of a dirty bomb. According to frequently cited intelligence reports, Iraq had tested a crude radiological device in 1987. Then there was the redoubtable Osama bin Laden, West's alter ego (sic). Reportedly, Osama's operatives in Sudan had tried and failed to buy enriched uranium produced in South Africa on the black market. A large number of radioactive items that can be used to make dirty bombs are unaccounted for in the USA and Russia.

During the 1998 nuclear explosions in Pokhran, Indians had claimed detonating miniature thermonuclear devices (neutron bombs). There were rumors that, under the smoke screen of Indian nuclear explosions, Israelis had tested their own low yield tactical nuclear weapons, including nuclear artillery shells. As mentioned earlier, Israel is an undeclared nuclear power and has maintained a policy of ambiguity all these years. Reacting to the Indian claim, the Americans declared

that their seismic stations and CIA sensors planted in India had not recorded any low yield explosion.

There is a well-documented history of CIA's nuclear espionage in India. In 1965, a year after China's first nuclear test, the CIA, with logistics support from India's Intelligence Bureau, planted a nuclear-powered remote sensing device atop the 25,645 foot mountain feature Nanda Devi, located in India's Uttarkhand state. Reportedly, the mission failed and the 125 pound device, containing plutonium 238 that can remain active for 500 years, was lost. When a monitoring team returned to the site in 1966, it failed to locate the device. In 1967, CIA deployed a second nuclear-powered device on another feature, Nanda Kot. This second device served CIA's purpose well, but was abandoned a year later. Both the devices are still lying there. There is a strong likelihood that after India's first nuclear test in 1974 CIA covertly planted many surveillance devices on the Indian soil, this time much lighter and miniaturized, to monitor India's future nuclear tests. More details ahead.

What would happen if a radiation bomb is exploded, say, inside the Banihal Tunnel linking Jammu with Kashmir Valley? If the Americans, with all their technological expertise, could not detect a low-yield nuclear detonation, unless they were trying to cover up the Israeli connection, a radiation bomb attack by a militant group in the Indian-controlled J&K territory may deceive the Indians into believing that Pakistan had exploded a tactical nuclear bomb, and they will retaliate. And how would the commoners react? Due to the confusion created by the ambiguous nature of the explosion, the primordial human instinct for survival and self-preservation will overwhelm not only the civil population but also cause the security forces to run for safer areas. Amid this confusion, India will launch a full-scale nuclear attack against Pakistan, to be followed by a Pakistani counter attack.

In yet another scenario, Pakistan and India may try to destroy each other's nuclear facilities, something India tried to do in the 1980s but failed due to lack of political will. The most likely targets for Pakistan are the Indian nuclear power plants at Kota (Rajasthan) and Tarapore (near Mumbai), and the plutonium churning reactors at Trombay (Near Mumbai). For India, the likely targets could be KANNUP at Karachi and the reactor complex at Khushab. What would happen? If the reactors are destroyed, by airstrikes, missile attacks, or sabotage from within, a series of explosions and the resulting fire will send a plume of highly radioactive fallout into the atmosphere and over an extensive geographical area. The rest will be a replay of the events already discussed in the other scenarios.

In his novel “The Third World War : The Untold Story”, General Sir John Hackett(1978) , portraying a fictional third world war between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces which breaks out in 1985, brings the story to its end when the Soviet Union launches a nuclear missile strike against Birmingham, England. The U.S. and Royal navies retaliate with a joint nuclear strike on Minsk, which results in the unraveling of the Soviet Union. And that was when the belligerents were superpowers. In his book “The Fourth Round”, Indian defence analyst Rikhye opens his narrative by describing a fictional Indian attack on the Kahuta facility which expands into a major war between India and Pakistan. “The Fourth Round” is written on the lines of Hackett’s novel. However, Rikhye rates his book superior to “The Third World War” because he goes deeper into minor tactical engagements whereas Hackett confines his narrative to divisional and above level operations.

“The Fifth Horseman” is a 1980 thriller written by Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre. The plot of this novel revolves around Libya’s Gaddafi holding New York city hostage by smuggling a thermonuclear bomb into the city and threatening to set it off. The book had such a shock effect that the French president cancelled the projected sale of nuclear reactors to Libya. The French version of “The Fifth Horseman” differs from the English version. In the French version, the crisis is concluded with the French president secretly inviting both Gaddafi and Begin to seek a permanent solution to the Palestinian problem.

In “The Fourth Protocol” a novel written by Frederick Forsythe, published in 1987, the plot involves a Soviet plan to smuggle the components of a nuclear device into Britain, assemble it and donate it in the vicinity of a U.S. base in Scotland. The huge explosion would obliterate the base and make it look like an accident, drumming up public uproar against U.S nuclear bases in Britain.

Due to the bleak picture painted by the author, do the chances of a nuclear war in the Sub-continent are also bleak? NO! The explanation lies in Fermi Paradox.

Fermi Paradox

According to the Italian physicist Enrico Fermi, the apparent size and age of the universe suggest that many technologically advanced extraterrestrial civilizations ought to exist. However, this hypothesis seems inconsistent with the lack of observational evidence to support it. If the cosmos fulfill conditions for the existence of aliens, why have we not come across them? (Hart, 1975)

Many explanations have been forwarded to answer the paradox. One of these implies that it is the nature of intelligent life to destroy itself. This is the argument that technological civilizations may usually or invariably destroy themselves before or shortly after developing radio or space flight technology. Possible means

of annihilation include nuclear war, biological war or accidental contamination, climate change, nanotechnological catastrophe, ill-advised physics experiments, a badly programmed super-intelligence, or a Malthusian catastrophe after the deterioration of a planet's ecosphere.

This argument does not require the civilization to entirely self-destruct, only to become once again non-technological. In other ways it could persist and even thrive, according to evolutionary standards, which postulate producing offspring as the sole goal of life—not "progress", be it in terms of technology or even intelligence. As a microcosm of planet Earth, India and Pakistan are heading towards validating the Fermi Paradox. What is the way forward? Well, this book has been written to discuss war, not peace.

How will this self destruction come about in the context of India and Pakistan? The answer lies in their contradictory war doctrines. The Indians tend to downplay the nuclear dimension and insist that, in a future war, they will defeat the Pakistan Army through sheer weight of conventional force. Presently, a near parity exists between the two armies. But in case the Indian Army gets such an overwhelming conventional edge over the Pakistan Army that it tries to “kill the fly with a sledgehammer”, Pakistan will definitely use its nuclear option. The author says so with confidence because, Pakistan, being a more fragile state than India, is also a more credible nuclear state. This is how Fermi Paradox will be validated in the Subcontinent.

Taking out Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal

There is a strong lobby in the West which presses for seizing Pakistan's nuclear weapons on the pretext that Pakistan is a highly fragile state. According to Goldberg and Ambinder (2011), specific reasons for taking control of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal are:-

Vulnerability to Nuclear Theft

1. Pakistan is an unstable country located at the epicenter of global Jihadism.
2. It is the only Muslim country, out of 50 or so in the world, to have successfully developed nuclear weapons. Hence it would be an obvious place for a Jihadist organization to seek a nuclear weapon or fissile material.

3. The Pakistan government is willing to make its nuclear weapons more vulnerable to theft by jihadists simply to hide them from the United States.
4. It has been the foremost supplier of nuclear technology to such rogue states as Iran and North Korea.
6. Al-Qaeda (*and Daesh, sic*) is trying to secure a nuclear weapon that they would have no compunction at using.

Unstable Regime

1. Pakistan's central government has serious trouble controlling the many corners of its territory.
2. Its security forces are infiltrated by an unknown number of Jihadist sympathizers.
3. Militants have already targeted at least six facilities widely believed to be the storage sites for nuclear weapons or related materials.
4. Pakistan government is willing to make its nuclear weapons more vulnerable to theft by Jihadists by simply hiding them from the United States.
5. . To hide weapons from the prying satellite eyes of the United States, Pakistan moves warheads around in unmarked vans with low- security profiles down busy roads.
6. Neither the Pakistan army nor the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) seem to consider Jihadism the most immediate threat to the security of their nuclear weapons. Instead, SPD remains focused on rooting out American and Indian spies. PAF trains its pilots to intercept U.S. spy planes.
7. There may be an accidental launch of a nuclear weapon during a period of high tension between Pakistan and India.
8. Rogue elements inside the Pakistan military might take it upon themselves to launch a nuclear attack.

U.S. War Plans

After adumbrating the parameters of the threat posed by Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, Goldberg & Ambinder (2011) next, narrate Pentagon's plans to deal with the perceived threat. They mention that during senate hearings for her confirmation as

secretary of state in 2005, Condoleezza Rice had remarked: “We have noted this problem, and we are prepared to try to deal with it”. Goldberg & Ambinder describe Pentagon’s plans for dealing with various contingencies involving Pakistani nuclear crisis as follows:-

1. If a single weapon or a small amount of nuclear material were to go missing, the response would be contained – Abbottabad redux.
2. Seizing control of –or at least disabling – the entire Pakistani nuclear arsenal in the event of a Jihadist coup or other catastrophic event. The scale of such an operation would be too large. An across the board campaign would be led by U.S. Central Command.
3. In a larger disablement campaign, the U.S. would likely mobilize the Army’s 20th Support Command, whose Nuclear Disablement Teams would accompany Special Operations detachments or Marine companies into the country.
4. At the same time, the U.S. military and intelligence forces have been quietly pre-positioning the necessary equipment in the region. In the event of a coup, U.S. forces would rush into the country, crossing borders, rappelling down from helicopters, and parachuting out of planes, so they can secure known or suspected nuclear-storage sites. Their first tasks might be to disable tactical nuclear weapons – because those are more easily mated, and easier to move around, than long- range missiles.

The fact that Pakistan’s nuclear programme is India-centric is even silently acknowledged by Israel. Whereas Israel considers Iran’s nuclear programme an existential threat to the Jewish state and has vowed to destroy it, it has not expressed a similar concern about the Pakistani bomb. The planned joint Indo-Israeli operation in the 1980s against Kahuta did not materialize because Israel did not press India to provide its aircraft refueling facility in Jamnagar. However, sometime in the future, America and Israel may decide, either because of their own calculations or prompting from India, that the nuclear threat from Pakistan is as grave as the Iranian threat. In such an eventuality, America, in concert with Israel and India, will take a drastic action against Pakistan similar to the one America was contemplating against Iran. How will such an operation develop?

Robb (2006) has discussed a similar scenario where, after running out of “soft” options, America decides to take military action against Iran. We will discuss Robb’s brief before drawing parallels with Pakistan. According to Robb, the US military response to the Iranian nuclear threat will most likely be based on air

power because, given the experience of Iraq, the US does not have the appetite for a ground action against a country as large as Iran. In contrast, employment of airpower offers surgical precision at an affordable cost. However, there are two major problems:-

1. As a result of dispersal and hardening, some of Iran's nuclear facilities will survive a conventional air attack.
2. The destruction of facilities will delay the programme, but most of the threat is contained in the knowledge of its engineers. Eventually, the programme will be resurrected.

To address these problems, Robb recommends a regime change in Iran through a rapidly evolving method of air warfare called the "effects-based operation" (EBO). Iran is an urbanized country and its population relies on national networks vulnerable to disruption and manipulation. An EBO will break down Iran's critical systems, eliminating critical nodes within its electricity, communications, transportation, military, and industrial systems. This will cease all governmental and economic functions in Iran, shutting it off till the regime changes. Simultaneously, the US will arm and actively support ethnic guerrillas (Kurds, Balochs, and Azeris) to turn sections of the country into autonomous zones. The likely air offensive will come from the US carrier groups currently operating in the Arabian Sea south of Iran. With the destruction of its command and control apparatus, the Iranian government will eventually collapse. Hopefully, for the Americans, the new regime which replaces the Ayatollahs will be more pliant and receptive to the American demand for nuclear deals similar to those America concluded with Gaddafi's Libya and Kazakhstan.

In recent times, nuclear disarmament has taken place only where the countries concerned willingly agreed to give up their weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). In the wake of 9/11 attacks, Gaddafi, focusing on termination of U.S. sanctions against Libya, decided to normalize his country's relations with the United States. In December 2003, Gaddafi made a surprise announcement about his decision to dismantle Libya's WMDs. Following the announcement, Libya agreed to destroy all its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. In recent years South Africa, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan have also chosen to willingly give up their WMDs.

Robb's prescription assumes that an effects-based operation will bring about a regime change in Iran whereas it will not. In the wake of Operation Desert Storm, Iran decentralized the command and control structure of its military and security forces, allowing them to keep operating autonomously if the central authority

collapsed. Even after the collapse of Iran's critical systems, a limp central authority will survive and, using primitive means, continue guiding a national resistance movement on the ground. This, along with the fact that Iran has dispersed its nuclear assets, implies that America will be forced to induct its ground forces to physically wrest these assets, something Americans would want to avoid. The history of airpower is rife with Robb-like suggestions. In the final analysis, wars are still won by Mk 1 Grunt and his rifle.

In Pakistan's case power is shared by the political government and the Army. The latter is also the Keeper of the Holy Grail – Pakistan's nuclear assets. Most likely, Pakistan Army would also have learnt its lessons from the Gulf Wars and decentralized its command and control structure. It is perhaps for this reason Pakistan employs a disproportionately large force (a complete Army corps) to guard its nuclear assets. This again implies that the US forces will be embroiled with Pakistani forces in a widely dispersed ground operation to get hold of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, something the Americans are loathe to do .

Analysis

Most of the above mentioned observations have already been discussed at various forums. Here we will deal with the aspects of which satisfactory explanations are missing:

- ***Is Pakistan the Only State Vulnerable to Nuclear Thefts?***

The observations about nuclear thefts are valid. Like any man-made system, Pakistan's nuclear weapons security programme is vulnerable to infiltration, sabotage, and thefts by non-state actors, rogue elements within the armed forces, United States, India, and Israel. Barring the first two elements, the rest of them had been trying to do just that when Pakistan established the enrichment plant at Kahuta. Throughout this period, Pakistani intelligence agencies remained busy neutralizing the sensors planted by the CIA, and apprehending/roughing up/terminating the American, Indian, Israeli and French agents. However, Goldberg and Ambinder create some humour when they insist that the Pakistan government is willing to make its nuclear weapons more vulnerable to theft by Jihadists by simply hiding them from the United States. Why would Pakistan do that? If it has a soft corner for the Jihadists, it would give them nuclear weapons anyway.

According to Fragile States Index-2015 (Chapter I, Appendix II), fragility rankings of India and Pakistan are 79.4 and 102.9 respectively, making India a "Warning" state and Pakistan a "Very High Alert" state? Accepted that

Pakistan is a more fragile state than India, but India is also not a placid country. Presently there are eight major insurgencies going on in India's north-eastern states and Kashmir whereas the insurgency in East Punjab is dormant, not quelled.

- ***Sermons on Nuclear Security***

How many people know that in 1965 the US' Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and India's Intelligence Bureau (IB) joined hands on a clandestine mission to install two nuclear-powered sensing devices on the summit of India's second highest peak, Nanda Devi, and Nanda Kot, a feature nearby? Both the devices lie abandoned in Uttarakhand's Garhwal Himalayas, and keep ticking, each with its deadly stock of plutonium about half the size of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima (Bag,2015).

According to Beckhausen (2013), after China exploded its first nuclear device in 1964, the Pentagon and CIA were worried about how to monitor Chinese missile tests which were being conducted at a top secret facility a few hundred kilometers north of the Himalayan mountains. They desperately needed to find out the performance parameters of the Chinese missiles and compatibility with nuclear warheads. The mountain range blocked ground-based sensors which could have picked up the missiles' radio telemetry signals. Worse, Pakistan had just kicked out America's spy planes and, back in the 1960s, precision satellite imagery was still primitive.

In 1963, USAF General Curtis LeMay, along with a small team of Sherpa guides, had led an expedition to the summit of Mount Everest. The General was tasked by the CIA to head the second expedition in October 1965, this time in a clandestine operation to carry a plutonium-powered generator — known as a SNAP Unit— and a sensor device to a Himalayan peak high enough to secure a direct line of sight to the Chinese missile test site. Once at a suitable summit, the team would assemble the device and aim it towards China.

With the cooperation of India's Intelligence Bureau, Nanda Devi, a 25,645 ft (7815M) mountain within Indian territory was picked for planting the surveillance equipment. Installing the device, however, meant carrying up equipment weighing around 56kg, including an 8-10ft-high antenna, two transceiver sets and the most vital component, a system for nuclear auxiliary power (SNAP) generator. The generator's nuclear fuel, consisting of seven plutonium capsules, came in a special container (Beckhausen, 2013).

However, due to heavy snowfall and declining oxygen levels the expedition was forced to abandon a summit attempt . The nuclear-fuelled generator, nicknamed Guru Rinpoche by the climbing Sherpas, after the Buddhist god, was already emitting heat, and those who knew about its radioactive dangers were apprehensive. Unable to take the generator with them, the team, therefore, secured it near their camp and returned to safety(Bag,2015;Coburn, 2013).

A follow-up Indian expedition which was sent to retrieve the device told the Americans later that it had gone missing, apparently having slid down the mountain in a landslide, carrying its plutonium with it. Another American expedition ,sent in spring 1966 to retrieve the device, flew into the area in helicopters and scanned Nanda Devi for many months with neutron detectors , but failed to pick up any signals. The Americans suspected that Indian intelligence had secretly hiked up there before that spring mission ,retrieved the device, and whisked it away, presumably in order to study it and gather scientific and technical information for their own nuclear weapons programme.

In 1967, the CIA eventually did get a SNAP unit and signal device planted below the summit of Nanda Kot, a 22,510 ft mountain nearby. It was buried in snow three months later and stopped working, although having gleaned enough data from Chinese tests to indicate — at the time — that Beijing did not yet have a long-range nuclear warhead. The plutonium capsules, which have a longevity of over five hundred years, could still be buried somewhere in the snow. The area has been virtually closed for decades. Barring a few exceptions, such as army or Indian Mountaineering Foundation (IMF) sponsored expeditions, nobody is allowed to climb or explore Nanda Devi, purportedly for environmental reasons (Beckhausen,2013)

Fears have been expressed in the Indian and American media about large-scale plutonium contamination of the Rishi Ganga, the river that drains the Nanda Devi glaciers into the Ganga. According to Manmohan Singh Kohli, the Indian team leader, the “lives of millions of Indians would be affected, especially those living along the Ganga, right up to Kolkata”. Water sources and rocks were tested for hints of radiation, but the real results were always doctored by the GOI (Bag, 2015).

Forty years after leading the expedition which, in 1965, hid the first SNAP generator in a crevice atop Nanda Devi, Kohli (2005) makes a startling revelation by expressing the scare when, in the summer of 1968, an Indian team went to retrieve the second SNAP generator from Nanda Kot :

“When the team reached the Dome (the Nanda Kot Dome where the device was installed), they were shocked to see no sign of the entire equipment. They dug a couple of feet and saw an amazing sight. There was a perfectly sound cave formed with the hot generator at the centre. With the continuous heat emitted from the generator, the snow had melted up to 8ft in all directions, creating the spherical cave!” (Kohli,2005).

- ***Uranium Smuggling in Meghalaya***

According to BBC News, in 2008, police in the northeastern Indian state of Meghalaya arrested five people for smuggling uranium ore. The packets containing uranium, seized from the culprits, had the seal of India's Atomic Minerals Division on them. Police were not sure whether those detained were part of a global racket. The arrests were an embarrassing time for India, just days after the Nuclear Suppliers Group ended a ban on civilian nuclear trade with India. Indian officials had a hard time persuading members of the group that their nuclear industry was in safe hands.

- ***The Rosenbergs***

The first major case of nuclear espionage and transfer of top secret nuclear information took place in 1953 in the United States. American citizens Julius Rosenberg and Ethel Greenglass Rosenberg were charged with and executed for treason and conspiracy to commit espionage relating to passing the blueprints of an atomic device to the Soviet Union. Many accomplices of Julius and Ethel, who had made confessions about their crime, were not executed (FBI, the Atom Spy Case). In his judgement on pronouncing the death sentence on Julius and Ethel, Judge Kaufman wrote:

“I consider your crime worse than murder...I believe your conduct in putting into the hands of the Russians the A-bomb, years before our best scientists predicted Russia would perfect the bomb, has already caused, in my opinion, the Communist aggression in Korea, with the resultant casualties exceeding 50,000, and who knows but that millions more of innocent people may pay the price of your treason.

Indeed, by your betrayal you undoubtedly have altered the course of history to the disadvantage of your country. No one can say that we do not live in a constant state of tension. We have evidence of your treachery all around us every day, for the civil defence activities throughout the nation are aimed at preparing us for atom bomb attack”.

In his posthumously published autobiography, Khrushchev (1970) remarked that he learned from Stalin and Molotov that the Rosenbergs had provided very significant help in accelerating the production of Russia’s atomic bomb.

- ***Jonathan Pollard***

The author was hesitant to include Jonathan Pollard’s case in this discussion because the true extent of the U.S. top secret information provided by Pollard to Israel has never been revealed. Jonathan Jay Pollard was an intelligence analyst at the Navy Field Operational Intelligence Office (NFOIO), an office of the Naval Intelligence Command (NIC). He was caught in 1985 and pleaded guilty to spying for and providing top secret classified information to Israel.

Whenever asked to specify the details about Pollard’s spying for Israel, the American authorities concerned always put marbles in their mouths. What has generally come to the fore mentions that he sold numerous closely guarded secrets, including the National Security Agency’s ten-volume manual on how the U.S. gathers its signal intelligence. However, what makes us suspect that Pollard leaked classified information on the naval component of the U.S. nuclear triad also to Israel, are the guarded pronouncements issued from time to time by persons like Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, former CIA director George Tenet, and many others, that the damage to U.S. national security due to Pollard’s espionage was far more severe, wide-ranging, and enduring than publicly acknowledged.

This suspicion is reinforced by the fact that, according to the terms of the U.S. government offered plea agreement to Pollard, he was forbidden from disseminating any information concerning his crimes without first submitting to pre-clearance from the Director of Naval Intelligence. It has been mentioned earlier that for Israelis stealing technology and other national secrets from the United States (as also from Switzerland and elsewhere) is kosher. However , what should we make of Naval Criminal

Investigative Service (NCIS) investigator Ronald Olive's allegation that Pollard passed classified information to South Africa, and attempted, through a third party, to sell classified information to Pakistan on multiple occasions (Olive, 2006).

- ***Operation Plumbat***

After the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, France stopped supplying Israel with uranium fuel for the Dimona reactor. In 1968 Israel hijacked a ship between Antwerp and Genoa. The ship was carrying 200 tons of yellow cake (Landau & Portugali, 1978). The Americans meekly said that this Mossad covert operation "violated EURATOM controls of nuclear materials". What was it if not nuclear piracy on the high seas?

- ***The Ghost of Abbottabad***

According to Goldberg & Ambinder

"when Navy SEALs penetrated Pakistani air defences, landed in helicopters streets away from a prestigious military academy, killed the most wanted fugitive in modern history, and then departed, the Pakistani military was oblivious for the duration pervasive derision followed. A popular text message in the days after the raid read 'If you honk your horn, do so lightly, because the Pakistani army is asleep'" (Goldberg & Ambinder, 2011).

After the raid, CIA chief Leon Panetta remarked that either the Pakistan Army knew about bin Laden staying at Abbottabad, or it was incompetent. Ahem! Goldberg and Aminder imply that a future attempt by the terrorists (or the United States) to grab Pakistan's nuclear weapons will be successful even as the Americans had succeeded in taking out bin Laden in the Abbottabad operation.

There can be three possibilities: 1) Pakistan Army is incompetent; 2) It was privy to bin Laden staying at Abbottabad; 3) It was a joint U.S. - Pakistan operation in which Pakistan Army acted as a facilitator. Why do we consider the third likelihood? According to Time Magazine (May 7, 2012): As the SEALs were landing near the compound, there was an electricity breakdown. There can be three possibilities: 1) it was due to the normal load shedding, which is a regular feature in Pakistan; 2) it was manipulated by the Americans or; 3) it was manipulated by the Pakistanis.

There were deep fissures in the Pakistani corridors of power. We all know how Zardari and Haqqani, president of Pakistan and Pakistan's ambassador to the U.S. respectively at the time of Abbottabad incident, were overactive after the operation and defended the Americans to the embarrassment of the Pakistan Army. It looked Zardari and Haqqani had foreknowledge about the US plans. Perhaps they did not know the details but had the inkling that something tumultuous was going to happen. From this, we can conclude that the Americans, after receiving information about bin Laden's hideout in Abbottabad from the Pakistan Army/ISI, kept the latter in the dark about the impending operation while they took Zardari and Haqqani into confidence on a need to know basis. This thesis is reinforced by Qadir (2012). According to Qadir:-

- a. In his statement announcing the death of bin Laden, Obama said that US counterterrorism cooperation with Pakistan (Army, sic) helped lead the Americans to bin Laden.
- b. CIA's claim that the ISI did not provide the lead was an afterthought, and thus untrue.
- c. Probably, after getting the tip (from Army/ ISI, sic) the US did not take GHQ into confidence about the projected operation because they feared that the Pakistan Army would not execute bin Laden.

Why would the Pakistan Army facilitate the Americans in such a manner? Perhaps the Americans, having been thoroughly smothered up by the Taliban, were in need of a symbolic victory and had requested for such help even if it embarrassed Pakistan. Such embarrassments are a given in asymmetric relationships. In the past also, Pakistan Army had been pulling America's chestnuts out of the fire. If the truth be told, it were 19 Lancers and 7 FF that rescued 75 US marines held hostage at Mogadishu airport by General Adeed's rebels rather than the travesty depicted in Hollywood's "Black Hawk Down". Towards the end of the movie, the marines are shown to be taken to the Pakistani brigade headquarters where they are served tea by Sikhs in Pakistani uniforms.

Stealing Fire

Quest by the Third World countries, to gain access to the mysteries of nuclear power, is considered by the developed countries as akin to stealing fire by Prometheus from Mount Olympus. Franz Kafka (1924) wrote a short piece on Prometheus, outlining what he saw as his perspective on four aspects of this myth:

According to the first, he was clamped to a rock in the Caucasus for betraying the secrets of the gods to men, and the gods sent eagles to feed on his liver, which was perpetually renewed.

According to the second, Prometheus, goaded by the pain of the tearing beaks, pressed himself deeper and deeper into the rock until he became one with it.

According to the third, his treachery was forgotten in the course of thousands of years.

According to the fourth, everyone grew weary of the meaningless affair. The gods grew weary, the eagles grew weary, the wound closed wearily.

So, in Pakistan's case all the four perspectives outlined by Kafka materialized: It was, Prometheus like, clamped to the rock of sanctions which kept feeding on its liver; it pressed itself hard against the sanctions until they ceased to cause pain anymore; The latter day gods forgot about Pakistan's sin; and lastly, the gods grew weary, the sanctions grew weary. Slowly, the gods learned to live with a stubborn Pakistan and accepted the inevitable.

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VII

THE LEGEND OF PETER THE GREAT

*We walked into a narrow hall and then climbed a flight of stairs.
The carpet was worn, and the banister was slightly loose. Our steps echoed
loudly on the squeaky floorboards – not at all what you would expect in an
embassy of a world power.*

Ostrovsky (1994)

From Peter the Great to the Kremlin Gerontocracy

The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on the Christmas Eve of 1979. Pakistan, the country which was going to be in the eye of the storm for the next nine years, remained silent, at pains to comprehend the situation before evolving an appropriate response. The United States and its allies initially reacted stoically as, according to their reasoning, Afghanistan, since long, had been considered a country within the Soviet sphere of influence. Intellectuals and diplomats in the West considered the invasion as yet another step towards the fruition of the centuries-old Russian dream of reaching the warm waters of the Indian Ocean.

Peter the Great died fifty-one years before the birth of the United States. In his much talked about will: *Le Testament de Pierre le Grand*, Peter advised his successors to

“Approach as near as possible to Constantinople and India. Whoever governs there will be the true sovereign of the world. Consequently, excite continual wars, not only in Turkey, but also in Persia and, in the decadence of Persia, penetrate through the Persian Gulf as far as India.”

When Peter the Great was referring to India, he, even as Alexander the Great, his generals and the ancient Greek historians, had in mind the land which now constitutes Pakistan. It is alleged that the testament was a forgery made in the late 1700s by a Polish general, and published in 1812 in Napoleonic France to portray Russia as an expansionist power. Despite having been declared a forgery, the testament was widely quoted in the West, particularly in the aftermath of the Soviet advance into Afghanistan. What had instigated the gerontocracy, which ruled in the Kremlin, to disturb the hornet’s nest in Afghanistan?

On 27th April 1978, Sardar Daoud was killed along with his family members in a coup staged by the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) with the help of the Afghan Army. Nur Muhammad Taraki, who long years ago had served as a clerk in a small Afghan-owned outlet (Pakhtun Food Company) in Mumbai, became the president of the Revolutionary Council and prime minister of the newly established Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. DRA government was organised along factional lines. Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, his deputy prime minister, belonged to the Khalq faction whereas Babrak Karmal and Najibullah were from the rival Parcham faction. As it turned out, they were all armchair Marxists whose favourite pastimes, besides making the ordinary Afghan's life more miserable, were to fight among themselves and lecture even the Soviet leadership on the finer aspects of Marxism-Leninism. As a result of the controversial reforms introduced by the PDPA, which were vehemently opposed by the conservative Afghan society, a civil war started which soon spread throughout the country.

A treaty, signed in December 1978, allowed the DRA to call upon the Soviet Union for military support (Grau & Gress, 2002). In March 1979 about a hundred Soviet advisers and their families were among the thousands killed in an uprising in Herat, near the Iranian border. Following the carnage in Herat, Taraki asked Kosygin for Soviet military aid with men and armaments. Kosygin not only refused this request, but also rejected all further attempts by Taraki to solicit Soviet military assistance. Rebuffed by Kosygin, Taraki next approached Brezhnev whose response was the same. Brezhnev also advised Taraki to ease up on drastic social reforms and seek broader support for his regime. Taraki was killed in September 1979 and power was seized by Hafizullah Amin.

Thus, throughout the PDPA rule, the Soviets remained reluctant to militarily intervene in Afghanistan and repeatedly refused such requests during Taraki's rule and later during Amin's short rule. The Soviets, after reluctantly sending their forces in Afghanistan, hoped that they would soon quell the rebellion against PDPA and hand over the conduct of operations to the local forces. Keeping in line with their strategy, they were adamant to beef up their forces in Afghanistan. In 1985, when the Afghan insurgency was at its peak, the Soviet Union had no more than 120,000 troops in Afghanistan.

East of the Durand Line

Zia had seized power in July 1977 by toppling the Bhutto regime. On 4th April 1979, he executed Bhutto on charges of masterminding the murder of a political opponent. The intended victim of the murder had survived, though, and his father was killed instead. Zia's action had provoked worldwide condemnation. The world had not accepted Zia's coup against Bhutto's popularly elected government. His government was facing the problem of political legitimacy. By hanging Bhutto, Zia had further isolated himself in the world. Moreover, the country he governed was in danger of being squeezed out of existence by India and the Soviet Union. As a result of the invasion, refugees, along with Soviet and Khad agents, had started pouring into Pakistan, further aggravating an already precarious security and economic situation.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a windfall for Zia's martial law regime. If somehow he could rally support from the world, particularly the United States, he would have access to the much needed borrowed power he was desperately in need of. He needed the borrowed power both for his personal survival as well as for Pakistan, which was threatened simultaneously by India to the east, and the Soviet Union along its western border.

Being a cautious man, Zia turned to Akhtar Abdur Rehman, his spymaster, for evolving an appropriate response to the multiple challenges spawned by the Soviet invasion. This was happening when the Americans were still waiting on the sidelines for the events to evolve further. In the absence of support from the United States, what Akhtar produced was a bold plan which committed Pakistan to the military option without provoking the Soviets into a direct confrontation. It called for covertly supporting the Afghan resistance to wage a guerrilla war in Afghanistan. For this to happen, Pakistan would offer the border areas of the NWFP and Balochistan as sanctuaries for both the refugees and the Mujahideen (Yusuf & Adkin, 1992). The ISI had based its plan on its assessment of the level of Soviet troop motivation and the contradictions and weaknesses inherent in the Soviet system. This assessment widely differed from the picture painted by the Americans.

Like Bhutto, Zia also goaded the otherwise inert Organization of Islamic Countries to wake it up from its slumber. In January 1980, foreign ministers from 34 Islamic countries adopted a resolution demanding an immediate and unconditional

withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The UN General assembly also passed a resolution protesting the Soviet intervention by a vote of 104 to 8. A month had passed after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan when President Jimmy Carter, in a panic, offered Zia four hundred million dollars in economic and military aid. Zia rejected the offer, calling it “peanuts”.

Bhutto, while ruling Pakistan, had tried to impose his socialist agenda on the economy. Acting with a vengeance against the big business which had generally opposed him during the 1970 elections, Bhutto had nationalized heavy industries and banks. Later, his wrath would fall even on small businesses like flour mills. Wali Khan, Bhutto’s arch-rival, termed the nationalization as nothing other than handing over the factories to the hopelessly inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy. As a result, huge investments in heavy engineering, chemicals, and other sectors started going down the drain, till nothing was left of the factories but hulks. While Bhutto set about destroying the old enterprises, considered by him as symbols of a decadent era, he also started creating new ones which, he thought, would be remembered as monuments to his greatness. Construction of the steel mills was negotiated with the Soviet Union. China would provide help in establishing a tank rebuild factory near Islamabad, and a Mirage rebuild facility would be established with French help. He even cajoled the Shah of Iran to invest in two textile factories in Balochistan. Bhutto cultivated personal relationships with the Gulf sheikhs and Gaddafi of Libya. Pakistanis, in hundreds of thousands, found jobs in these countries and became a major source of foreign remittances. However, in 1977, as a result of four months of civil unrest, and partially due to Bhutto’s socialist policies, Pakistan was in the grip of double-digit inflation.

Besides the economy, the armed forces were also in need of replacing their obsolete equipment. In 1979, PAF was still flying Korean War vintage Sabres. After a series of air crashes where the aircraft wings buckled, these aircraft were permanently grounded when X-ray scans revealed hairline cracks in their airframes. What remained were around 100 x Mirages (III & V) and 200 x MiG-19s. The latter was also a remnant of the Korean War. Having no radar, MiG-19’s sole source of getting information about hostile aircraft, after eyeballs mark II, was its VHF radio contact with the ground control. To improve the aircraft survivability, the PAF had installed a radar warning receiver on MiG’s tail, and a Sidewinder missile to enhance its firepower. On the other side, India was inducting MiG-23, Anglo-French Jaguar, and BAE Harrier.

In his report submitted before the 1971 War, Captain Shariff (Later, Admiral Shariff, CNS Pakistan Navy), had recommended a gradual replacement cum

extensive repairs programme for the navy's all surface combatants. The recommendations could not be implemented because of shortage of funds. When Shariff became CNS, the Navy, which had so far operated on a policy of Sea Control, opted to operate, for an interim period, on a policy of Sea Denial as Sea Control was beyond its capacity. Whereas India was getting the latest Soviet warships and submarines for a song, against payments in the form of footwear and such like items, Pakistan Navy was decommissioning its WW2 vintage surface combatants. China had provided a few coastal defence craft. PN was thus relegated to a coastal defence, nay, a harbour defence force.

The Army, besides having Chinese T-59 tanks, had a considerable number of M-47/48 Pattons. T-59 tank, in spite of the poor Chinese metallurgy, was accepted because the Chinese provided it free of cost. The Patton, with its 90 mm main gun, was outgunned when compared with the Indian Centurion, Vickers, and T54/55 tanks. It was when the Shah of Iran offered Pakistan, of course, on payment, to upgrade the M-47 Patton tanks. The upgrades included an AVDS-1790-2A diesel engine, CD 850 -6A transmission, replacement of the bow gunner's position with additional ammunition stowage, besides many other small modifications (Zaloga, 1999). What happened to the upgraded tanks is another story. Iran took a very long time to complete the upgrades. Some of the upgraded tanks, out of a total of 147, were delivered back to Pakistan while the rest were still in the process of being handed over when the Shah's government was toppled. Soon thereafter, Iran-Iraq war broke out and the Ayatollahs promptly diverted the upgraded tanks to the battlefield, without even bothering to compensate Pakistan.

Till 1980, 3.5 inch rocket launcher was Pakistan Army's standard handheld anti-tank weapon. This was again a remnant of the Korean War. The main problem with this weapon was its firing mechanism which was battery operated (though the later versions had a magneto starter system). After the 71 War, Chinese had supplied their Type 69 rocket launcher (a reverse-engineered RPG7). Chinese had also supplied a 75 mm recoilless rifle. It was issued only to the mountain formations where it was employed as a handheld weapon in bunker busting role. In 1980 or thereabouts Pakistan Army reverse engineered the Soviet RPG-7 and was still struggling to produce the ammunition for this weapon.

It was in this backdrop when Zia accepted Reagan's offer of military and economic assistance to Pakistan. It was some months before the U.S assistance would be made available. During the intervening period Pakistan, particularly its armed forces, would have to deal with batteries of American delegations which descended upon the army formation headquarters and thence on the fighting units to get, what

they called, first-hand information about our war preparedness. During such visits, the guests were given demonstrations on various aspects of training and taken around the kotes, mechanical transport parks, and firing ranges. The author remembers one such visit to his unit where the head of the delegation remarked that whereas Pakistan Army was thoroughly professional, it was constrained to devote disproportionately longer time on maintaining and keeping its equipment fit for war. This, he observed, was done at the cost of training. The Americans behaved as if they were deeply concerned about the Pakistan Army's lack of modern equipment. In retrospect, one realizes that the main purpose of such visits was not so much their concern about obsolete equipment than to fathom the willingness of Pakistan Army's rank and file to take on the Russian bear.

Nearly three decades after getting involved in military pacts, Pakistan was still dependent on borrowed power from the United States. The pseudo-industrial infrastructure created by Ayub Khan had nearly been destroyed during Bhutto's reforms. American military aid had been cut off in the wake of the 1965 War, and Pakistan's weak economy could not meet military's growing requirements to face the external challenges. Resumption of American economic and military aid in the 1980s provided Pakistan another opportunity to build up its national power. As expected, India vehemently opposed U.S. aid to Pakistan as it would make Pakistan powerful enough to stand up to India's blackmail.

Through GHQ, a U.S. Army general service publication (GSP) on the Soviet Army was circulated to the formations. It was an interesting read which gave in detail the tables of organization and equipment down to the unit level. It also discussed the Soviet Army's doctrines and tactics. Presentations on the GSP were arranged by the junior formations and units and it was very exciting to discuss the motor rifle divisions (MRDs) and FROG (Free Rocket over Ground) regiments. The GSP painted an awesome picture of the Soviet Army, particularly its mobility and firepower. Besides the official U.S. publications, the American gossip depicted the Soviet soldier as a thoroughly indoctrinated and motivated person, an embodiment of "The New Soviet Man", ready to spill his blood for the motherland.

Zia's decision to support the Afghan resistance was, except for one or two religious parties, vehemently opposed by Pakistani political opposition, particularly the left-leaning Pakistan Peoples Party, which was unseated by Zia's coup, and the defunct National Awami Party which had close contacts with both India and the Soviet Union. The insurgency in Balochistan had not yet fully abated and the local chieftains hostile to the central government had all their loyalties and sympathies with the Soviets. Nawab Sher Muhammad Marri, a key leader of the

1973-77 Baloch insurgency had, along with his tribesmen, gone into a self-imposed exile in Afghanistan, where he remained till 1993, a year after the government of President Najibullah was toppled by the Taliban. He was eventually evacuated to Pakistan in a PAF C-130 plane. So much for Pakistan's Byzantine politics. How would Zulfikar Ali Bhutto react to the Soviet invasion had he been still alive and in power?

In less than two years after Bhutto had assumed power in Pakistan, King Zahir Shah, who had ruled Afghanistan from 1933 to 1973, was overthrown in a military coup by his cousin Sardar Daoud who abolished the monarchy and declared Afghanistan a republic. It has been stated that, while serving as prime minister during the 1950s, Daoud had reiterated Afghanistan's claim on the eastern Pashtun lands which formed part of Pakistan's NWFP province. In 1960, Daoud embarked upon waging a border war with Pakistan by sending Afghan troops across the poorly marked Durand Line, Pakistan's de-facto border with Afghanistan. Daoud's adventure failed when Pakistan Army routed the Afghan troops who had infiltrated into Pakistan's Bajaur Agency. In 1961, as a result of Daoud's hostile policy, Pakistan closed its border with Afghanistan. Being a landlocked country, Afghan transit trade with India and the rest of the world was dependent on Pakistan's land and sea routes. Having lost access to these routes, Afghanistan turned to the Soviet Union and Iran. The crisis was finally resolved when Zahir Shah, under pressure from the Shah of Iran, forced Daoud to resign. Thereafter Pakistan opened its border to Afghan transit trade and normal movement. All along this period, India had been covertly supporting Daoud's policy of destabilizing Pakistan.

On seizing power in 1973, Daoud resurrected his revanchist claims on Pakistan's territory. Again, India and the Soviet Union supported Afghanistan to further reinforce their efforts at Balkanization of what had remained of Pakistan. Bhutto retaliated by authorizing, under Major General Naseerullah Babur, covert operations in Afghanistan. During 1974, Pakistan's intelligence agencies extradited Burhanuddin Rabani and Gulbadin Hekmatyar to Peshawar, two Afghans who would later play decisive roles in the Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union, to Peshawar (Bowersox, 2004). It was feared that both these leaders were on the hit list of Daoud.

In 1974, Jamiat Islami militants attempted at overthrowing Daoud's government by starting a rebellion in Afghanistan's Panjshir valley. The insurgency was defeated and a large number of rebels sought refuge in Pakistan, where they enjoyed the hospitality of Bhutto's government. It was Bhutto's proactive Afghanistan policy which eventually forced Daoud to seek a peaceful solution to the border dispute

with Pakistan. In retrospect, one can safely infer that, had Bhutto been alive and still in power in 1979, his response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan would not have been much different from Zia's. Bhutto, even as Zia, was equally in need of borrowed power, both for himself as well as Pakistan. It was the edifice created by Bhutto upon which Zia and his spymaster built their response to the Soviet invasion.

As the things proved later, America would strongly support Zia's regime as long as he followed the American policy of "sowing shit in Russia's backyard". There were frictions, though, as Zia effectively quarantined the CIA from dealing directly with the Afghan warlords. Though it immensely irked the Americans, the alliance of seven Afghan fighting groups was controlled by ISI. Whereas CIA provided weapons and money, it was the ISI, which distributed the funds to Afghan warlords, trained the Afghan fighters at its dedicated training facilities, and stored the American, Chinese, Czechoslovakian, Egyptian, and Indian supplied weapons in its warehouses. Yes, India was not averse to making some quick bucks and had also been providing, on payment made by the CIA, .303 rifles, and their ammunition, for the Afghan insurgency (Yousaf & Adkin, 1992). The author refrains from quoting the remarks made by the CIA about the Indians.

The Arena

The Soviets had sent their motor rifle divisions into Afghanistan expecting a Hungary or Czechoslovakia like operation, where the Soviet tanks had overawed and swept relatively soft, educated, and pondering type urban populations. However, unlike Eastern Europe, the Soviets did not come across mobs of civilized street agitators in Afghanistan. Instead, they faced battle-hardened fighters who attacked them in small groups and then melted away into the local population. Contrary to the CIA propaganda, it has been variously reported that the Soviet troops sent into Afghanistan were ill-equipped, poorly trained and improperly fed. Except for the famed Spetsnaz and recon infantry, they were not sufficiently motivated to take on the Afghan fighter. It had been a long time since WW2 when the Russian soldier would attack his German counterpart with the ferocity of a cornered animal.

Despite all these Soviet weaknesses, Colonel Imam, an ISI handler of the Afghan Mujahideen, who had participated in the Mujahideen's various battles against the Soviet troops, considered the Soviet soldiers head and shoulders above the American troops who streamed into Afghanistan during the US invasion. Imam was killed by the Pakistani Taliban in the wake of 9/11 (Schofield, 2011).

In the rough terrain of Afghanistan, the Soviet motor rifle divisions were ineffective against small guerrilla groups which used hit and run tactics and did not present a tangible target to the enemy. In mountainous terrain and built up areas, armour protection and firepower give a false sense of security to the tank crews and infantrymen cloistered inside the APCs/IFVs. Even with a combined armour-infantry attack against a static defence to clear the objective overrun by the tanks, mechanized infantry is of little value unless it dismounts, runs through the minefield, attacks the defender, and overcomes the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting. This is what some of the armies trained in mechanized warfare are averse to.

In a set piece Soviet attack, the Mujahideen localities were pounded by fire from gunship helicopters and artillery. ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns mounted on medium trucks would engage and try to flush out the guerrillas holding the heights. Thence, the Soviet armour, closely followed by mechanized infantry, attacked and swept across the area, firing with all their weapons. Rarely did the mechanized infantry dismount and pursue the enemy into their hideouts where the tanks and IFVs could not go. This happened during the Panjsher offensive and was replicated elsewhere. Resultantly, when the Soviet troops withdrew after a battle, the rebels came out of their sanctuaries and reorganised for fresh attacks. Whereas Imam (Schofield, 2011) mentions that the Soviet mechanized infantry dismounted and did engage the Mujahideen in hand to hand fights, such engagements should be considered as exceptions.

The Afghan revolt against the Soviet occupation replaced the tribal chief with the Mujahideen commander who was a creature of the peculiar circumstances and social forces unleashed by the war. In this new development, tribal loyalties were subordinated to the religious underpinnings stressed by the Mujahideen commander, or the warlord, a term popular with the Western press. As the centre of gravity shifted towards the warlord, Afghanistan's primitive pastoral economy was morphed into a war economy based on foreign funding and weapons and narcotics smuggling (though the latter had existed earlier also, but on a smaller scale). The warlord and his apparatus did not function in a vacuum. The network of insurgents operated from the bases located in Pakistan. We will now focus on how the insurgents operated from Pakistan.

As mentioned earlier, the covert operation inside Afghanistan was supported by the CIA and various other intelligence agencies that, though accorded due respect by

Pakistan's ISI, were not allowed to act beyond providing the finances, weapons, and equipment for the insurgency. The distribution of funds, materiel, and tasking to the seven party coalition of warlords was done by ISI. The operations undertaken by the Mujahideen outfits were cumbersome and slow moving, at times taking more than two months to accomplish an assigned task.

Out of the funds and materiel provided by ISI, the warlord would pay to his operators (transporters and fighters), bribe the Afghan Army officials, and also give the local Communist Party apparatchik his cut. The firing team or raid/ambush party would, in turn, arrange for the logistics, transport the free-flying rockets and their launchers*, or explosive in the vicinity of the intended target (in case it was a bombing/ sabotage operation), or move the fighters to the likely concentration area, and execute the operation. The entire chain of operation, starting from the receiving of money by the warlord and his tasking by the ISI operative, to the actual execution, had that many beneficiaries. This was the modus operandi of Mujahideen operations fuelled by the Afghan War economy.

*Chinese Type 63 ,107 mm Multiple Rocket Launcher (12x tubes) has been considered as a no bullshit workhorse of the underdog. The launcher can be easily set up on a rock or other firm surface and crudely aimed in the direction of its target up to five miles (8.05 km) away. Accuracy is mostly guesswork. It is still being used by the Taliban in Afghanistan. The trigger mechanism is usually connected to an improvised timer; a burning cigarette butt or a block of ice. Once the cigarette butt reaches its fag end, or the ice block melts, it joins two trigger wires connected to a battery. This sets off a barrage of explosions aimed at the enemy camps and installations. The Soviets could do little to stop the barrages against their air bases and other sensitive installations. When they retaliated with all the firepower at their disposal, the culprits were likely gone. Mujahideen loved this type of fireworks.

Afghan War and Indo-Pakistan Rivalry

Pakistan's response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan cannot be separated from the Indo- Pakistan rivalry. We now have a fair number of indicators from which to derive conclusions about the intentions of the Indian leaders. It has been mentioned how, soon after the 1971 cease-fire on the western front, an insurgency had flared up in Balochistan. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan created a new window of opportunity for Pakistan. Though belatedly, and with strings attached, economic and military help from the United States provided much needed "borrowed power" to Pakistan to address its economic and security issues. By then, Bhutto had been executed and Zia ul Haq was firmly in power. We can never be sure if there was a grand design by Zia behind how the events unraveled in the region. Most likely, he shrewdly responded to the different challenges presented to him by India, the Soviet Union, and the rest of the world, laid down an intricate web of minefields

and created a deep quagmire which his internal and external foes find difficult to negotiate till today

What was Zia up to? He was a man of few words who seldom shared his thoughts with others except his very tight inner circle, that too on a need to know basis. An example of how he manipulated the things to achieve his goals is the way he exploited the rivalry between the Kahuta enrichment facility and the Atomic Energy Commission and set them up in a race to separately develop the nuclear bomb. He was accidentally hurled into power and massively underestimated by Bhutto, who had brought him into power, and by his peers who had helped him in overthrowing Bhutto. He had seized power without any grand design and plans on running the affairs of the state. As the time went by, Zia learned his ropes and gradually built up the edifice to interact with and influence the internal and external forces around him. What he was doing, and wanted to do in the future, can be partially reconstructed from his actions while the rest can only be presumed.

Zia borrowed power from the United States, China, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere for his personal as well as Pakistan's survival. We know that his Afghan policy was not only aimed at defeating the Soviet Union, but also facilitating the emergence of a friendly Afghanistan, which would not be used by India as a staging area for destabilizing Pakistan. Perhaps this was the intention which was later expanded into the infamous concept of strategic depth after Zia's death. Zia had cobbled up a seven-party alliance, but avoided to provoke the warlords by interfering in their internal feuds.

While dealing with the threat on the western front, Zia was also alive to the challenges posed by a hostile India. He had supported the Khalistan movement as an answer to Indian supported insurgencies in Sindh and Balochistan. Perhaps it was unrealistic to expect that India would succumb to the demand for an independent Sikh state that would be a buffer between Pakistan and India. However, Zia's actions indicate that he at least intended to break India's eggs in East Punjab to keep the Khalistani insurgents busy in making omelets. This was necessary to interdict India's line of communications to the occupied Jammu & Kashmir.

There was no significant movement in the Indian-held Kashmir throughout Zia's more than ten year rule. The Valley, even as its lakes, remained placid. It was India, which disturbed the status quo by occupying the Siachen glacier in 1984. We will discuss it separately. However, by the same year, the success of Afghan insurgency had made Zia confident and bold enough to think about dovetailing the situation in

Kashmir with what was happening in Afghanistan. The Soviets were on the retreat in Afghanistan and it was a matter of some months before the fighting would cease, rendering the Mujahideen jobless. Something had to be done to keep the Afghans busy. So Zia evolved, according to the Indian claims, “Operation Topac” which envisaged hotting up the Valley and simultaneously diverting the Afghan insurgents eastward. While doing so, Zia was careful enough to ensure that India would not over react, as it did during 1965. We can surmise that he would have kept the temperature in the Valley hot enough to irk India while restraining it, through nuclear deterrence, from openly going to war with Pakistan.

The Solzhenitsyn Phenomenon

To some extent, the train of thoughts of the Army high command can be assessed through the speeches they deliver on various occasions. In 1986, General Aslam Beg, then the Commander XI Corps, in his address delivered at the Command & Staff College, gave his concept about the likely secession of the Central Asian Republics from the Soviet Union. With the help of slides, Aslam Beg explained the significance of these republics, considered as the soft underbelly of the Soviet Union, and the implications of their gaining independence from the communist tyranny. He predicted that, after gaining independence, these republics would become a huge buffer between Russia and the Muslim states stretching from Pakistan to the Near East. In 1992, not only did Aslam Beg’s predictions come true and there emerged seven independent Muslim states in Central Asia, the entire Soviet Union unraveled into more than fifteen independent countries.

There is another dimension to this issue. A significant segment of the Russian intelligentsia had started considering the Central Asian republics as a drain on the Soviet Union. It needs a separate discussion to highlight how the Slavic races had dominated the Bolshevik movement, relegating non-Slavs, particularly the Turkic races of Central Asia, to a secondary role. In the late 1980s, the period when the fighting in Afghanistan was at its peak, the inhabitants of the Soviet Union, Slavs and non-Slavs alike, were getting disgruntled from their government’s misadventure in Afghanistan. Being better educated, more prosperous, and holding greater power than the Central Asian Muslims, there was a general feeling among the Slavic races, which spearheaded the disintegration of the Soviet Union, that the sooner they got rid of Central Asia the better. This reawakening of Slavic consciousness was led by intellectuals like Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the Soviet dissident, after he was granted political asylum in the United States during the 70s, gave an interview which was published in the

Time Magazine. In the interview, Solzhenitsyn had expressed concern over the rapidly increasing Muslim population in the Soviet Union. His solution: Get rid of the Muslim republics of Soviet Central Asia, but keep the Russified areas of the Caucasus within a cohesive, predominantly Christian, Russian Federation. Solzhenitsyn was awarded the Nobel Prize in literature. The Swedish Academy that sponsors the Nobel Prize has been accused of using Nobel as an instrument for bolstering the West's policy line. During the Cold War, the Soviets repeatedly criticized it for awarding prizes to dissidents like Boris Pasternak, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and Andrei Sakharov.

In 1990, Solzhenitsyn wrote an essay "Rebuilding Russia", in Komsomolskaya Pravda. In the essay, Solzhenitsyn repeated his previous concerns and urged Russia to cast off all non-Slavic republics, which he thought were a burden on the Russian nation. He called for the establishment of a new Slavic state incorporating Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and parts of Russified Kazakhstan (during the 1960s, Khrushchev had colonized Kazakhstan by settling a large number of Russian farmers there under his agricultural reform policy, sic). This rejuvenation of Slavic nationalism, exhorted by Solzhenitsyn and many others, can be regarded as a "benign ethnic cleansing". The concept later provided inspiration for the more notorious ethnic cleansing that was unleashed by Slobodan Milošević in Yugoslavia.

In August 1991, there was a coup against Michael Gorbachev. A comical coup in which the Soviet tanks surrounded the parliament of the Soviet Federated Socialist Republic of Russia (SFSR). Yes, the same SFSR that was, at the time, ruled by Boris Yeltsin. During the coup, while general secretary Gorbachev was under house arrest in his dacha on the Black Sea, Boris Yeltsin was holed up inside the White House, the Russian parliament, directing a counter-coup against the Red Army. And all this was being shown to the world on CNN. The curtain fell with the Soviet tanks withdrawing meekly to their garrison. It was the first time in their history when the Soviet tanks had withdrawn without quelling an open rebellion.

On 8th December 1991 leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus secretly met in western Belarus, and signed the Belavezha Accords, which proclaimed the dissolution of the Soviet Union and declared the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), leaving the Central Asian republics to fend for themselves. On the night of 25th December 1991, at 7:32 p.m. Moscow time, after Gorbachev left the Kremlin, the Soviet flag was lowered for the last time, and the Russian tricolour was raised, symbolically marking the end of the Soviet Union.

The Loose Cannons

Zia had started with Afghanistan, added held Kashmir in his scheme of things, and later expanded his canvas by including Central Asia. Perhaps only he knew how he would achieve his objectives. However, he had overstretched his ambitions. In 1987 the stakes had become almost insurmountable for him. Throughout the Afghan War, Americans had tried their best to keep Zia pliable and use him as a tool for the accomplishment of their strategic objectives in Afghanistan. While he was a thorn in the flesh of the Soviet Union and India, nothing irked the Americans more than Zia's independence. We will not waste time here about discussing, for the umpteenth time, conspiracy theories behind Zia's death.

They accused him of breeding Islamic fundamentalism and nurturing the Kalashnikov culture in Pakistan, yet none of Zia's successors had the political will and the vision to steer Pakistan away from Zia's domestic and external policies. Zia had used religious orthodoxy as a means to perpetuate his rule and to counter the centrifugal forces abetted by India and the Soviet Union. Perhaps, in a state of war, Zia's policies were justified, and he was successful in his policies to an extent. After the Soviet Juggernaut was bridled in Afghanistan, Zia was eliminated by the same forces which had needed him during the crisis. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, a reappraisal of Zia's policies was in order. However, short of howling and cursing Zia, his successors were content with maintaining the status quo. More than ever, the Kashmiris needed Pakistan's support. With the Soviet Union humbled, the United States no longer needed Pakistan. Hence the need to realign Pakistan's strategy in dealing with India.

Why has peace remained ever more elusive in Afghanistan? Especially in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal from this country almost three decades ago. If we look back, Afghanistan under Zahir Shah (1933-1973) was a peaceful country. It was because at that time, like the tribal societies elsewhere, Afghanistan was actually a confederacy. The King held sway in Kabul and the major cities while the rest of the country was ruled by the local tribes and clans. There were local governors and administration, but at the grass roots level, the real power rested with the tribal chiefs. It was a functional arrangement which had, for four decades, maintained a precarious equilibrium between the various power centres. This equilibrium was immensely disturbed when Sardar Daoud toppled the monarchy and declared Afghanistan a republic. PDPA government, and later, the subsequent Afghan administrations under the Soviet occupation, erased whatever little local empowerment had remained.

As the war proceeded, the Mujahideen, with the warlord sitting on top, grew in strength. In due course of time the seven main Mujahideen groups, each of them having many auxiliaries, would be transformed into mafias which, besides fighting against the Soviets, were also engaged in their favourite tribal pastime – kidnapping, extortion, and drug trafficking. Even as the Knights Templar of the infamous crusades, each warlord created his own cult. As long as they were fighting against a well-defined, common enemy, their prejudices and hatred for each other remained generally unnoticed. However, with the war coming to a close and the Soviets started retreating, the differences between the warlords started accentuating.

The war in Afghanistan had provided jobs for hundreds of thousands of soldiers of fortune and created a black economy worth billions of dollars in the entire region. We cannot say if the planners of the Afghan resistance were aware of the consequences of creating militias which would subsequently become mavericks. In retrospect, we can speculate that the Americans cared two hoots what happened after the war as they were only interested in defeating the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. As for Zia, either he was ignorant or, like the Americans, did not care.

With the Soviets out of Afghanistan and Najibullah, a Soviet surrogate, controlling the cities, it was naïve for Pakistan and rest of the world to think that the Mujahideen would somehow overthrow Najibullah and form a government in the war-torn country. The Mujahideen thrived on chaos and intrigue. Their very existence depended on keeping the Afghan cauldron boiling. Why would they break their swords and turn them into plowshares? Hence the Afghan infighting which continued unabated throughout the 1990s and ultimately resulted in the emergence of the Taliban. There are parallels in history where non-state actors, after been used by their rulers for fighting against foreign powers, turn against the state. To highlight this aspect, we will next discuss the Knights Templar, Kharijites, and Assassins, in that order.

The Knights Templar

According to some historians, Crusades were started by the impoverished kings of Christendom, goaded by the Pope, to grab the fabled riches of the Muslim Middle East. The Knights Templar were a religious order formed after the First Crusade (around 1119) by a French nobleman Hugues de Payens. The avowed mission of the Order was to protect pilgrims on their journey to the Holy Land, as Palestine

was called by the Crusaders in those days. Highly trained, well-equipped, and motivated, the Templars are credited with acquitting themselves honourably in the many battles fought against Saladin.

According to Pike (2013), though there is no evidence the Templars ever provided security for the pilgrims, they were reportedly involved in some mysterious excavations at the Temple Mount*. The Order is regarded as the world's first corporate entity, with undertakings in banking, farming, and other financial activities. As their wealth and power grew in their firm base in France, the Templars fell afoul of the monarchy.

*We know that the Temple Mount retains an important place in Judeo- Christian mythology. After the 1967 War, the Israelis had been carrying out extensive excavations at the Temple Mount but have not found, to date, any proof of the fabled temple constructed by the equally legendary Solomon. The Western Wall or the Wailing Wall is not a remnant of Solomon's Temple, but was constructed much later by Herod.

After the Crusades, the order had started challenging the established monarchies and became a state within a state. King Philip accused them of scheming to form their state in southeastern France. This accusation was reinforced by the fact that the Templars had a large army, which could move freely throughout Europe. In 1306, the Templars were involved in a coup in which King Henry II of Cyprus was forced to abdicate his throne in favour of his brother. In 1307, the Templars in France were arrested in great numbers, tortured, and then put to death. This was followed by confiscation of all of their lands and wealth. The curtain fell on the order in 1314 when Jacques de Molay, Grand Master of the Knights Templar, along with his two immediate subordinates, was burnt at the stake. Thereafter, the order went underground and resurfaced at different times as Knights of the Holy Cross, Order of Christ, Order of Montesa, Hospitallers, and Freemasons.

The Kharijites and the Assassins

Kharijites is a general term referring to a breakaway Muslim sect which first appeared in the late 7th Century and played a divisive role during the struggle for power between Ali Ibn Abi Talib and Amir Muawiya in the years following the death of prophet Muhammad. This was the first sect which split away from mainstream Islamic thought and was excommunicated by both Sunnis and Shias. Ali defeated the Kharijites in 658 Hijri in the Battle of Naharawan, but was eventually assassinated, while in his prayers, by a Kharijite.

The Assassins is the name used to refer to the medieval Nizari Ismailis, an offshoot of Shia Islam. Formed in the late 11th Century from a split within Ismailis, they

started to threaten the Sunni Seljuq authority within Persian lands by capturing several mountain fortresses under the leadership of Hassan Bin Sabah. They became notorious in the medieval ages for using indoctrinated fanatics to assassinate Hassan Bin Sabah's opponents, hence the term "Assassins".

The Assassins held sway and kept terrorizing the whole of the Middle East for more than 150 years till crushed by the Mongol armies under Hulagu Khan. Thereafter, like the Knights Templar, they went underground. An offshoot of Assassins was employed as mercenaries to the Hungarian kings as late as 13th Century when they were destroyed during the Inquisitions ordered by the Catholic Church.

The Modern Mutants

The non-state actors in Afghanistan and Pakistan, from the Mujahideen groups, formed at the height of the Afghan War, to the Taliban and their various mutations, have many things in common with the secret and not so secret sects mentioned above. Like the Knights Templar, the modern militants have evolved from frugal groups, fighting for a noble cause, to vested interests fueling a war economy, which is based on human and drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and money laundering. Even as the Knights Templar maintained an elaborate network of hospices, monasteries, warehouses, and citadels to support their clandestine activities, their modern Muslim counterparts also have a system of logistics based on seminaries, supporters, beneficiaries, and sleeper cells. Their line of logistics operates between the Central Asian republics, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and extends all the way up to the United Arab Emirates. An auxiliary line of logistics runs between the Indian ports on the Gujarat coast and the Iranian port of Chah Bahar from where it goes to Afghanistan and ends up in Pakistan. The militants now provide their services to the entire spectrum of political stakeholders in Pakistan – from liberals to religious extremists. Their services include providing soldiers of fortune used in the kidnapping, murder, and extortion. India provides the logistics to its proxies in Afghanistan and Pakistan through the auxiliary route mentioned above. After 9/11, both the U.S and India are supporting some factions of Tehrik Taliban Pakistan (TPP). It is in this context where Pakistan's support of the Haqqani group should be viewed.

The Templars were a state within a state, wealthy beyond their means, and paid no taxes. We have mentioned about how the Templars were scheming to form their own state. To be located in the Languedoc region of southeastern France, they had wanted this state on the lines the Teutonic Knights had founded in Prussia. Similarly, the militant outfits in Pakistan and Afghanistan have been trying to form

a string of fiefs all across the Durand Line, particularly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. They need these fiefs, or emirates, as they prefer to call, as firm bases for launching their operations against Pakistan and Afghanistan. In fact, TPP had already established their emirates in FATA's North and South Waziristan agencies. These have since been dismantled by the Pakistan Army. Establishing the so-called emirates responds to a deep-seated psychological urge among these semi-literate and deprived people. Their vision does not extend beyond delivering summary punishments and beheading their opponents. Deep down, there is a Darwinian urge among the militants to wrest power from the state.

The Kharijites and the Assassins appeared in the 7th and 11th centuries respectively, when there was turmoil in the Muslim world and state power was on the wane. The Mujahideen and, later, the Taliban, along with their many mutations, are the 20th and 21st Century equivalents of the medieval Islamic militants. They interpret Islam to suit their own interests and thrive on chaos and tumult. Wherever Quran exhorts the faithful to take up arms against the infidels, it is in the context of a particular event where the latter had broken an agreement with the Muslims. Jihad, or holy war, is to be waged by the Islamic state and not by any individual or group. Moreover, Islam strictly prohibits killing women, children, and old people, even in war. These are but some of the aberrations in an otherwise long list of distortions these latter day saints of Islam have been acting upon in their quest for power.

Suicide has been glorified in non-Islamic cultures. During WW2, Japanese used suicide as a weapon. But they did it against the enemy's armed forces, not civilians. Suicide bombing is not an Islamic concept. Islam abhors committing suicide and does not allow a religious funeral to anyone who commits this sin. However, Hassan Bin Sabah used his Assassins in suicide missions to terminate his political opponents. In modern times, the Palestinians started resorting to suicide missions in their struggle against the Israelis. In South Asia, Tamil separatists were the first to employ suicide bombers against Sri Lankan armed forces. Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi was killed by a Tamil suicide bomber. To say that the Taliban and the other militant outfits employ suicide bombers will be a misstatement. A suicide bomber is one who willingly lays down his life for a given cause. Here, the militants kidnap children and helpless people, threaten and bribe the victims' parents and relatives, brainwash the victims by promising Assassins like rewards in the hereafter, and send them to their death. Such missions are not suicide missions, but murders through extortion.

The militants were raised by Pakistan, aided by the United States, during the Cold War period to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan. Strictly speaking, they were not a liberation army in the sense Viet Cong were in Vietnam, but a conglomeration of prospectors who had joined in a gold rush in the treacherous mountain terrain of Afghanistan. This was the best Zia could achieve since raising a resistance through a liberation army was not possible in Afghanistan's tribal society. Afghanistan was not a nation in the modern sense but, as mentioned earlier, a tribal confederacy strapped together precariously through a monarchy. Zia had been quite astute in dealing with the Mujahideen. It was Zia's shrewdness, matched by the single-mindedness of his spymaster that the Mujahideen circus was kept under leash. They had served their purpose during the war and had to be curtailed after the Soviet withdrawal.

How did Christianity get rid of the Knights Templar? During the Papal interrogations held in 1307, they were accused of having close links to the perverted Assassins, denying God, spitting and urinating onto the holy Cross, and homosexuality. They were also accused of worshipping the idol of Baphomet (a perversion of the Arabic word "Abu Fehmet" – father of wisdom, a term used for Satan). During the investigations, scores of French Templars were tortured and put to death. After spending seven years in jail, Jacques de Molay, the Grand Master of Knights Templar, and his two immediate subordinates were brought in front of Notre Dame to be executed. A pile had been erected on a small island in the Seine. There they were slowly roasted to death.

Roasting to death is not the answer in dealing with the Templars of Islam. It has been discussed that they are deeply deprived people who seek self-actualization through half-baked and self-serving dogmas sprouting from mainstream Islam. What they strive for is not a society based on the universal tenets of Islam, but raw power which is denied them in a society which is still struggling to evolve from its dark age. To seek power by overthrowing the existing order, they have no compunction in getting help from the same forces they had been fighting against.

During all the general elections held in Pakistan, the religious parties and their sympathizers never got more than 3% of the total votes cast. It will be wrong to assume that the mainstream religious parties which take part in the elections are different from the militants. They are the two sides of the same coin which keeps flipping, changing its face to suit the situation. Rebuffed in the general elections, they morph into militants, and then change course to sneak into the power centres through the back door.

In Pakistan, Islam has been used by the state to hoodwink the masses. To accomplish this, the state has created various organs which have no practical utility. The Council of Islamic Ideology is one such constitutional body that advises the legislature whether or not a certain law is repugnant to Islam. Having a huge budget, the Council keeps itself busy in hairsplitting and agitating about non-issues. The present chairman of the Council, a cleric from a religious party, on assuming his position wrote a letter to the prime minister, asking him to rearrange the order of precedence and put him fourth in the hierarchy after the president, prime minister, and chairman of the upper house of the parliament. This is simply a quest for raw power behind the façade of religion.

The Ethnic Fault Line

The end of the Afghan war brought to the fore the ethnic fault line between the mainly Persian-speaking inhabitants living in the north and the Pashtuns inhabiting the south. The rise of the Taliban power in the Pashtun belt bordering Pakistan was due to the creation of a power vacuum in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal. This development should be viewed in the context of the renewed Indian interest in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. In 1986 Rajiv Gandhi invited Zia and Najibullah to New Delhi in a bid to assert India's interest in postwar Afghanistan. Zia rebuffed Rajiv's gesture. We will not go into repeating the narrative about the advent of the Taliban. Suffice it to say that the coming into power of the Taliban prompted India, Iran, and the Soviet Union to prop up the Northern Alliance as a rival centre of gravity in Afghanistan. The seven-party alliance was either subsumed by the Taliban and the Northern Alliance or ceased to be relevant in the Afghan power play. While India busied itself in outflanking Pakistan from the west, Pakistan had to act to secure its interests. The civil war in Afghanistan had entered a new phase with the battle lines drawn between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. In the post 9/11 scenario, two successive civil governments have failed to secure peace and stability in Afghanistan.

“What is more important — demise of the Soviet Union or a few stirred up Muslims? There is only a small window when America can grab control of the center of the Eurasian continent. Once we pull the strings in the strategic center (also the home of the world's second largest oil reserves) we must then play off Europe against the Orient. This will assure that even a

reunited Japan and China will not be powerful enough to evict America from long term control of the planet's prime landmass."

Zbigniew Brezezinski (1998)


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VIII

THE NORTHERN BATTLEFIELDS

Map 8.1



The princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, as it existed in October 1947, was a manufactured entity. With the assistance of mercenaries - foreign as well as local, Ranjit Singh was able to invade and throw together a mixed bag of ethnically and geographically disparate regions of Kashmir Valley, Ladakh, and the Karakorams. Ranjit Singh had shiftily dealt with the British power and the regional players. His policy involved ceding some territory south of the Sutlej River while building up and maintaining a formidable army to deal with the twin threat from

the British and the Afghans. To do so he had hired American and French mercenaries to train his infantry, cavalry, and artillery. In 1822, Ranjit Singh charged General Jean Baptiste Ventura and General Francois Allard, two French veterans of the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815), to train his infantry and cavalry respectively. Training and command of artillery and ordnance were under the Punjabi generals, Ilahi Baksh and Lahina Singh Majithia, until General Claude August Court joined the Sikh Army in 1827, followed by the American Colonel Alexander Gardner in 1832. According to the Sikh Encyclopedia, whereas Sikhs led the army and constituted its bulk, there were also Punjabi Muslims, Pathans, Purbias (from Gangetic Plains), Kashmiris, and Gurkhas in the infantry units.

As mentioned earlier, the Sikhs had wrested the Kashmir Valley from the Afghans in the early nineteenth century. Later, Sikh General Zorawar Singh conquered Ladakh and Baltistan. Starting in July 1834, Zorawar led a series of military expeditions into Ladakh as a result of which this region was annexed to Maharaja Ranjit Singh's kingdom in 1840. The same year Zorawar's army captured Baltistan, a Muslim principality in the Indus Valley to the north of Kargil, across the Kargil Heights.

Zorawar next turned his attention towards Tibet. In April 1841, he marched into Tibet at the head of a large army. This expedition failed and a combined Chinese-Tibetan force defeated the Sikh army at Lake Mansarovar. Zorawar was killed in the battle. However, in a treaty signed in September 1842, Chinese-Tibetan representatives recognized Sikh suzerainty over Ladakh (Singh, 2007). During this period Sikh incursion had also started in Gilgit and Hunza areas. In 1842 a local adventurer Karim Khan captured Gilgit with the support of a Sikh army from Kashmir. Thereafter, this region changed hands many times between the local rulers and the Sikhs.

The Dogra principality was born in 1812 in Jammu, a predominantly Hindu area with some sprinkling of Sikhs and Muslims. After the British defeated the Sikhs in the First Anglo-Sikh War (1845-1846), they bequeathed Gulab Singh, the Dogra chieftain of Jammu, all the areas conquered by the Sikhs in Kashmir, Ladakh, Gilgit and Baltistan for seventy-five lakh rupees. Inheriting the Sikh conquests in the region, the newly formed Jammu & Kashmir state controlled by the Dogra rulers shared borders with Tibet to the east and northeast, Punjab to the west and northwest (at the time North West Frontier was still part of Punjab), and Chinese Turkestan (Xingjian) to the north.

If not for the Sikh forays during the 19th Century, and the engineered accession of Jammu & Kashmir in 1947, post-independence India would not have shared borders with Pakistan in the Vale of Kashmir, and with Pakistan and China in the

Karakorams and the Ladakh region. However, independent India considered itself the successor to the British Empire in India and maintained that since the northern frontiers were defined by what was then the government of India, the post-independence government of India was the guarantor of Tibet and heir to all the territories occupied by the Sikhs and Dogras.

The Plug

As a result of the First Kashmir War, Pakistan had secured one- third of the state of Jammu & Kashmir, but failed to dislodge the Indians from the Valley. Moreover, India still controlled the sources of the Indus river system. Yet everything had not gone as planned by the Indian leadership. In the twilight years of the British Raj there was a Congress- led government in the restive Muslim- majority North West Frontier Province (NWFP), contiguous to Jammu & Kashmir. And the Congress had laid claims to the province. It had planned to manipulate the accession of the NWFP with India through its ally Ghaffar Khan and, with India in possession of Jammu & Kashmir through the Radcliffe Award, the road would be open for the Indian dominance of Afghanistan and ingress into Central Asia. That was not to be. Despite its machinations, Congress party failed to hack off NWFP from Pakistan.

Map 8.2



In 1877, the British established the Gilgit Agency in order to guard India against the Russian advance. In 1935, the British forced Maharaja Hari Singh to lease them Gilgit, Hunza, Nagar, Yasin and Ashkomen for 60 years (The Sikh Encyclopedia). The First Kashmir War left Pakistan holding not only the mountain barrier separating the Valley from the plains of West Punjab, but also in possession of Gilgit & Baltistan. Later, the Sino-Indian border war effectively quarantined Tibet from India. While keeping in view Pakistan's grievances, one should not be

oblivious of India's frustrations. In the 21st Century, huge iron, copper, and natural gas deposits have been discovered in Afghanistan, not to mention the enormous gas reserves in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. India can have access to these natural deposits, but for this giant plug controlled by Pakistan.



Map 8.3

The Squeeze from the East

Tibet

While Pakistan gained control of Gilgit and Baltistan in 1948, to the east and north-east the Chinese started asserting their power in Tibet. Both the Chinese communists and their predecessor, the Koumintang, had strongly claimed Tibet. In 1949, shortly after overthrowing the nationalists, the Chinese Communist Party reaffirmed China's claim on Tibet, Taiwan, Hainan, and Pescadores and its resolve to incorporate these territories peacefully or by force into China. While the Tibetan administration dilly-dallied, the PLA crossed the Jinsha River and captured the border town of Qamdo by 19th October 1950. Thereafter the PLA sent a captured Tibetan commander to Lhasa for holding negotiations with the local Tibetan administration on China's behalf. The administration at Lhasa, through El Salvador, launched a complaint at the UN against the Chinese incursion, but India and UK prevented it to be debated. Tibetan representatives and the Chinese government signed a seventeen-point agreement on 23rd May 1951 in Beijing. According to the agreement: 1) Tibet agreed to be part of China; 2) the Chinese government allowed Tibet self-rule except in Qamdo area which was captured by China in 1950; 3) Tibet was to reform at its own pace, in its own way and allowed religious freedom. Later, Dalai Lama would claim that the Tibetan representative was pressured by the Chinese into signing the agreement and the terms of the

agreement had not been cleared with the Tibetan government before signing (Moraes, 1960).

Beginning in 1956, the CIA established a base camp at Kalimpong, India, to recruit Tibetan guerrillas to fight Chinese troops. Soon thereafter the CIA trained militias in the eastern Kham region started fighting the Chinese. In 1959, when the fighting spread to Lhasa, the Dalai Lama fled to India, where he established a Tibetan government in exile. Thereafter, except for making faint protestations, India relinquished any effective role whatsoever in Tibet.

Nehru's response to the Chinese occupation of Tibet was vague and bordered on accepting the inevitable. In a statement made in the Upper House of the Indian parliament on 4th May 1959, Nehru grudgingly accepted Chinese occupation of Tibet:

The circumstances were undoubtedly difficult. On the one side there was a rapidly moving society; on the other, a static unchanging society fearful of what might be done to it in the name of reform. The distance between the two was great and there appeared to be hardly any meeting point. Meanwhile change in some forms inevitably came to Tibet. Communications developed rapidly and the long isolation of Tibet was partly broken through. Though physical barriers were progressively removed, mental and emotional barriers increased. Apparently, the attempt to cross these mental and emotional barriers was either not made or did not succeed. To say that a number of "upper strata reactionaries" in Tibet were solely responsible for this appears to be an extraordinary simplification of a complicated situation. Even according to the accounts received through Chinese sources, the revolt in Tibet was of considerable magnitude and the basis of it must have been a strong feeling of nationalism which affects not only the upper class people but others also. No doubt, vested interests joined it and sought to profit by it. The attempt to explain a situation by the use of rather worn-out words, phrases and slogans, is seldom helpful. When the news of these unhappy developments came to India, there was immediately a strong and widespread reaction. The Government did not bring about this reaction. Nor was this reaction essentially political. It was largely one of sympathy based on sentiment and humanitarian reasons. Also on a certain feeling of kinship with the Tibetan people derived from long established religious and cultural contacts. It was an instinctive reaction. It is true that some people in India sought to profit by it by turning it in an undesirable direction. But the fact of that reaction of the Indian people was there. If that was the reaction here, one may well imagine the reaction among the Tibetans themselves. Probably this reaction is shared in other Buddhist countries of Asia. When there are

such strong feelings, which are essentially not political, they cannot be dealt with by political methods alone, much less by military methods. We have no desire whatever to interfere in Tibet; we have every desire to maintain the friendship between India and China; but at the same time they have every sympathy for the people of Tibet, and we are greatly distressed at their hapless plight. We hope still that the authorities of China, in their wisdom, will not use their great strength against the Tibetans but will win them to friendly cooperation in accordance with the assurances they have themselves given about the autonomy of the Tibet region. Above all, we hope that the present fighting and killing will cease.

Aksai Chin

Aksai Chin, located to the east of Ladakh, is a high altitude desert covering an area of 37,244 square kilometers (14,380 square miles). In the north, the Kunlun Mountains separate Aksai Chin from the Tarim Basin. The region is almost uninhabited. Even at the cost of repetition, it would be worthwhile to summarily discuss how the border between British India and China shaped up in the Ladakh region.

After annexing Ladakh in 1834, the Sikhs invaded Tibet in 1841. Chinese forces defeated the Sikh Army, entered Ladakh and besieged Leh. Thereafter, both the sides signed a treaty in 1842 by which they agreed to respect the de facto border. The British defeat of the Sikhs in 1846 resulted in the transfer of sovereignty over Ladakh to the British. Whereas the border between China and British India was reasonably well defined at the two extremities of the Ladakh region, Pangong Lake, and Karakoram Pass, the Aksai Chin area in between lay largely undefined as both the sides were sufficiently satisfied that the traditional border was defined by the natural features.

The Maharaja of Kashmir had laid claim on Aksai Chin, though the area had never been physically held by the state. The claim was based on a survey carried out in 1865 by one William Johnson, a civil servant with the Survey of India. According to the line drawn by Johnson, known as the Johnson Line, Aksai Chin was shown as part of J&K. This was the time when China did not control Xingjian, so this line was never presented to the Chinese. Based on Johnson's demarcation, the Maharaja claimed the territory to the north as far as the Kunlun Mountains, i.e., the whole of Aksai Chin.


During the 1950s, unbeknownst to the world, and while India had no physical presence in this area, Chinese built a 1,200 kilometre (750 miles) road connecting Xingjian with western Tibet, of which 179 kilometres (112 miles) ran south of the Johnson Line through the Aksai Chin region claimed by India. The Indians did not

learn the existence of the road until one year after China formally annexed Tibet. India came to know about the existence of this road in 1958 when it was shown on Chinese maps. Even after occupying Tibet and extending their control up to Aksai Chin, Chinese forces continued probing westward. India's claim, as mentioned above, was based on Johnson Line, which was drawn and, according to the Chinese, unilaterally imposed by the British on a weak China. Until 1958, Indian patrols had been visiting Haji Langar and Karatagh Pass located west of Macartney- MacDonald Line, which was drawn by the British in 1899 and accepted by China till 1958. Thereafter the Chinese repudiated this line also and extended their claim further west. By 1959 they had established a string of posts linking Haji Langar, Shamal Lungpa, Kongka La, Dambu Guru, and Khurnak Fort.

Before the 1962 border war, the Chinese had moved further west (Maxwell, 1970). The Line of Actual Control (LAC) left the Chinese in possession of the western portion of Deshang Plains and part of Pangong Lake. Before they left, the Chinese advised the Indians not to approach within 20 kilometres of LAC. As often as the Indians ignore the Chinese warning, so do the Chinese come forward, dismantle the disputed Indian Army encampments and take away the surveillance devices and cameras installed by the Indians.

The Chinese consider an Indian presence in Deshang Plains threatening as it permits the Indians to launch an armour operation to overrun Aksai Chin. As an interim measure, the Chinese would like the LAC in this area to run along the Shyok River and down south to the western edge of Pangong Lake. The Indians appreciate that a future war in this area will be a two-front war in which Pakistan and China will launch a three direction combined offensive against the Indian positions in Ladakh and Baltistan along the western (Pakistan), and northern and eastern (China) approaches. This offensive may result in India losing all the areas northeast, east, and southeast of Leh, making Indus River the new line of control with Pakistan and China (Rikhye, 2012).

Map 8.4



The Trans-Karakoram Tract

Map 8.5



The tract, claimed by Pakistan until 1963, comprises an area of approximately 5,800 square kilometers (2,239 square miles) along both sides of the Shaksgam River. Most of the tract is composed of the Shaksgam Valley. The tract, one of the world's most inhospitable areas, has some of the highest mountains. It is bounded by the Kunlun Mountains to the north, Broad Peak, K2 and Gasherbrum to the south, and the Siachen glacier to the southeast. Historically, the people of Hunza cultivated and grazed the areas to the north of Karakoram. The Mir of Hunza claimed those areas as part of Hunza, including the Raskam Valley, north of Shaksgam Valley.

Pakistan relinquished its claim to the tract under a border agreement with China in 1963 with the proviso that the settlement was subject to the final solution of the Kashmir dispute. After the agreement, Nehru accused Pakistan of conceding Shaksgam Valley to China. Ayub (1967) responds to Nehru's allegation:

"I asked the experts concerned to mark the actual line of control on the map for me, which they did. And then I said, well now, does it mean that we claim the area up to this line and not beyond. They said, by-and-large this is it. But of course opposite to the Shamshal Pass, the people of the Shamshal village live on this side, on our side, but they take their cattle for grazing to areas on the other side which is very fertile for grazing, but where the Chinese have some posts. And also, the people of Shamshal used to get their salt, which is scarce and, hence, a very valuable commodity in those areas, from there. Barring that we really had no claim beyond the actual line of control...."

"They came out with a map, and in that map they had laid certain claims to our side of the area, for example, Khunjerab and some areas near the K2 Mountain, in fact, the whole of the K2 area. After much arguments and discussions, they finally agreed to the demarcation line. By-and-large, the watershed of the Indus Basin was to be in our possession; and the watershed of the rivers Yarkand and so on was to be on their side.... A survey of the area was conducted and a mission from their side came here and our people went there, and finally the whole matter was settled without any difficulty" (pages 244-246).

Noorani (2006) writes:

"Van Eekelen, a Dutch diplomat who served in India, wrote in his book Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China that the accord

“followed the main Karakoram watershed, but once left it for another spur and a river bed to accommodate Pakistan in her desire for the pocket of Sokh Bulaq.... The compromise border left about two thirds on China side, but while Pakistan in the main had given up only claims on maps, China would be withdrawing from about 750 square miles.”

Siachen Glacier



Map 8.6



Map 8.7

Siachen glacier was a no man's land located to the southeast of the Karakoram Tract, and at the extreme northern end of the Line of Control that separates Pakistan's Northern Areas from Indian-held Kashmir. In the past, armies of both the countries had been sending patrols to the glacier. In the villages located on the periphery of the glacier, Pakistani currency was the legal tender. Pakistan had also

been hosting mountaineering expeditions to the glacier. Based on the historicity of the facts, Pakistan had a silent claim on the glacier.

In early 1980s, a Pakistani advertisement for procurement of high altitude mountain gear in a foreign mountaineering magazine prompted the Indians to launch a brigade-size operation to seize Siachen. The Pakistan Army was found napping. As a result of its operation, India gained over 1,000 square miles (3,000 square kilometres) of territory in this area. Presently, India controls the entire 76 kilometres (47 miles) long glacier and two of the three main passes of the Saltoro Ridge immediately west of the glacier- Sia La and Bilafond La. Pakistan holds Gyong and Bilafond glaciers to the west and Gyong La Pass which dominates Shyok and Nubra river valleys and Indian Army's access to Leh district. In the context of Siachen, the word "Pass" is a very misleading term. Unlike the passes elsewhere, Siachen passes, because of the shifting ice and thousands of meters deep crevices, do not control entry or exit into the glacier. The Indians cannot come down from the dominating features occupied by them on the Saltoro Ridge. Passes or no passes, they cannot encroach further west beyond the lower heights occupied by Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistanis, unless dropped in a heliborne operation, cannot climb up and dislodge the Indians from their positions (MacDonald, 2008).

In 1953, the Indian Army was also found napping when the Chinese captured the Aksai Chin plateau separating Tibet from Indian- controlled Ladakh. So, in a way, the Indians had pulled an Aksai Chin on Pakistan. In defensive operations, we always lay emphasis on dominating the no man's land through aggressive patrolling. Why did we lose sight of this in the case of Siachen? Zia tried to downplay the loss of the Siachen glacier by stating it had no strategic significance. This was a very lame excuse which ill suited the head of a government. It was Pakistani territory which we lost due to our ineptitude.

Capturing Siachen glacier does not make any sense unless it is used as a jump off point to advance further west to threaten Skardu or recover Shakgam Valley from China. The glacier may not be having an immediate strategic significance, but it provides 1) access to Indian patrols for reconnaissance of the area west of Saltoro Ridge (though this is contested by the Pakistani commanders). A mule track exists which starts from Leh, crosses Shyok River at Satti, leads onward to Sasoma, crosses the Glacier at the northern tip of Saltoro Ridge, and enters Pakistani-controlled territory from where tracks are available to Dansam, Khapalu, Karmango, and Skardu. However, this track cannot be used for a projected operation across the Saltoro Ridge to capture Skardu and/or Shakgam Valley. A

large- scale offensive cannot rely on mule tracks. Any Indian offensive to capture Skardu will be based on a heliborne/airborne operation across the Kargil heights.

Indian defence analysts had been stressing that controlling the Siachen glacier was not enough and the Indian Army 1) should advance further northwest and occupy Sherpi Kangri glacier and Kabiri glacier system; 2) advance to the K2 by attacking the Pakistani post at Conway Saddle, around 5 kilometres from the northernmost Indian post*; 3) Infiltrate across Siachen Glacier in conjunction with a brigade size heliborne operation across the Kargil heights for attacking Shaksgam Valley.

* After capturing Siachen glacier the Indians had vowed to send a mountaineering expedition to K2. At the highest Pakistani post, Conway Saddle, the men serve a maximum of 21 days - unless they are evacuated with nausea and palpitations of altitude sickness, or the pulmonary and cerebral edema that are its final stages, causing slow suffocation. However, opening up a route to K2 would be a real propaganda triumph for India

In 1984, Pakistan Army even did not have a high altitude helicopter to transport a limited number of troops and slung payload to the mountain positions. In 1986, two years after the Indian occupation of Siachen, six Lama helicopters were purchased from Brazil (HB315B Gavio), through France (the original manufacturer). As the French had stopped producing these helicopters, the Brazilian supplied helicopters had some parts manufactured by HAL (Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd). There were a few helicopter accidents - the rotors had been tampered with. In 1987, Pakistan Army used TOW anti-tank missiles during its counterattack to regain Quaid Post, but the missile was ineffective at such high altitude. It would be interesting to note that the main reason for the failure of the Pakistani counter attack on Quaid Post was Commander FCNA's insistence that the attack be launched after he (Maj Gen Zahir ul Islam Abbasi) reached the concentration area and led a collective prayer to invoke divine blessings. The attack was to be launched at dawn. It was broad daylight when the general reached the concentration area. As a result, the attack was launched within enemy's full observation and aimed fire. The result was obvious. Mixing up tactics with spiritualism is hazardous.

Indians themselves have not been able to give a convincing justification as to why, in 1984, they invaded the desolate glacier. The arguments forwarded by them so far are?

- 1) According to the 1949 Agreement, as interpreted by the Indians, Siachen was a no man's land and thus belonged to India.

- 2) Pakistan was provoking India by sending mountaineering teams to the glacier.
- 3) The Tri-junction of China, Pakistan, and India, which is presently located near the northern tip of the glacier, would have been located at the Karakoram Pass. By occupying the glacier Indian Army had pushed the Tri-junction to the west, short of Conway saddle. According to Arpi(2016), Pakistan's occupation of the Siachen up to the Karakoram Pass would lead to their domination of Nubra Valley and the route down to Leh. This is an invalid argument because Pakistan Army controls Gyong La Pass, which dominates Shyok and Nubra river valleys and Indian Army's access to Leh district.
- 4) The Indian occupation of Siachen creates a formidable wedge between Shaksgam Valley and Aksai Chin. This implies that the Pakistani occupation of Siachen would have facilitated a Chinese offensive through the glacier to roll down Indian defences from the west and threaten Ladakh. This again is not convincing because Indians themselves concede that the most likely Chinese offensive in this area will be from the east, across the Despang plains.
- 5) Occupation of the glacier was essential for the defence of Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO). India maintains a landing ground at DBO for rapid deployment to block the KKH in a future two-front war with Pakistan and China. The landing ground can also be used for air dropping supplies to Siachen in case roads get blocked due to inclement weather. However, the landing ground will be quickly neutralized by China because , as compared with India, China has a far superior infrastructure in the area.

The author wants to help the Indians by creating a stronger case for them for the occupation of the Siachen glacier. For the purpose of this argument, the author will perform the role of the Devil's Advocate. He thinks that the Indians occupied the Siachen glacier because:-

- 1) Back in 1984, India had been stopped from playing any role whatsoever in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union, India's ally, was being drubbed in Afghanistan by the Pakistan-backed Mujahideen. For India, it was time to vent its anger (and that of its ally) by needling Pakistan in an unexpected area.

- 2) The Sikh militancy in east Punjab, sponsored by Pakistan to interdict India's line of communications to the IHK, was another big irritant for India for which it wanted to repay Pakistan in kind.
- 3) Nearly seven of the world's highest mountain peaks are clustered west and northwest of Siachen. Every year thousands of tourists visit this area. The capture of Siachen would create an Indian claim on these Karakoram peaks. In fact, India had issued postage stamps showing K-2 as Indian territory.

Kargil

In the spring of 1999, Pakistan Army had launched a large infiltration operation across the Line of Control in Jammu & Kashmir. The operation was aimed at occupying the heights dominating Srinagar-Leh Road. Before the 1971 War these heights were controlled by Pakistan. Due to extremely difficult terrain and harsh weather conditions, it is not possible to man the defences in this area September through April. Hence, on the onset of 1971 War, this sector was thinly held by the Pakistani scouts and Azad Kashmir irregulars. Indians had, therefore, no difficulty in capturing the scattered and isolated Pakistani posts overlooking Srinagar –Leh Road, Indian Army's lifeline to Ladakh. The capture of this strategically important area was a great relief for the Indians. Earlier, the Indian Army convoys traversing this road would frequently come under heavy weapons and artillery fire directed from the Pakistani posts.

Map 8.8



During the 1971 War, Pakistan Army, as elsewhere, made half-hearted attempts to counter the Indians across the international border and the Cease-fire Line (CFL) in Jammu & Kashmir. But the hopeless situation in the eastern theatre was replicated in the west. Indians occupied large chunks of Pakistani territory across the international border in the Punjab and Sindh sectors of the western theatre. In Jammu & Kashmir sector, Pakistan lost valuable territory in Poonch, Muzaffarabad, and Kargil sub-sectors.

As a result of the Simla Agreement that was concluded after the 71 War, India returned Pakistani territory captured along the international border but refused point blank to restore the old CFL and part with the prized Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas territories it had captured during the war. Thus emerged the Line of Control (LOC) that manifested the new ground realities. Even as the Simla Agreement was being inked, Indians had started violating it by occupying Pakistani posts across the projected LOC. Indians continued to nibble at the Azad Kashmir territory and, by 1980, had transgressed at many places. Emboldened by the meek reaction from the enemy, Indians embarked upon another calculated venture. They took advantage of Pakistan's complacency and, in 1984, captured the Siachen Glacier.

The area is inhospitable. Harsh weather conditions preclude continuous manning of the posts overlooking the Srinagar –Leh Road (Highway 1-A, as the Indians call it). After capturing these heights during the 71 War, Indians had continued with the practice and routine followed by their Pakistani predecessors: The posts would be manned during the summer. In the autumn, Indians would vacate these posts and go to the less inhospitable areas in the rear, leaving behind their heavy weapons and equipment.

In late December 1998, when Indians vacated these posts, Pakistani troops moved forward and occupied them. This incursion was initially meant to straighten out the defences (as they call it in the army parlance). It soon turned into a competition between various local commanders. As though participating in an obstacle race, they inched forward from one height to another till they came in contact with the Highway. Being itself not very clear about its military objectives, the high command at GHQ did not interfere with the initiative taken by the local commanders.

India first learned of the incursion from local informants between 2nd and 5th May 1999, a full four months after the initial breach of the LOC. By this time the original incursion had been expanded into a proper military operation. Another week passed before the Indian military comprehended the full scale of the Pakistani operation. By that time, Pakistan Army controlled an area of Indian

territory eleven kilometers deep and two-hundred kilometers wide. From this strategic vantage, Pakistani forces stood poised to disrupt traffic on Highway 1A, the only supply route to India's forces in the contested Siachen Glacier region, and to Leh.

Indians reacted massively and tried to recapture the lost ground. They even inducted their air force which used laser guided bombs to dislodge Pakistani infiltrators. The aerial onslaughts by the IAF were augmented by infantry attacks to evict the Pakistanis from the peaks overlooking Highway 1A. The infiltrating force had been thrown into the area without any logistics support. One by one, the heights started slipping out of Pakistan's hands.

The Kargil planners had believed that they would be able to drag on and prevent India from recovering the lost ground through a combination of surprise, denial, and deception till the onset of winter, thus presenting India with the *fait accompli* like the one India had presented Pakistan in its 1984 Operation Meghdoot to occupy the Siachen Glacier. In doing so, as usual, they had not considered India's response encompassing the entire spectrum of fighting. Fifteen years before Kargil, India had also presented Pakistan with a *fait accompli* by occupying Siachen in a surprise operation (Lavoy, 2009). Pakistan had responded by hurriedly occupying the valleys west of Siachen and by involving in a sloggish match with India over the control of Salto Ridge. Pakistan could not employ its air force to hit Indian positions on the Salto Ridge because, back in 1984, PAF did not have air-launched laser guided munitions.

The Enemy's Train of Thoughts

India's dilemma is that the Line of Control in the Northern Areas runs too close to the Indian Highway 1A linking Srinagar with Leh. It is India's compulsion to push the Pakistani defences in this area as far north as possible and this was what the Indians did during the 1965 and 1971 wars, and even after the drawing of the LOC post-Simla Agreement. We have discussed earlier how, despite its importance, the area had been thinly held by paramilitary forces which allowed India to make incursions. In addition, in 1971 India occupied Turtok village located to the west of the base of Siachen glacier.

We have also discussed how Pakistani control of Gilgit and Baltistan irks India. India has not given up its claim on these areas and will like to reclaim them by force when a suitable opportunity presents itself. In the subsequent paragraphs, we present the train of thoughts of the Indian defence analyst Ravi Rikhye (2014)

about how he thinks the Indian Army can take back these areas in a two-front war with Pakistan and China.

Presumptions

Timeline

Based on its present force level, India can wage a two-front war within a year to recover the territories it had lost in the past to Pakistan and China. The one-year timeline is required for planning and meeting critical deficiencies. However, the problem is not the quantum of force or making up deficiencies in war materiel, but a lack of confidence within both the government of India and its armed forces to take on the enemy. This is a psychological problem which can be overcome by giving the GOI and the Indian armed forces such a large margin of superiority that they shed away their inferiority complex and gain confidence to launch an offensive against the enemy. This can only be achieved through a massive military expansion, which would need some eight years to materialize. The expansion will require increasing the percentage of GDP to be spent on defence from the present less than 3% to 5- 6%. In monetary terms, it will take between 600-700 billion USD just to retake POK. However, such a long timeline will give the enemy time to react, greatly complicating the task.

Military Parity

Seeking military parity with Pakistan had been a major flaw in the Indian defence planning. Parity as a strategy is acceptable as the last resort. But when the adversary is much smaller in terms of size, economic strength, and military power, seeking parity is to play the game by its rules. Due to its massive GDP, India could have outspent Pakistan to such an extent that it would be left without any option. To say that this is what is happening at present is a fallacy.

The Indian argument that Pakistan knows it cannot win a conventional war, hence it has resorted to terrorism, and this threat would remain no matter by which factor India tries to outmatch Pakistan, does not hold water. If we go by the statistics, we find that India has never outmatched Pakistan in a meaningful manner. In 1965 India had 12x divisions to Pakistan's 10, giving it a very narrow margin of superiority of 1.2: 1. In November 1971 when India attacked East Pakistan, there was absolute parity in the western theatre, with each side having 15x divisions*. The projected force ratio in 2017 is likely to be 1:0.8 in Pakistan's favour. Pakistan knows that India lacks any military option to counter Pakistan sponsored terrorism because, given the present force and equipment levels, India can neither retaliate nor force Pakistan out of Kashmir.

*On the Western front, Pakistan had 10 x infantry divisions, 2x armoured divisions, 3x indep armoured brigades, and 1x indep infantry brigade against India's 14x infantry divisions, 1x armoured division, 3x armoured brigades and 1x infantry brigade, giving India a slight advantage in combat power.

It will be argued that in an emergency India will pull out some mountain divisions from the China front and deploy them against Pakistan. During the 1965 and 1971 wars, India did right that (2-3x mountain divisions in 1965, and 5x mountain divisions in 1971). However, in the likelihood of a true two front war, India will forfeit this option.

Equipment Imbalances

Equipment modernization was put on hold for three decades. Though in theory modernization is underway, because of the inane way in which India's Ministry of Defense functions, very little has been actually done, as opposed to grand talk. Every year of delay increases modernization costs: weapons feature probably the highest inflation rate of any industrially produced goods. The inflation is pushed by each order being too small to benefit from economies of large orders, and by the constant up gradation in weapons technology.

Comparison

Rikhye gives the year wise relative strengths of the two armies as follows:-

Table 8.1

Year	Divisions		
	India	Pakistan	Ratio India/Pakistan
1947, Partition	3	0	-
1948	6	5	1.2
1954 pre US assistance	7	8	0.9
1962	10	8	1.3
1965	12	10	1.2
1966	12	13	0.9
1971 November	15	15	1.0
1973	18	18	1.0
1987	24	20	1.2
2012	24	23	1.0
2017 (projected)	24	29	0.8

Rikhye (2014)

Indian Army

According to the above-mentioned estimates, in 2017, Pakistan is likely to have 29x divisions to India's 24 (Pakistan Front), a force ratio of 1:0.8 in Pakistan's favour. To achieve the desired overwhelming superiority over Pakistan, Rikhye proposes an army of 90x divisions in 30x corps, with an independent brigade group for each corps, plus 5x independent brigades for tasks where a division is not required. The projected 90x division army is intended to meet all the contingencies of a two-front war as follows:-

- From Naushera to Rann of Kutch – 30x armoured / mechanized divisions.
- Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas – 15x infantry divisions*
- Against China – 27x divisions
- Army HQ Reserves – 18x divisions

Total : 90x divisions

*including at least four or five divisions for internal security in Indian Held Kashmir

Causus Belli

Could be any one of the following:-

- Build on a provocation by China and teach it a lesson.
- Patrol across the LAC – we will still be in the Indian territory; this should provoke China into action.
- Announce Chinese and Pakistani moves in the North threaten to force India back to the Ladakh Range, costing it several thousand square kilometers of territory, and India must resort to war.
- Throw China out of Gilgit and Baltistan on the grounds it is Indian territory occupied by China.
- Retaliate against Pakistan for a border incident; this will escalate and China will be drawn in.

The Plan

The plan is sketched in broad outline. It is up to the Indian Army to turn it into an operational plan. The purpose here is, as always, simply to generalize about what is possible, with the aim of showing the Army that it is capable of achieving considerably more than it thinks.

General Outline

- Attack and capture Aksai Chin, Azad Kashmir , and Gilgit-Baltistan with 28x divisions in 9x corps as follows:-
 - East Ladakh: 2x corps, plus one air assault division till D+7
 - North Ladakh, Baltistan, and Gilgit: 2xcorps
 - Western Kashmir: 2x corps
 - 3x corps in reserve
- Annex the districts of Sialkot and Narowal to provide depth for the Indian L of C to Kashmir.

Aksai Chin

- 2x corps for the immediate front.
- 1x corps in Reserve.

Tasks

- Take the north end of Aksai Chin Road using one air assault division from AHQ Reserve Corps.
- Return the division to AHQ Reserve after link up with motorized corps.
- 2x corps will be sent through Demchok to take the Aksai Chin, 1x corps for the north and one for the south.

Note: Rikhye thinks that China will undoubtedly attempt at least one major offensive to win back the Aksai Chin. It is unlikely it can mount an attack before D+30 or perhaps even till D+45. India will spend the intervening time preparing its defenses. It is also unlikely that more than 1x corps will be required to reinforce when the Chinese attack. But, if necessary, there is the reserve corps to draw from.

Gilgit & Baltistan

- 1x corps ex-Central Command to attack Gilgit from Gurais.
- 1x corps to attack Skardu.

Tasks

- Capture Gilgit and Baltistan.
- After Chinese/Pakistan forces are cleared from North Kashmir, these two corps will turn south towards Muzzafarabad in an effort to outflank the West Kashmir defenses from the north. They will be joined, if necessary, by a reserve corps.
- At the conclusion of hostilities, one of these corps will assume new permanent positions in the extreme north, from the Khunjerab to the Karakoram Pass. The second corps will return to Central Command where it will execute an offensive in the sector in the event there is no ceasefire with China after the Aksai Chin is taken.

Note: Rikhye reports that General K. Sundarji's Operation Trident envisaged a December 1987 offensive with three divisions into Pakistan's Northern Areas, including a division each down the Nubra and Western Shyok valleys. The Nubra thrust would have been supported by BMP mechanized infantry fighting vehicles, which were actually landed at Thoise via Il-76s.

Azad Kashmir

- 1x Corps to attack from Uri-Tithwal
- 1x Corps to attack from Akhnur-Poonch

Tasks

- Pin down Pakistani forces in West Kashmir. The object is to prevent any Pakistan forces from moving to Gilgit to interfere with India's northern offensive. Do not get heavily engaged in this sector.
- 3x corps to remain in reserve to broaden West Kashmir offensive if necessary, and to cut short any Pakistani thoughts of sending reinforcements to the north.
- Outflanking tank/mechanized offensive. This will be conducted by Western Army Group with 1x corps.

Ravi-Chenab Corridor

- India will face five armoured/mechanized divisions with three of its own, so likely it will have to mostly defend. Appropriate fortifications will have to be built.
- 1xcorps will tie down Pakistan forces in the corridor, which will include Pakistan's XXX Corps and likely Army Reserve Center (termed as III Corps).

South of Ravi – Sutlej Corridor River

XXVI Provisional Corps to cover corridor while XI Corps slips south to join the outflanking offensive. It will come into existence only on the eve of war.

Central Sector (Uttarkhand-Tibet and Himachal-Tibet Border)

XXXXXXX

Eastern Front (Sikkim-Bhutan-Arunachal and north Nagaland)

XXXXXXX

Analysis

Maximizing the Force Levels

In Operations Research, Linear Programming (LP) is a method of allocating resources in an optimal way. Programming refers to mathematical programming. Within Linear Programming, Simplex method is a decision- making tool that allocates resources – labour, materials, machines, and capital- in the best possible (optimal) way so that costs are minimized or profits are maximized. The resources are known as *Decision Variables*. The criterion for selecting the best values of the Decision Variables is known as the *Objective Function*. The limitations on resource availability are known as *Constraints*. Linear programming can also be used in the armed forces for making optimal utilization of the available resources for achieving a given objective.

The plan under discussion makes the concept of Linear Programming stand on its head. Your author calls this approach Reverse Simplex. In this approach, instead of making optimal utilization of the available resources to achieve the objective, the value of *Decision Variables* is maximized. This plan requires 600-700 billion USD just to retake Pakistan-administered Kashmir and Northern Areas. The GOI is never going to spend such a huge amount. Ostensibly, Rikhye wants to just goad the GOI and the Indian Army.

In his books, Rikhye uses Lanchester's Equation to forecast the outcome of an operation or battle. In this method, weights are assigned to various types of formations (3 to an armoured division; 2 to an independent armoured brigade; and 1 to an infantry division). Adding up the numbers scored by each side and squaring off the total score gives the relative combat power of the combatants which is then used to forecast the outcome of a projected engagement. Based on Lanchester's Equation, Rikhye predicts that ,being superior in numbers, the Indian Army will come out as the winner in any future war with Pakistan. Mathematizing force ratios is used as a forecasting tool in war gaming. In their tactical appreciations the Egyptian Army, besides many other armies, even assigns weights to the weapon systems and uses the outcomes for decision making. For example, whether to launch a counter attack or occupy counter penetration positions. In model and map discussions, this is a neat method to predict who the winner is. But it does not take into account the imponderables.

Consider, for example, the performance of Indian and Pakistani armoured divisions during the 65 War. India had the force preponderance in Sialkot Sector (According to Lanchester's Equation, India enjoyed 3:1 superiority against Pakistan in the Sialkot sector). Pakistan was superior in Khem Karan sector (1.44: 1 superiority

over India, according to Lanchester's Equation). Both floundered. In India's case, the armoured division commander failed to accurately read the battle. In fact, India's 1 Armoured Division was halted by a single Pakistani armoured regiment. In Pakistan's case, the armoured division was launched in an area which was not suited to armour operations, and where the enemy had transited into a defensive posture. The Indians, making judicious use of the terrain, defeated the adversary. This is what happens in a real war.

Rikhye (2014) estimates that in 2012 Pakistan Army had 23 x divisions for India's 24 (Pakistan Front), an almost parity. Rikhye's calculations, based on ongoing and projected raisings, indicate that, in 1917, Pakistan Army will have 29x divisions to India's 24 (Pakistan Front), a force ratio of 1: 0.8 in Pakistan's favour. According to Rikhye, India will need 45x divisions in a future war to effectively deal with the Pakistan Army (30x armoured/mechanized divisions, and 15x infantry divisions, including at least 4 or 5 for internal security in IHK). But then Rikhye also suggests having 27x divisions against China and 18x divisions for Army HQ Reserves, a total of 90x divisions to counter both Pakistan and China – it will be a two front war. This envisages doubling the Indian Army strength. Expansion of IAF and IN will be beside this. The aim is to have such an overwhelming superiority of force that the enemy is left with no option. It will be unrealistic to believe that India will undertake such a massive force build up.

In the last chapter, we will discuss the force ratios in detail and prove that presently Indian Army enjoys superiority in infantry formations, while Pakistan Army is superior in mechanized formations, self-propelled artillery, and airborne forces. Historically, Pakistan Army has effectively kept pace with the Indian Army's expansion.

IAF enjoys a 2:1 superiority against IAF, which, given the past experience, is manageable for PAF.

The asymmetry between the two opposing navies is more pronounced in India's favour. In the face of it, the Indian Navy is a formidable force. It keeps churning out surface combatants (and, to a lesser extent, submarines) at an impressive rate. But, most of its surface combatants will be, for a long period, without an effective medium/long range surface to air missile and Advanced Towed Array Sonars (ATAS).

Capturing Gilgit & Baltistan

Rikhye's plan requires 2x corps to capture Gilgit and Skardu, a corps each attacking Gilgit (from Gurais) and Skardu (from Kargil). Approaches have not been mentioned, but we understand that the attacking corps will advance along the river valleys. This is because he also makes a passing reference to Operation Trident in 1987 which envisaged an offensive to capture the Northern Areas with three divisions, including a division each down the Nubra and Western Shyok Valleys, with the third division in reserve.

During all the Pakistan-India wars, neither side attempted an offensive along these river valleys. In fact, all these valleys are interspersed with glaciers into which the rivers and their tributaries drain. Mountain rivers are not like the rivers in the plains. They meander around craggy peaks and steep slopes, at places reducing to narrow gorges flowing through deep ravines, occasionally disappearing underground and then reappearing as rivulets. Sometimes the approach in the Karakorams becomes so narrow that the advancing force has to negotiate by climbing up rocky features 5000 to 7000 meters high. The average temperature during summers is below zero, dropping to minus 25 degrees centigrade during the winters. Rivers Astore, Gilgit, Nubra, Shyok, and Indus are actually gorges, i.e. fast running streams flowing through narrow valleys, confined between steep rocky walls forming their shoulders. The valleys open up at places, but the approaches through these valleys are largely determined by the roads and mule tracks that are cut into the shoulders of the mountain features flanking the banks of these streams. Operations to capture Gilgit and Skardu will thus rely on movement along various roads and tracks available in the area. A summary of the routes determining the major approaches from IHK to these strategic objectives is given below:

Table 8.2

Serial	Approach	Road/Track Designation	Alignment	Remarks
1.	Gurais-Doarian-Naran- Chilas- Gilgit	N15 N35	Gurais- Doarian Doarian-Naran Mansehra-Naran- Chilas Chilas-Gilgit	Mule Tracks Mule Tracks Naran-Chilas; 113km Chilas-Gilgit: 133 Km
2.	Kargil- Khapalu-Skardu	Undesignated	Kargil-Khapalu- Skardu	173 km

Map 8.9



At about 2,400 M, Gurais is located in the High Himalayas, about 86 km north-east of Bandipur, 123 km from Srinagar, and 244 km from Gilgit. The force advancing from Gurais to capture Gilgit will be restricted to the mule tracks while travelling between Gurais and Doarian (northwest of Gurais) . From Doarian, it will continue advancing across the country, making use of the existing mule tracks, till it hits N15 at Naran. Along N15, Chilas is 113 Km from Naran . N35 (KKH) joins N15 at Chilas. Travelling on KKH, Gilgit is another 133 Km from Chilas. The operation will require helidropping a battalion size force at Naran to secure the movement towards Chilas , a battalion to secure Babusar Pass, and a brigade near Gilgit to establish a firm base for linkup with the leading elements of the main force.

Advancing northwest from Gurais to contact N15, the attacker will be channelized in the narrow valleys of various mountain streams crisscrossing the area. Here, the defender will be facilitated by the terrain and will hold the attacker with few demolitions and by manning the dominating heights. Due to the terrain friction, the defender will have ample time to respond.

The formation advancing to attack Skardu will most likely move along the 173 km (approximate distance) Kargil- Skardu road. This road, initially running northwest from Kargil, crosses the LOC and, somewhere halfway hits Khapalu before finally reaching Skardu.

Each one of the above- mentioned approaches can take no more than a brigade, in echelons, with heavy equipment and artillery airlifted.

Nubra River originates at Rimo Glacier and flows in a southeasterly direction till Pangong Lake where it takes a U-turn and starts flowing northwest. Shyok River originates at Siachen Glacier and, like Nubra initially flows south before joining Nubra in the vicinity of Diskit. Thereafter the reinforced Shyok starts flowing, as mentioned, in a northwesterly direction till it reaches Khapalu in Baltistan. Shyok drains into Indus near Keres.


We come to Sunderji's 1987 plan, as reported by Rikhye (2014). An advance along the Nubra river valley will be in small infiltrating parties moving along mule tracks. Such an advance, as contemplated by Rikhye, made sense if the advancing division had to move upstream of the river, towards Siachen Glacier, and infiltrate through the Saltoro Ridge before attacking Skardu. We have discussed earlier how it is not possible to launch a large-scale offensive across the Saltoro Ridge.

We now discuss Sunderji's other division advancing along the Shyok river valley. Indus and Shyok rivers flow almost parallel to each other till Shyok drains into Indus at Keres, near Khapalu. If we consider the Shyok river approach, it starts at Turtuk and runs along the Shyok River till it hits Skardu. It is a more restricted approach and also depends on mule tracks only. It can only be used for infiltration by small groups.

An infantry battalion is supposed to march 48 km (30 miles) per day in the plains. We reduce the travelling distance in mountainous terrain to half, i.e. 24 km per day (which is very optimistic). Advancing along the Srinagar- Gilgit caravan route, the leading elements of the Gurais force, covering a distance of approximately 244 km, will contact Gilgit by D+10. This is the pure travelling time and does not take into account enemy's reaction. Advancing along Gurais-

Sharda- Naran- Gilgit approach will take more time because it will have to cover the Guraish- Naran segment by relying solely on mule tracks . Going by the same yardstick, the leading elements of the division advancing along the Kargil- Skardu road, travelling a distance of approximately 173- 200 km, will contact Skardu by D+8 , again not factoring enemy resistance.

Map 8.10



Attacking Gilgit and Skardu with a corps each will further mess up the offensive because the river valley approaches simply do not have the capacity to take such large forces. Capturing Gilgit and Baltistan with the sheer force of numbers is thus not possible. The only practical way an offensive across the Karakoram may materialize is through infiltration like the one Pakistan Army attempted during the Kargil War. But it was also a slow moving operation which took more than a month to infiltrate maximum two brigades up to 11 km across the LOC. And it failed, besides other

reasons, because of logistics failure. Hussain (2006) contemplates an operation where the Indian Army captures Skardu airfield in a surprise attack by airborne troops and follows it up by a massive airlift of troops to rapidly build up a force of the size of a reinforced infantry division. This appears more practicable. The same holds true for an operation to capture Gilgit.

Why were BMPs landed at Thoise during exercise Chequerboard? Perhaps an air assault operation was also in the offing in conjunction with the ground offensive. We are not clear about this. Such forces are landed in the enemy's rear to:-

- a. Establish a firm base inside enemy territory for facilitating the overall operation.
- b. Create a shock effect on the enemy and imbalance it psychologically. However, the attacking force itself is most vulnerable to ground fire during the airdropping/ landing phase.
- c. After landing, the leading elements of the force get busy in 1) securing the firm base, the airfields, and the landing grounds; 2) fighting off enemy counter attacks.

In a division strength operation, the airborne force, normally a brigade, acts as the advance guard and holds ground till link up with the main force takes place. The advance guard brigade itself will land in phases, a battalion size force acting as the vanguard. The sustaining power of such an advance guard is between 24-48 hours within which period the main force should link up. The advance guard may be followed either by the remaining airborne division or infantry and/or armoured formations advancing on the ground. Landing an airborne advance guard followed up by a ground force advancing along the river valleys is not possible in the Karakoram since, unlike Afghanistan, there is no Salang Tunnel through the Karakoram to move the ground forces for a quick link up with the airborne force. Therefore, after securing the Gilgit and Skardu airfields, division size forces will have to be airlifted for completing the task and subsequently undertaking a combing/consolidation operation.

In December 1979, airlifting an airborne division to Kabul took the Soviets three days. And this when there was no ground opposition. In the context of a future Indo-Pakistan war, any attempt by India to capture Gilgit and Baltistan through an airborne operation will be immediately countered by the enemy troops holding the likely landing zones. Even if the response is

late, the attacker will be eventually embroiled in fierce ground battles with the defender. Establishing a firm base inside the enemy territory will face stiff resistance.

It must be borne in mind that in October 1947 India initially landed 1 Sikh Battalion at Srinagar airport. The leading elements of this battalion were under explicit orders to turn back if the airfield was held by the raiders. Even if Indian Army employs an air assault division each to capture Gilgit and Skardu, the technique and tactics will be the same. Pathfinders will try to secure the airfield, followed by the leading brigade and the remaining division. And the airfield, nearby installations and ground would be held by the Pakistani forces. The point here is, it will not be a walkover. The actual battle will start soon after the attacker's boots are on the ground. While the landing of troops is in progress, the defender will retaliate by engaging the enemy aircraft, airfields, landing grounds and heliports with air, air defence artillery, field artillery, and SSMS.

Capturing Aksai Chin

The hypothesized plan calls for capturing Aksai Chin with 3x corps; 2x corps to attack Aksai Chin advancing east from Demchok, and 1x corps in reserve. It aims at taking the north end of the Aksai Chin Road with 1x air- assault division from the AHQ Reserve Corps. How would an air-assault operation unfold? Again, consider the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. It started with an airlift not air assault, because there was no enemy on the ground. The spearhead of the invasion was the Soviet 105 Airborne Guards Division. It took the Soviets almost three days (night 24th – 26th December) to airlift the entire division, in the absence of any ground opposition, by roughly 250 flights of Il-76 and other transport planes. Besides securing Kabul airport, the airborne units also seized key points along the highways and tunnels to provide a secure route to the ground troops that followed (5, 16, 66, 357, and 360 Motor Rifle Divisions). The overall operation was provided air support by the Soviet Air Force.

A standard Soviet Airborne Division incorporated two parachute regiments, an artillery regiment, and an armoured regiment equipped with 107x BMD light armoured vehicles. (Brigades were called regiments). These divisions also carried substantial quantities of air defence and anti-tank weapons.

What is the history of the Indian airborne forces? In the 1990s, Sunderji had conceived converting 54 Infantry Division into an air assault division by about the year 2000. More than two decades later the only airborne force projection capability that India has is the 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade stationed at Agra. This brigade comprises 2x parachute battalions, 1x special forces battalion, 1x field regiment artillery, an engineers company, and complements from the services units. The Indian Army is still thinking about raising a division-size rapid reaction force of which 50 Parachute Brigade will form the nucleus. This should likely come about by the end of India's 12th Defence Plan (2012-2017).

How did Indian airborne/heliborne forces perform in the past? In October 1987, Indian Army employed its 10 Para (Special Forces) along with Sikh Light infantry in a heliborne operation against the Tamil militants holed up in Jaffna University. The operation was a failure, resulting in heavy casualties to the attackers. After the initial setback, 10 Para participated in November 1987 in another heliborne assault 14 miles to the north-west of Jaffna where, reportedly, they killed 200 militants. We do not know about Indian casualties.

In November 1988, the Indian Army employed its 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade to carry out an airborne/air transported operation in what was claimed to be an operation to liberate Maldives from a bunch of rebels, apparently looking like petty thieves, who had reportedly overthrown the government of this island nation. Most likely it was a put up show contrived to show the world, and to the Indian people at large, that the Indian Army was capable of launching such an operation. Despite the miserable looking tramps of rebels, the parachute brigade meticulously followed all the drills involved in an airborne operation. Spearheading the mission, 6 Para flew in a fleet of transport aircraft. One team rescued the poor president of Maldives, another took over the airfield, and a third rescued Maldivian security personnel. There was a role for the navy also. When the rebels tried to escape along with some hostages, they were chased by the Indian Navy.

Coming back to Aksai Chin, the plan assumes that, due to lack of adequate forces in Aksai Chin, China is unlikely to mount a counter attack before D+30 or perhaps even till D+45. China is deliberately maintaining a light presence in Tibet, but its 15 Airborne Corps, stationed in Guangzhou Military Region, comprises three airborne divisions (43, 44, and 45). This airborne corps is China's primary strategic airborne formation and is part of

its Rapid Reaction Units. Unlike most armed forces, China's airborne forces are part of the PLAAF. During the 1990s, only one of the corps three divisions could be airlifted and deployed to any part of China within 48 hours. Reportedly, a 10,000 strength airborne division was transported to Tibet in 1988 in less than 48 hours. The airlift capability would have been enhanced by now.

Equipment Imbalances

See Chapter X

Miscellaneous Aspects

- The mindset on both the sides is the same – defensive. However, Pakistan Army, due to introspection, particularly during the 60s, has imbibed more flexible and initiative seeking principles in its doctrines. For example, whereas the Indian Army teaches attacking from firm base to firm base, In Pakistan Army, there is no concept of securing a firm base before the attack and, unlike the Indian Army, a local commander does not seek permission to exploit and attack the next objective once he secures his assigned objective. He has the flexibility and initiative to take a decision if the situation warrants. Pakistan Army also discarded the concept of reverse slope defence inherited from the British.
- The plan being discussed calls for launching pre-emptive attacks against both China and Pakistan. It is based on the premise that it will be the end once India secures its military objectives. It will not. Rikhye has considered various contingencies and suggested solutions to address the likely scenarios. But he has not taken into account all the likely countermeasures by China and Pakistan.
- India is following the indirect approach to achieve its strategic objectives against Pakistan. There is no need for India to wage a fresh war. The war is already going on.

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IX

THE ONGOING WAR

The Present Situation

We must reconcile with how the world has changed since the Cold War. Water flows in the direction where it finds the least resistance. The same is true about relationships- individual and collective, hence the new world alignments in which the United States, the European Union countries, Japan, and India are lined up against an assertive China. We should not, however, compare the post-Cold War alignments with the rivalry between the United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union. The world is no longer divided into two camps based on opposing ideologies. Ideological states have been replaced by “identity states”. It is not a matter of fight till death for either of the contestants. In many areas, the United States and China complement each other. While China blows hot and cold in the Pacific, it is very careful about overplaying its hand. In this new post Cold War alignment, the United States, and the informal coalition it is trying to forge, view themselves as representatives of pluralistic and benign societies arrayed against an authoritarian and repressive China. For the last many decades, there are insurgencies and separatist movements going on in the Indian-held Kashmir and in its northeastern states. However, the western powers only focus on China’s restive provinces, especially Tibet.

Whereas China and India have a territorial dispute, this is not stopping them from cooperating with each other in the economic field. As a matter of fact, the Sino-Indian border dispute has become irrelevant for both the countries. They are living with it, and will continue to do so in the future. This brings us to the question: should Pakistan keep seeking symmetry with India by borrowing power from China? The answer is, clichés apart, there is no such thing as “all weather friendship”. Pakistan’s Cold War relationship with China was based on the ground realities of that era. It derived its strength from the Sino-Indian border conflict. Since then, China has repaired its relations with India to a large extent. It has also come out of its world isolation and no longer requires Pakistan as a window to the world, as it did half a century ago. However, China still remotely needs Pakistan to checkmate India even as India needs Vietnam to checkmate China.

The India-centric aspect of Sino- Pak relationship, though not ceased altogether, has diminished to a considerable extent. However, the relationship has greater scope for expansion in another dimension. China needs Pakistan for an access to the Gulf oil fields and the Middle East markets. The so-called economic corridor


linking China's backward western regions with the Gwadar port is a step in this direction. The project provides Pakistan an opportunity to modernize its infrastructure, industrialize itself, and become a self-reliant nation. However, the manner in which the Pakistani politicians (including those in the government) are drooling over getting a share in the USD 46 billion bounty may dampen China's enthusiasm.

Indirect Approach

Moving forward from the Cold War period, India-Pakistan rivalry has shifted to a lower dimension where proxy operations against each other have replaced conventional warfare. In this scenario, nuclear deterrence acts as a stabilizer which prevents the events from getting escalated beyond a certain level. After the 71 War, and particularly after the 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, a pattern can be discerned where both India and Pakistan have resorted to indirect approach to address their mutual differences. We notice manifestations of this approach in the Indian support of various separatist forces in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh, and its infiltration of religious extremists in Punjab. Many Taliban groups are also on the pay roll of Indian intelligence agencies. Pakistan is supporting the insurgency in IHK by maintaining that it is a freedom movement. It is logical for Pakistan, a weaker power, to resort to an indirect approach for the achievement of its strategic goal : recovery and integration of IHK with Pakistan.

What were the Indian motives to adopt an indirect approach for destabilizing Pakistan? We have discussed earlier how cautious and risk-averse Indian civil and military leadership is when it comes to settling scores on the battlefield. India attacked and absorbed small states like Hyderabad, Junagarh, Goa, and Sikkim, etc., because militarily they were no match for India. In 1962, Nehru tried to test the waters by provoking China through his forward policy. After India's defeat, China declared a unilateral (and well thought out) ceasefire, restricting India from ever approaching within twenty kilometers of the Line of Actual Control and, to this day, India obliges China. In 1971, India attacked East Pakistan only when it was absolutely sure of its victory, but the Indian Army stopped in its tracks in the western theatre because of the human and material risks involved. In the future, India will resort to armed intervention in Pakistan only when it is absolutely sure that it's offensive will be a walkover. Covert Indian intervention in Pakistan should be viewed in this context.

Seasons of Indo-Pakistan Confrontation



Not that indirect approach is a new phenomenon in South Asia. In the past, the intervening periods between conventional wars in the Subcontinent were peppered with proxy wars. However, after 1971, these have become the sole instrument of conflict resolution. If we liken the Kashmir dispute to the eye of the storm, Indo-Pakistan confrontation is like a weather system which has, over the last six decades, generated a seasonal cycle characterized by 1) major wars (47-48, 65, and 71); 2) lesser wars (Siachen-85 and Kargil-96); and 3) proxy wars. Presently we are living in the season of proxy wars. This completes the first cycle of the seasons of confrontation. Apparently, within the cycle, the seasons proceed in a linear fashion: major wars- proxy wars- lesser wars. However, it is more complex than we think. There are sub-seasons in a season.

The First Kashmir War, if we still count it among the category of major wars, in spite of its limited scope and restricted employment of the Pakistan Army, spawned the other two major wars in 1965 and 1971. As we look back, we find that during the period 1948-1965, both India and Pakistan, deriving motivation from their differences over Jammu & Kashmir, had been trying to destabilize each other through proxy wars. India, in cahoots with the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, supported the Pakhtunistan stunt as a result of which Afghan forces invaded Bajaur and Dir areas. Pakistan had to use its air force to get the Afghan aggression vacated. The first post-independence insurgency in Balochistan, led by Sher Muhammad Marri, also had the Soviet and Indian Support. It was also during the

1948-65 period, when India started supporting the separatists in Sindh (Jiye Sindh) and East Pakistan (Awami League). It is an academic discussion if Pakistan reacted to the Indian moves or it was vice versa. However, during the same period Pakistan was also supporting the Naga and Mizo insurgencies in India's northeast. Surprisingly, during this period Pakistan remained relatively inert in its support to the Kashmiris and, short of lip service, did nothing much to foment a rigorous uprising in the Valley.

The 1962 Sino-Indian border war indirectly influenced the Indo- Pakistan hostility matrix and led to the 1965 War. It was due to incorrect conclusions drawn from this border war, which made Ayub Khan and Bhutto believe that the time was ripe for launching an operation in the Valley. Pakistan tried to spark up an insurgency in IHK during a brief period between the Rann of Kutch conflict and launching of Operation Gibraltar and failed because of the short incubation period and lack of preparation.

During the period between 1965 and 1971 wars, both the countries kept themselves busy in propping up their respective proxies. Moreover, the Indians embarked upon a comprehensive plan to dismember Pakistan through the Soviet borrowed power. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan augmented Indo-Pakistan confrontation, even as the Sino-Indian war had earlier influenced the Indo-Pakistan rivalry. A significant addition, during this period, was the Khalistan insurgency, which was supported by Pakistan to interdict India's line of communications to Jammu & Kashmir. Unable to do anything significant to neutralize Pakistan's direction and control of the Aghan War, and while the Pakistan Army's attention was focused on the western border, India exploited the gap between the northernmost point of the Line of Control and Pakistan's border with China in the Trans- Karakoram Tract , and occupied the Siachen glacier.

After the 1971 War, Pakistan's support to Mizo and Naga rebels had become irrelevant. Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah had grudgingly accepted Indian suzerainty and become chief minister of Indian-occupied Jammu & Kashmir. However, a decade later (in 1981) Sheikh Abdullah was terminally ill and Pakistan had decided to exploit the vacuum that was going to be created after his death. Moreover, Kashmiris were fed up with the corruption rampant in IHK under Abdullah's rule. Conditions for a fresh uprising were thus being created in the Valley. It has been stated that Pakistan's support to the Kashmiri separatists is not in retaliation to what India is covertly and overtly doing to destabilize Pakistan, it is because Pakistan considers the uprising in Jammu & Kashmir as a genuine liberation movement launched by its people.

The one significant movement abetted by Pakistan in retaliation to the Indian subversive operations was the Khalistan movement. In 1980 or thereabouts, nuclear deterrence had established itself in the Sub-Continent and, while the Indian leadership bristled due to Pakistan's support to the Khalistanis, the 1986 standoff between India and Pakistan remained inconclusive.

Contrary to the general perception, Khalistan movement was not started by Zia-ul-Haq. According to Raman (2012) a retired officer of RAW:

“ In 1971, one saw the beginning of a joint covert operation by the U.S. intelligence community and Pakistan's ISI to create difficulties for India in (Indian, sic) Punjab.... The U.S. interest in Punjab militancy continued for a little more than a decade and tapered off after the assassination of Indira Gandhi.

After assuming power, Zia resumed (or intensified) Pakistan's support of the Khalistan movement by starting, what the Indians call “Operation Topac”. This operation dovetailed operations in J&K with the Sikh insurgency. Perhaps Pakistani leadership was never serious about the Khalistan movement beyond the consideration that a restive Indian Punjab disrupted Indian Army's line of communications to the Indian-held Kashmir. The Khalistan insurgency was not started by Zia. It was resurrected during the 1980s in retaliation to Indira's ham-handed policies against the Sikh community. Zia exploited the Sikh turbulence in East Punjab. The undeclared nuclear deterrence in the Sub-continent (Pakistan had not yet shown its hand) had transformed India-Pakistan hostility into a slow burning and long drawn out war which continues to bleed both the countries. India and Pakistan, though both of them deny it, are using terrorism as an instrument of state policy. Being a weaker power will not make Pakistan blink even as being weak has not deterred Vietnam and Taiwan from defying China. Such are the dynamics of power. Paradoxically, Pakistan's present political instability makes it a more credible nuclear weapons state than India.

The Kargil, according to Vajpai, was a “near war”. We categorize it, like the Indian operation in Siachen, as a lesser war. Thereafter, the Subcontinent was plunged into a grand season of proxy wars such as the terrorist war waged in Pakistan by the Taliban, and the Indian sponsored civil war in Karachi, interior Sindh, FATA, and Balochistan. Indians accuse Pakistani proxies of launching terrorist attacks on the Indian parliament and in Mumbai. We have to take the Indian accusations seriously. The season of proxy wars will not last forever. It will end somewhere. However, once the proxy wars come to an end, and the seasonal cycle is completed, it should logically start all over again with the season of major

wars under a nuclear overhang. Both the sides are honing their respective doctrines to fight such a war. All the while, Jammu & Kashmir remains in the eyes of the storm. It is easy to say that Pakistan should peacefully resolve its territorial differences with India. It needs two to tango. One time or another, one side refuses to dance. Maybe in the 22nd Century there is peace between the two countries. Till then both these countries, it is feared, will learn the things the hard way.

Hitting at the Tender Spots

During the low- intensity conflict punctuating the period between major wars, India and Pakistan have sought to hit at each other's tender spot - centrifugal forces, terrorism, and civil-military divide (Pakistan-specific):

Centrifugal Forces

The tendency to centralize all the powers at the centre bred resentment and a sense of deprivation among the federating units which was exploited by the other side. Like the tribal societies elsewhere, Balochistan was a confederacy where different tribes were ruled by the local chieftains called sardars. At the core of this confederacy was the Khanate of Kalat which was founded in 1666. The Khanate was unified during the period of one Mir Noori Naseer Khan Ahmedzai Baloch I. Like a permeable membrane the state territories expanded and contracted over the centuries, but were eventually formalized in the late 19th Century by treaties with the British agent Robert Sandeman. Under these treaties, parts of the state to the north and northeast were leased out or ceded to form the province of British Balochistan. On independence, whereas British Balochistan became part of Pakistan, Kalat remained a de facto independent state from 15th August 1947 to 27th March 1948 when it acceded to Pakistan. The Balochistan States Union was formed on 3rd October 1952 with three neighbouring states. The Khanate of Kalat ceased to exist on 14th October 1955 when the province of West Pakistan was formed (Dashti, 2012).

The amalgamation of Balochistan in Pakistan had cut through the vested interests of the sardars. Suddenly, their world had collapsed. Their resistance to Pakistan was understandable. The insurgencies that kept sweeping Balochistan from time to time were essentially a power struggle between the local sardars and the rulers in Karachi, and later Islamabad, to control the resources of this province. The commoners were exploited and hoodwinked by both the sides. When the Baloch sardars talk about the rights of the Baloch people, they mean themselves. All the cultivable land, water resources, and grazing grounds are the private property of these chieftains. The common man ekes out a miserable life in Balochistan. On the other hand, when the central government talks about developing Balochistan, it

means grabbing lucrative contracts to line the pockets of politicians and bureaucrats.

Sher Muhammad Marri from Kohlu, also known as Babu Shero, Shero Marri, General Sherof, and Baloch Tiger, was the chieftain of Marri tribe, Balochistan's largest. He was the first to rise in revolt against Pakistan. Sher Muhammad favoured armed struggle for the rights of the Baloch people and had close links to Kabul and Moscow. A Marxist, he gave the Baloch insurgency a new turn by employing modern guerrilla warfare tactics. In the early 1960s, his Parari (fighters) groups attacked the Pakistan Army in Marri and Jhalawan areas. The first wave of the Baloch insurgency came to an end in 1967 with the declaration of a general amnesty. In 1973, Sher Muhammad was arrested for his role in the second Baloch insurgency against the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Upon his release by Zia in the late 1970s, he went into self-exile in Afghanistan ((Siddiqui, 2012). Following the fall of Najibullah's government, Sher Muhammad and his retainers were rescued from Afghanistan in a PAF C-130 plane. He died on 11th May 1993 in a Mumbai hospital.

Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti was another Baloch stalwart. After independence, he served as a minister in Jinnah's cabinet. Bugti was a mercurial person. Educated at Lahore's Aitchison College, he had a love-hate relationship with the central government. His main grudge against the centre was depriving him of the royalties from the vast natural gas reserves, which were found on his private property in Bugti area. Bugti was right when he accused the centre of transmitting Balochistan's natural gas to every nook and corner of Punjab, Sindh, and KPK, but keeping, till 1980, even Quetta, the provincial capital, without this facility. With the passage of time, Bugti's disillusionment with Pakistan increased and, in 2006, he retreated to the mountains to fight against the state (Nicholas, 2007). On 26th August 2006 Bugti, along with his grandson, 37 armed fighters, and 21 Pakistan Army soldiers, died when the cave he was hiding in collapsed due to an explosion. These were the weaknesses of the Pakistani state which were exploited, from time to time, by Afghanistan, The erstwhile Soviet Union, and India.

As mentioned earlier, active Indian meddling in Balochistan started soon after the 1971 War. There are three routes through which Indian support to Balochistan materializes: 1) the coastal route which emanates from the Gulf states and, through various fishing villages dotting the Balochistan coast, hits the hinterland. 2) the route emanating from Iran's Chah Bahar port located 45 kilometers to the west of Gwadar. This route passes through Iranian Balochistan and ends at various entry points along Pak-Iran border. 3) the route from Tharparkar- Shikarpur – Bolan-

Quetta, and thence to interior Balochistan. There is a significant Hindu population all along the third route which is exploited by India. During all military standoffs between India and Pakistan, information of troop movement between Quetta and the rest of the country was leaked to India through its proxies positioned along this route. Various local chieftains (sardars) hostile to Pakistan find refuge in the Indian safe houses located in Afghanistan, India, Britain, and elsewhere.

Balochistan has gained added importance due to the projected China- Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Running about 2395 kilometers from Gwadar to Kashgar, it will link Gwadar with China's Xingjian region via a network of highways, railways, and oil and gas pipelines. The Corridor will open trade routes in western China and provide China direct access to the Gulf via the Arabian Sea, bypassing longer logistical routes. Gwadar, located at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, just outside the Strait of Hormuz, was not part of Pakistan when it became independent. Till 1958, it was an overseas possession of the state of Muscat and Oman, when it agreed to sell this enclave to Pakistan for PKR 5.5 billion. The area was not integrated into Balochistan till 1977.

India also supports the separatist outfits in Sindh and, though surprising for the gullible people, religious extremists in Punjab and Khyber - Pakhtunkhwa. The ambit of Indian intervention not only covers terrorist activities but also includes planting lies and confusion regarding such issues as water sharing and building of new water reservoirs on River Indus.

The Iran Factor

The geopolitical situation around Pakistan is so complex one cannot definitely say where lies the fault line. There are political, sectarian, and ethnic dimensions to this hydra-headed conflict. It is an open secret that, for the last many years, those who matter in Pakistan have looked the other way while Iran and Saudi Arabia fought their proxy wars in Pakistan and its neighborhood. During the last few years, Hazara (a Shia minority community in Balochistan) people have been routinely butchered while travelling to pay homage to Shia shrines in Iran and Iraq. To be fair, all of them are not simply Shia pilgrims. Some of them are Shia holy warriors recruited by Iran to fight its proxy wars in Iraq and Syria.

Not to be left behind, Saudi Arabia also recruits and ships Sunni fanatics from Pakistan to fight its sectarian wars in the arc of crisis extending from Lebanon to Afghanistan. Gulf- 1 was fought between Iran and Iraq, Gulf -2 (A&B) between Iraq and the US, and Gulf -3 is gradually unwinding itself while the battle lines are still being drawn. The civilian power brokers in Pakistan are crying themselves

hoarse that the recent tiff has no sectarian underpinnings. They conveniently ignore the fact that, when it comes to the rivalry between Iran and the Arabs, every issue assumes a sectarian dimension. Religion is but a façade for the chasm that has existed between these two people for the last two thousand years.

The author understands that in the future India is going to enhance the exploitation of this chasm, particularly in the Karakoram. The population on both sides of the Kargil Heights is predominantly Shia. Iran is playing a silent role in controlling the social and religious life of Shias living in Gilgit – Baltistan and Kargil. Shia lunar calendar for Gilgit- Baltistan is determined by the Imam of the Friday mosque at Kargil. And the Imam of the Kargil mosque receives his instructions from Iran. This is not something symbolic. It implies that the Shias living across the line of control now have a single authority which regulates their secular as well as religious life. During the recent years, Ladakh Hill Council has floated the idea of Greater Ladakh incorporating Ladakh, Gilgit, and Baltistan (Bazaz, 2009). There is rampant corruption and widespread unemployment on both sides of the LOC in the Karakoram region, which has bred resentment among the people, particularly the youth. Given the evolution of Indo-Iran strategic partnership during the last three decades, one can safely assume that Greater Ladakh will be a palatable proposition for Iran. It is time both India and Pakistan stop thinking of Jammu & Kashmir as a piece of real estate.

As already mentioned, Pakistani militants (Shia as well as Sunni) are fighting in Syria and Iraq. These soldiers of fortune are being recruited, through Saudi and Iranian money, by various Pakistani religious outfits. The author has interviewed some Pakistanis belonging to the tribal areas. One of them told him that twenty people from his village in Dir alone had gone to fight, maybe in Syria or Iraq, he was not sure. After a few months, only eight of them returned. What happened to the rest is not known. Similar replies were received from the others. This has been going on for many years.

However, Pakistan's relationship with Saudi Arabia and Iran should not be based on the Shia- Sunni benchmark. Since the 1990s, India and Iran have established a strategic relationship which incorporates economic and security aspects. The U.S. has helped India in nurturing this strategic relationship. During the U.S sponsored sanctions against Iran, India continued to buy oil from Iran while the U.S. looked the other way. The strategic partnership between Iran and India reinforces their respective national interests. Pakistan's relationship with Iran and Saudi Arabia should also be based on its national interests instead of pressures from its Shia and Sunni lobbies. The hard fact is that there are around three million Pakistani

expatriates in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states who send billions of dollars every year to support Pakistan's economy. During the last forty years, Saudi Arabia has massively helped Pakistan in overcoming its financial problems. No such equation exists between Pakistan and Iran. What would happen to Pakistan's economy if these Arab states decide to gradually send home Pakistani expatriates?

Arabs, Pakistan, and Israel

The Palestinian problem is one of the factors which generally determine Pakistan's relationship with the Arab world. From a larger perspective, the modern Arab states owe their existence to the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement negotiated between Britain and France during WWI. The dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, as a result of the war, allowed Britain and France to divide the former Ottoman possessions into their respective spheres of influence and arbitrarily redraw the boundaries of the Arab Middle East. The Ottoman province of Syria was divided into three separate territories; Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria. Palestine was put under the British mandate whereas Lebanon and Syria went under French occupation. The UN, in 1947, voted for the partition of Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state. Jerusalem was to have the status of an International city. Whereas the Arab states rejected the UN plan, Jews accepted it (as a stop gap measure, as they eyed the whole of Palestine).

The state of Israel was proclaimed in May 1948 and was immediately attacked by armies of its Arab neighbors. And what armies they were. Syrians were represented by bands of marauders headed by Fawzi el Kawaukji, an ex-Ottoman Army officer. The Egyptian army, according to Nasser, was busy in making toilets for the king. Only Trans-Jordan had a British-trained army which, under Glubb Pasha, its British commander, could take on the far better trained Haganah and Stern Gang, and occupied the West Bank of the river Jordan and East Jerusalem. With the passage of time, helped by the ineptitude of the semi-literate and corrupt Arab leadership, Israel gradually expanded its boundaries and today has its teeth in the entire formerly British mandated Palestine, in addition to the Golan Heights which it grabbed from Syria during the 1967 War.

Whereas successive Pakistani governments have parroted their commitment to the Palestinian cause, their support, even as the support of the Arab states, is nothing more than a cosmetic gesture. During the Suez crisis Iskander Mirza, Pakistan's first president, had even secretly congratulated Israeli leaders on the superb performance of their 'little army' in giving a bloody nose to the Egyptians. Pakistani gesture was not lost on the Egyptians. Fifteen years later, in the aftermath

of the 71 War , Hasnain Heikal, while addressing his Indian audience, remarked, “ you were not alone during the 71 war. We were with you”. Such are the dynamics of International relations. Today, the Arab Middle East stands fragmented, more than it was after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire

Egypt had recognized Israel in 1979 as a quid pro quo for the return of Sinai and Sharm el Sheikh. As a result of the peace process initiated after the second Gulf War, Israel was formally recognized by Jordan in 1989. The Gulf states and Morocco also ended Israel’s economic boycott the same year and established mutual trade relations with her. Although the Israeli trade missions in Bahrain, Oman, and Morocco were closed in 2000 due to Israel’s harsh treatment of the Palestinians, trade and economic ties continue. Also, Israeli tourism to Morocco is encouraged by the World Federation of Moroccan Jewry, a Jewish NGO. Whereas Saudi Arabia does not have diplomatic ties with Israel , this does not deter it from continuing with a back door diplomacy with the latter on how to deal with Iran. Talking about Iran, it’s anti- Israel rhetoric is just that - rhetoric, aimed at currying favour with militias like Hezbollah. Otherwise, it had been receiving arms, notably TOW anti-tank missiles, from Israel during the first Gulf War.

Why is it imperative for Pakistan to initiate a dialogue with Israel? There are four reasons for it:-

1. India, Pakistan’s arch enemy, has a strategic relationship with Israel. The relationship allows India access to the cutting edge Israeli military technologies purloined from the United States.
2. The recent US warming up to India, and the resultant US resentment against Pakistan, is a function of the Indo- Israeli strategic paradigm.
3. In the not too distant future, Pakistan will need Israel to deal with the threat from Iran. In this regard, there is greater convergence of aims between Pakistan and Israel than between India and Israel. After all, there is also an Indo – Iranian strategic relationship.
4. Apart from clichés , Pakistan will be better poised to help the Palestinians if it has diplomatic relations with Israel.

Terrorism - A Tale of Two Dons

The subject of terrorism in South Asia has been thrashed out many times over. India and Pakistan both accuse each other of using terrorism to destabilize the other side. For Pakistan, the point to note is, if India is using its intelligence agencies to foment trouble in Karachi, Balochistan, and elsewhere in Pakistan, it cannot be successful without the connivance of powerful lobbies within the country. India may be financing and arming the terrorists, but the bombers, the hit men, and the target killers are Pakistanis. Self confident nations do not complain about being abused by the others, they sort out the problem themselves.

Earlier, we had discussed how, with the passage of time, various Afghan Mujahideen groups had evolved into mafias which were involved in kidnapping, extortion, and drug trafficking. The Afghan War had created a black economy worth billions of dollars which not only financed the Mujahideen and their facilitators in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but was also instrumental, later on, in fueling terrorism. The terrorist financing game is a complex affair sponsored not only by various intelligence agencies, but also by politicians, feudal lords, religious seminaries, and business tycoons who have, on their pay roll, drug barons, smugglers, human traffickers, land grabbers, and criminals of all sorts.

It goes like this: almost every religious and political outfit in Pakistan has a militant wing which it employs to coerce its rivals. Black money is generated by the outfits through extortion, ransom, and corruption (in case of the ruling parties) by sponsorship of the underworld. After giving the terrorist outfits their cuts, rest of the money is squirreled away in UK, US, South Africa, Channel Islands, Dubai, India, and elsewhere. Shown as donations by the party members and sympathizers, the money is thus laundered. Some of this laundered money is used for buying arms, ammunition and other gear used in terrorist activities. The balance ends up in the private bank accounts of the sponsors. Interestingly, links have also been found where the secular political parties sponsor religious militants to terminate their opponents. It is here, under the cover of democracy, human rights, and religion, that this gory game is going on.

Intelligence agencies of India and Pakistan, besides those of US, UK, Russia, Germany, France, Israel, Iran, UAE, and Saudi Arabia, to name a few, also chime in and contribute according to their capacity. It makes little sense when India accuses Pakistan of sponsoring terrorism inside India. While doing so, the Indian leaders conveniently forget that they also have their fingers deep in the terrorist pie.

How is this happening? Quoting a former Indian police officer, Rajnath (2004) writes that both India and Pakistan use the underworld to undermine each other even as their armies use smugglers to infiltrate into other's territory to spy on the movements of the enemy army. Indian proxies operate from bases located in Ganga Nagar, Bhachbhar, Birsilpur and Lunkha in Rajasthan.

In a Press Trust of India report published in Express Tribune (2014), India's interior minister Rajnath Singh blamed that Pakistan was providing shelter to Dawood Ibrahim who was hiding along the Pak-Afghan border. Dawood Ibrahim and Chota Rajan are two Mumbai underworld dons who used to operate together in the notorious Indian organised crime syndicate "D-Company". The Syndicate had been actively involved in money laundering through sponsoring the Bollywood film industry, cricket match fixing (particularly IPL), drug trafficking, extortion, and terrorism in South Asia, including Pakistan. The Syndicate flourished in narcotics business by spreading its tentacles into Far East, Middle East, South East Asia, South Africa, and Australia. It was involved in smuggling of synthetic drugs such as Methaqualone, Acetic Anhydride, Pseudoephedrine, and other chemical ingredients used in production of Mandrax, Ecstasy, and Morphine, etc. The money earned from narcotics was provided to the Indian intelligence agencies for their South Asian and overseas terror financing.

Such organizations work solely for money, have no permanent affiliations/loyalties, and are run by two/three/four... timers. This is what happened to D-Company when Dawood Ibrahim turned on his Indian masters. Reportedly, Dawood Ibrahim and Chota Rajan parted ways after the 1992-93 Mumbai bomb blasts allegedly masterminded by Dawood Ibrahim. According to Rajnath (2004), "When the BJP came into power, a sensitive organization contacted Chota Rajan, and he agreed to work with it. BJP government, especially L.K. Advani, used Chota Rajan to launch operations against Pakistan". Citing examples of how Chota Rajan was used for terrorism in Pakistan, Some Indian officials revealed that the Karachi bomb blast on 11th July, 2003 was the handiwork of the Chota Rajan gang. The headquarters of Chota Rajan gang were located on a cruise ship anchored near the Malaysian coast. He has three passports issued him from Malaysia, Laos, and India.

After the split, Dawood Ibrahim moved to Dubai and set up shop there, famously inviting Bollywood actors to his parties in Dubai and Sharjah. After the Mumbai bombings he became India's most wanted man. Dawood is currently on the wanted list of Interpol for cheating, criminal conspiracy, and running an organised

crime syndicate. India accuses Pakistan of harbouring Dawood, Hafiz Saeed, and many others even as Pakistan accuses India of harboring the terrorists involved in sabotage and killings in Karachi, interior Sindh, Balochistan, and Pakistan's North West. In 2010, a US Congressional report, prompted by India, claimed that D-Company had a strategic alliance with Pakistan's ISI. They overlooked how D-Company had been providing black money to RAW for terror financing in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Srilanka, and Nepal. In November 2015, Chota Rajan was apprehended from Bali by the Indonesian police and handed over to the Indian authorities. He has since been brought back to India, ostensibly to face charges of terrorism and money laundering, etc., or is he simply handed back into the custody of his erstwhile protectors?

We now discuss the linkages between the Indian film industry and Mumbai's underworld, and their involvement in terrorist operations in the region. It is an open secret that RAW coordinates the underworld's financing of Bollywood movies and exploits the film industry to launder black money for India's terrorist operations in South Asia. Through various channels, including use of sea launches and human transporters trailing along desert and mountain routes, this laundered money finds its way to Dubai, Chah Bahar, Zahidan, Qandahar, and many other cities and towns dotting Pakistan- Iran and Pakistan - Afghan border areas. From there the money is issued to various Indian sponsored terrorist outfits which operate in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Indian consulates in Iran and Afghanistan serve as conduits for this terror financing.

To have a glimpse of these linkages, let us see how organizations like the Indian International Film Academy (IIFA) are exploited by India's Ministry of External Affairs and RAW to facilitate and promote Indian covert objectives. We all know how India abetted the Tamil insurgency in Srilanka, and the havoc it wreaked on this island nation. After about three decades of intense fighting, the Indians realized it was a futile war and decided to call it quits.

IIFA's awards presenting ceremony is an extravaganza held every year in different countries around the world. The 11th IIFA Awards ceremony took place on 5th January, 2010 at the Sugathadasa stadium in Colombo. Indian Minister of State for External Affairs was the chief guest. The ceremony was televised in India and internationally. At the ceremony's end, Jacquelin Fernandez, the India based goodwill ambassador of the NGO "Habitat for Humanity" announced that the NGO, in partnership with the Indian super star Salman Khan, will build 100 homes for the war affected people of Srilanka. Quoted in Indian newspaper Deccan Herald, Khan said "Many people lost their lives or have been displaced due to war, and constructing 100 homes is a commendable and good start." (Habitat, 2010).

This is how you first destroy a country and then make a mockery of rehabilitating it. This was not all. To complete the double dealing, The South Indian Film Chamber of Commerce, Film Employees Federation of South India, Tamil Nadu Theatre-Owner's Association, and Tamil Nadu Producer's Council were some of the organizations who vehemently opposed holding of IIFA ceremony in Colombo and boycotted it.

Civil- Military Divide

What is democracy in context of Pakistan? There are a few political dynasties ruling the roost. These dynasties control the political parties where there are no internal elections and an inner circle makes all the important appointments. The parties are run like fiefs and the electorate is hoodwinked through false promises and catchy slogans. What is the Pakistan army's role in this imbroglio? Is the Army again overstepping its domain, as propounded by some? These are the questions which agitate the minds of the common people.

Pakistan's response to the situation in Jammu & Kashmir, soon after independence, was determined by a civil government which found itself incapable of launching an overt military invasion of the state and was thus constrained to seek help from non-state actors. Pakistan Army's role in this conflict remained confined to seconding two of its officers to a ghost headquarters covertly set up with the blessings of Pakistan's prime minister for planning, preparation, and execution of the secret war in J&K. It also sent some of its officers on leave to provide leadership to the infiltrators. Pakistan Army was fully involved in the conflict in the spring of 1948 when the Indian Army was threatening to advance beyond Line Uri-Poonch-Naushera. This was how Indo-Pakistan hostility paradigm was framed.

During the Cold War era, Pakistan was the only country in the so-called "Free World" where the political government had the serving army chief (General Muhammad Ayub Khan) double as the country's defence minister. Behind the Iron Curtain, Marshall Grechko of the Soviet Union held this honour. The point here is, the civil governments involved the army in politics and then cursed it when it went out of their control. This pattern was refined during the decade spanning the period between the end of the First Kashmir War and imposition of martial law in 1958.

Pakistan remained under military rule till it was dismembered in December in 1971. Thereafter, power in Pakistan has alternated between pseudo-democratic and military governments. We say pseudo- democratic because frequent military interventions have throttled nurturing of a democratic culture. This on again-off

again jockeying for power has created a deep chasm between the politicians and the military.

The civil-military differences have reached a point where they have started blaming each other for Pakistan's ailments. The polarization has been such that some politicians do not hesitate to seek help from India, Pakistan's archenemy. The trend, started by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, has now influenced even some of Pakistan's main stream parties. Though the Cold War terminology of left, centre and right has become redundant, old affiliations die hard. It is in this context that some politicians to the left and centre now question Pakistan Army's threat assessment and accuse it of holding the nation hostage to the Kashmir dispute. They forget that the threat assessment was evolved by the civil governments. On the other hand, another group of politicians, with rightist leanings, openly, or tongue-in cheek, have sympathies with the religious terrorists.

Over the last four decades, successive Pakistani governments have, through cronyism, destroyed the heavy industry. The heavy industries nationalized by Bhutto, Karachi steel mills, and Karachi shipyards are but a few examples. The remaining plants are under the hammer. After depleting the country of its industrial assets, the successive political governments have encouraged emergence of a few cartels which control the entire economy. Presently, the economy is being held hostage to sugar, fertilizer and textile barons, most of them politicians and retired bureaucrats. The economy of Pakistan, as it stands today, cannot support the armed forces to even maintain a semblance of a viable defensive posture. And this when the army and the air force are fighting the war on terror as well as keeping more than an eye on the eastern border. In such a situation, when Pakistan's armed forces are financially hamstrung in meeting their defence needs, they will continue to play a larger than life role in the national decision making process.

What is the present state of affairs? It goes to the credit of Pakistan's armed forces that, whereas now Indian military budget surpasses Pakistan's entire budget, the military is keeping the Indian juggernaut at bay by making do with mostly second hand equipment. Our Army is buying second hand helicopters from the United States and rebuilding junk armoured personnel carriers received, gratis, from Italy. Our air force needs F-16 Viper (the latest version) to counter India's SU-30s and the projected induction of French Rafale. Due to lack of funds it has resorted to buying second hand, old version F-16s from Jordan and elsewhere. The air force also keeps re- building its half a century old Mirages to keep them flying. The navy, except for its four Chinese origin frigates, for the last three decades is making do with two to three decades old hulks. As for the nuclear deterrence, a

nuclear bomb is a deterrent till it is not used. Once used, it unleashes a mutual hara-kiri. So basically it is the conventional deterrence reinforced (of course) by nuclear deterrence.

Pakistan Army trainers are in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf emirates for the last many decades. They have created and trained the armed forces of these countries virtually from the scratch. Pakistan (not Pakistan Army) has sold small arms, APCs, armoured cars, and basic trainer aircraft worth millions of dollars to the Iraq's predominantly Shia government. During all this period Pakistan has had an active military relationship with Iran (both under the Shah as well as the Ayatollahs), particularly in training Iranian pilots and airmen. The level of military cooperation with Iran keeps fluctuating, but the cooperation never ceases.

So, what should have been the military's interest when Saudi Arabia asked for Pakistani troops and military equipment to deal with the insurgency in Yemen? The motivations for helping the Saudis were more mundane and down to earth. Pakistan needs a strong military to keep its neighborhood secure. And the military has to be properly budgeted and equipped to squarely face the security threat. Those who talk of downsizing the armed forces should understand that to simply defend itself against India, Pakistan needs an army one-third the size of the Indian Army, plain and simple.

Pakistan's security constraints have forced it, like Israel, to surreptitiously develop nuclear weapons and, like the United States, the erstwhile Soviet Union, and France* get hold of conventional and nuclear military technology from wherever it is available. The military nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan is well publicized. What, however, is ignored, is the fact that this cooperation was not one sided. Likewise, Pakistan has not only reverse engineered some weapon systems but also significantly improved them.

* It would be worthwhile to remind the readers how these countries had dismantled entire aircraft factories, rocket designing centres along with rockets, and tank manufacturing and ammunition plants from Nazi Germany and shipped them home.

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X

EPILOGUE

Returning to the nuclear debate; two important developments have taken place in the recent past:-

1. After establishing the infrastructure on the ground, completing the peacetime relocation of their field formations along the western border, and raising the launching platforms, Indians have disowned Cold Start by saying that it is not an official military doctrine.
2. Indian defence analysts have started raising doubts on its officially declared nuclear doctrine which professes a “No first use” policy. They maintain that this doctrine lacks flexibility and must be reversed to counter the Pakistani nuclear threat.

Why, this about face? The problem lies with Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) doctrine. It has been discussed that the major reason for Indian opposition to Pakistan’s nuclear programme was to deny the latter the option to counter Indian nuclear blackmail and enable India to slap a Pax Indica on the Sub-continent. Since 1998 when Pakistan became a declared nuclear power, India had been frantically trying to find the gap in Pakistan’s defence posture and exploit it with its superior conventional forces.

Such a gap was perceived by the Indians at the tactical level, which, they thought, could be breached through a low intensity, rapid advance into enemy territory with mechanized forces supported by the IAF. Hence the Cold Start doctrine which called for a quick punitive operation through a shallow penetration inside the enemy territory in response to enemy crossing a declared red line, causing destruction to enemy’s men and material, followed by a swift withdrawal, thus denying the enemy time and excuse to retaliate.

Apparently, it is a reactive doctrine and not one of pre-emption. However, like the 1971 War, it aims at creating conditions where Pakistan would be channelled into a situation to be used as an excuse for a military action. Pakistan responded to the challenge by developing tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs). This is the reason India has recoiled from the Cold Start doctrine and feels insecure with its policy of “No first use” of nuclear weapons. It is trying to

put pressure on Pakistan through the United States either to abandon the FSD altogether or curtail its nuclear arsenal.

The entire debate revolves around bypassing Pakistan's nuclear deterrence regime and striking it in a region where it is weakest- the conventional asymmetry. Let us investigate this myth. For the purpose of comparison , we will consider only those forces which will play a decisive offensive role in a future war, i.e., armoured and mechanized formations, combat aviation, parachute forces, air forces, and navies.

Global Firepower Comparison (2015)

Table 10.1

Category	India	Pakistan	Ratio	Remarks
Global Firepower Ranking	4 (of 106)	17(of 106)	-	-
Active Military Personnel	1,325,000	617000	2.1:1 in India's favour	
Active Military reserves	2,143,000	515,000	4.1:1 in India's favour	
Helicopters	584*	313	1.8:1 in India's favour	*Mostly operated by IAF
Attack Helicopters	20*	48	2.4:1 in Pakistan's favour	*Entirely operated by IAF. Being transferred to Indian Army Aviation Corps. Near parity will exist after new raisings/inductions
AFVs	6,704*	2,828	2.3:1 in India's favour	*Includes AFVs organic to RAPIDs and infantry divisions.
SP Guns	290	465	1.6 :1 in Pakistan's favour	
Towed Artillery	7,414	3,278	2.2:1 in India's favour	
MBRLs	292	134	2.1:1 in India's favour	

Note: The ratios slip further against IA when PLA is also factored.

Let us first have a glance over the comparative strength in mechanized forces

Mechanized Forces

Table 10.2

	India	Pakistan	Remarks
Armd Divs	1, 31,33	1,6*	*Infantry divisions grouped with I and II Corps (17, 37, 14, and 40) may have been earmarked for mechanization to achieve mobility compatible with 1 and 6 armoured divisions in a Follow in Zone role.
Mech Divs	-	25*,26*	*Corps reserves with V and XXXI Corps respectively
RAPIDS	14,18,24,36*	-	*More infantry divisions may be converted to RAPIDS
Indep Armd Bdes	2, 3,6,14,16,23	2,3,8,11,13 + 3x others	Corps reserves
Indep Mech Bdes	55,340	31 + 6x others*	Corps reserves
Combat Aviation	2x Mi 35 Sqns*	3x AH 1 S Sqns (31,33, and 35) @	*MI 35 helicopters being phased out. Three combat aviation squadrons being raised under Indian Army Aviation Corps. These will be based on 39x Apache and locally produced helicopters. Apaches will be delivered in 2018. @ Viper helicopters, being inducted, will raise an additional squadron. A near parity will exist after the new raisings/inductions.
Parachute Forces	50 (I) Para Bde *	SSG Div@	*Nucleus around which an air assault division will be raised. @ Comprises Div HQ and 2x bdes (7x commando bns, 2x indep commando companies, and div troops). Third bde under raising. PAF C-130s and Army Aviation rotary wing aircraft available for air lifting.
Self Propelled Artillery	17*x SP/ Towed Arty Regiments	27x* SP/ Towed Arty Regiments	*Number of regiments for each army has been calculated through guess work. See note below.

Data on Indian formations: Rahul, Rikhye, Bajwa

Note: Exact data on SP artillery not accessible. Number of regiments has been calculated on the basis of 1xSP/towed regt (In Direct Support) for each armd /mech bde. RAPIDS not considered:-

India

3x Armd Divs : 9

6x (I) Armd Bdes: 6
 2x (I) Mech Bdes: 2
 Total : 17x regiments

Pakistan

2x Armd Divs : 6
 2x Mech Divs : 6
 8x (I) Armd Bdes: 8
 7x (I) Mech Bdes: 7
 Total : 27x regiments

Indian and Pakistani armd/mech formations have an amalgam of SP and towed regiments. Indian SP artillery fields 60's vintage Abbott SP gun(105 mm) , 70' s vintage Catapult (Soviet 130 mm gun mounted on a Vijyanta chassis) , and FH-77B155 mm/39 cal Swedish towed gun. The first two categories will be phased out with Dhanush 155 mm towed gun, a version of Swedish FH-77 B, as and when it will be available.

Pakistani armd /mech formations field M110/M110A2, 155 mm tracked howitzers (US origin) and the older M109, 155 mm tracked howitzer (US origin) which has been locally upgraded to M109A2 version. SH1, 155 mm wheeled howitzer (Chinese) has been issued to AJK and Gilgit – Baltistan formations.

At 18x guns per regiment, Indian artillery organic to armoured/ mech formations (17x regiments, less those organic to RAPIDs) absorbs 306 x guns, a figure close to the 290 guns reported by Global Firepower. Similarly, Pakistani SP/towed artillery (27x regiments) organic to armoured/ mech formations should have 486 guns, a figure close to Global Firepower's estimate of 465 guns. We have not included RAPIDs because otherwise we cannot explain the disparity in the number of SP guns as reported by Global Firepower.

Post Script: In end March 2017, Indian cabinet Committee on Security approved acquisition of 100x tracked SP guns , to be locally manufactured in partnership with a South Korean firm. The guns are required to be delivered by by end 2020.

Summary

Table 10.3

	Armd Div	Mech Div	RAPIDS	Indep Armd Bde	Indep Mech Bde	Cbt Aviation Sqn	Para Bde
India	3	-	4	6	2	2	1
Pakistan	2	2	-	8	7	2	2 (3 rd bde under raising)

Except for the active army reserves, India nowhere enjoys a 3:1 superiority. Its superiority in critical forces is thus not enough for forcing a decision on the enemy. Indian superiority in armoured divisions and RAPIDs has been matched by the

combined combat power of Pakistan's 2x armoured divisions and 2x mechanized divisions. Pakistan Army also has more independent armoured and mechanized brigades, SP artillery, attack helicopters, and parachute forces. We also have to take into account Indian deployment against China. Do we really think that the Indian Army is capable of "slicing" Pakistan? It rather implies that the Pakistan Army can defeat an Indian armoured onslaught without the use of TNWs. However, Pakistan will still keep the tactical nuclear option open for three reasons-:

1. To keep Indian political and military decision makers guessing.
2. Pakistan considers India's declared nuclear doctrine a hoax aimed at hoodwinking the world at large and portraying India as a peaceful country threatened by its belligerent neighbor. Notwithstanding India's "no first use" declaration, Pakistan believes India will launch a pre-emptive nuclear attack against Pakistan whenever it finds it feasible.
3. India already possesses nuclear weapons based on Brahmos cruise missile. So why the hullabaloo over Pakistan's TNWs.

Pakistan had already defanged the Cold Start doctrine by deciding to mechanize its corps reserves. Pakistan produces its own tanks and APCs but is still planning to import additional tanks from China, Ukraine, Russia, or Turkey. It has already received second-hand APCs from Italy. This is indicative of an extensive Pakistani drive towards further mechanization of forces.

Despite a USD 2 trillion plus GDP and a large industrial base supported by an equally large R&D set up, the Indian armed forces are plagued by equipment deficiencies and bureaucratic wrangling in development and induction of new weapon systems. Presently, they are thinking about spending USD 7.5 - 9 billion on developing a new IFV for the Indian mechanized formations. A total of 2600 IFVs will be produced to replace the existing Soviet origin BMPs (Shukla, 2012). Pakistan's total defence budget for the fiscal year 2015-16 is USD 7.8 billion.

According to the available information, the future Indian IFV should be able to fight on its own, independent of tank support, be equipped with ATGMs, and have a high-velocity main gun to effectively suppress the enemy defences during an attack. Most probably it will have mobility compatible with tanks. So, in a sense, it will be another tank. If that is the case, why to spend USD 7.5 billion plus (@ Rs.66.34 to a \$ at the time of writing this book) on a new IFV instead of making an IFV on an existing tank chassis, like the Israeli Namer. Now Israelis, having greater experience about armoured warfare than Pakistan and India, do not believe in IFVs. The Namer, based on Merkava chassis, is an APC armed with either a

12.7 mm Browning machine gun or a grenade launcher on a remote controlled weapon station, a 7.62 mm machine gun, a 60 mm mortar, and smoke grenade launchers.

However, which tank chassis should they use to develop the new IFV/APC? After three decades and spending billions, the Indian Army has discarded its MBT Arjun. They say that it is too heavy, underpowered, lacks the ability to engage enemy gunship helicopters, and too big for the existing road-rail infrastructure (Gady, 2015). Instead, they will now spend USD 22.6 billion (more than thrice Pakistan's entire defence budget) on developing a new MBT to replace 2415 obsolescent T-72 tanks. The new platform will also be used to build a family of tracked and wheeled vehicles including light tanks, bridge layers, trawls, ambulances, etc.

The Indian Army, in a global Request for Information (RFI) has asked tank manufacturers to submit proposals to design the future MBT. This is akin to the General Service Requirement (GSR) of the Pakistan Army. The GSR, which lays down the design and operational parameters of a weapons platform/ system, is always evolved and determined by the operating service. Asking the manufacturers to lay down such parameters for a future MBT of the Indian Army defies logic. Most likely, this future MBT, like its predecessor, after spending billions of dollars, will also be discarded.

Air Power

IAF will be down to 32 squadrons by the end of 2015. Breakdown of the 32 squadrons is as follows:-

Table 10.4

Serial	Category	Squadrons
1.	MiG-21/MiG-27	11
2.	Suhhoi 30-MKI	10
3.	Jaguar	6
4.	MiG-29	3
5.	Mirage 2000	2
	Total	32

With 576 fighter jets, it will be well short of the 750-strong fighter jet fleet mandated by a government sanction to wage a simultaneous two-front war with Pakistan and China. IAF accuses HAL for the slow rate of the overhaul of existing aircraft and production of new ones. The project is three years behind schedule.

Out of a total of 272 of these aircraft to be delivered to IAF by 2020, HAL still has to deliver 70 (Banerjee, 2015).

Comparison by Global Firepower

Table 10.5

Category	India	Pakistan	Ratio	Remarks
Fighter Aircraft	629	387	1.6: 1 in India's favour*	* lowest ratio since 1947
Trainer Aircraft	263	170	1.5:1 in India's favour	
Transport Aircraft	667	278	2.3:1 in India's favour	
Serviceable Airports	346	151	2.2:1 in India's favour	

Note: The ratios slip further against IAF when PLAAF is also taken into account.

By increasing its combat radius, the IAF can fight a future war against Pakistan with its indigenously developed Tejas fighter, but it has almost rejected the aircraft and is trying to acquire the more modern Rafale from France. IAF's Air Staff Requirement for the LCA (Tejas) was finalized in 1985 after which the Aeronautical Development Authority (ADA) started marshalling the resources and putting up on ground various facilities, laboratories, and infrastructure required for the development of the core competencies for this aircraft. Project definition commenced in 1987, with France's Dassault Aviation in a reviewing/ advisory role.

After spending almost USD18.4 billion (including the money spent on the naval variant) the aircraft does not meet IAF and IN requirements. Both the services consider it underpowered. In addition, IAF wants an aircraft with the super cruise capability and AESA radar (Khokhar, 2013). This means that IAF now demands an aircraft which is more modern and capable than the SU-30 MKI because SU-30 lacks super cruise capability and only has PESA radar. Super cruise means at least 40% more fuel to travel the same distance at subsonic speeds. Also, AESA radar will require a more powerful engine and a larger nose cone to house it. So the desired aircraft will be bigger and heavier than the present Tejas. It will not be in the light combat category as stipulated in the original ASR. Tejas was supposed to replace MIG-21 which requirement it sufficiently fulfils. But it does require a more powerful engine to 1) increase its combat radius and 2) provide adequate thrust to enable the naval variant to take off from IN's relatively small aircraft carrier decks.

After the Kaveri engine failed to perform at high altitudes, Indian DRDO was considering a proposal to team up with French company Snecma for technical assistance to develop, using Snecma's new core, an uprated derivative of Rafale's M-88-2 engine, providing 83-85 kiloNewtons of maximum thrust. The proposal was shot down by the IAF by objecting that the DRDO will be merely helping Snecma in making an engine with an "Indian made stamp" (Shukla, 2010). Such being the rivalries between IAF and various Indian defence agencies (ADA, DRDO, and HAL), one is reminded of the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping who had once remarked : "It does not matter whether a cat is white or black, as long as it catches mice".

After cancelling the proposed team up with Snecma the DRDO, in 2008, selected GE F414 to power Tejas Mk II. However, adopting the new power plant entailed 3-4 years of redesign work. If we consider Rafale as a benchmark (considering its AESA and supercruise capabilities), it features 2x Snecma M-88 engines, each engine providing 50 kiloNewtons of dry thrust (a total of 100 kiloNewtons) , and 75 kiloNewtons with afterburners (total 150 kiloNewtons). The proposed GE F414 provides 57.8 kiloNewtons dry thrust and 97.9 kiloNewtons with afterburners, well short of the combined thrust generated by the Rafale's M-88 engines. How effectively GE414 will fulfill the revised ASR is yet to be seen. Also, India has now entered into an agreement with Israel for ELM-2052 AESA radar for Tejas. The modified version (SoP-2018) is expected to be inducted into IAF around 2018, which is doubtful.

Composites are used in airframes to achieve:1) significant reduction in weight;2) significant reduction in the part count;3) elimination of costly fasteners;4) reduction in material fatigue; and 5)reduction in the signature. It is claimed that up to 45% of Tejas airframe employ composites, lowering the aircraft's overall weight by 21 %. If this is correct, the advantage of weight reduction has not been utilized by making the aircraft perform efficiently with a less powerful engine. As for metal fatigue, PAF Sabres developed hairline cracks in their airframes in the 1980s, after almost 20 years of operation. The Mirage aircraft operated by PAF, due to their better metallurgy, are still flying after being inducted almost half a century ago. Composites, despite the claims made by HAL and ADA, are costly materials which should be used sparingly in critical regions of the airframe. Use of these materials in Tejas is rather lavish.

Presently a debate is going on if F-35 is going to be the last manned fighter aircraft. Notwithstanding the arguments forwarded in favour of and against the development of 6th generation fighters, it remains a fact that stealth aircraft are prohibitively expensive. There is a likelihood that armed and reconnaissance

drones will play a much greater role in future air wars, particularly in the Sub-continent.

Sea Power

Comparison

Table 10.6

Category	India	Pakistan	Ratio	Remarks
Major Ports	7	2		
Fleet Strength	202	74		
Aircraft Carriers	2*	0		*Without ATAS and LRSAMS
Submarines	15	8		
Frigates	15*	10		*25x frigates, destroyers and corvettes are without ATAS. All surface combatants are without LRSAMs
Destroyers	9	0		
Corvettes	25	0		
Mine Warfare Craft	7	3		
Patrol Craft	46	12		

Note: The avowed area of operations of IN stretches from the Straits of Hormuz to the Straits of Mallaca. It also has ambitions to maintain naval presence in South China Sea. PN has to defend its shoreline and SLOCs only.

Indian Navy and MoD, while planning for the construction of surface ships, did not place orders for the purchase or local production of long/medium range surface to air missiles and Advance Towed Array Sonars. Lack of these renders the Indian ships vulnerable to PN's sea skimming anti-ship missiles fired from aircraft and submarines. Likewise, they had failed to place orders for the purchase of torpedoes for their French origin Scorpene submarines (Mizokami,2013). These systems are not available off the shelf and require a rather longtime line between placing of orders and development/ supply by the manufacturer. All Indian surface combatants are without Long Range Surface to Air Missiles (LRSAMs) (Raghuvanshi, 2013). The joint Indo-Israeli Barak 8 LRSAM is still undergoing trials.

Barak 8 made its first test flight in the Mediterranean during the last week of November 2015. Its solid fuel propulsion motors have been developed by India's DRDO whereas Israel has provided the guidance system and sensors (70% of the project). Israelis claim that the missile can protect warships from anti-ship missiles launched from submarines, ships, or aircraft up to 150 kilometres away. This claim is not supported by the system's performance during the test flight. During the test, Barak 8 system had to detect and intercept a target drone flying at a speed of 500-550 kmph. This was slower than the anti-ship missiles in Pakistan Navy's inventory – the Harpoon anti-ship missile has a speed of approximately 865 kmph whereas the Exocet missile travels at 1,150 kmph. Reportedly, the on-board radar of the Israeli corvette, on which Barak 8 system was mounted, acquired the target at a range of more than 20 kilometers, but less than 120 kilometers – a rather large interval which keeps the evaluators guessing. The design parameters of the Barak 8 require a detection range of 70 kilometres. Israelis and Indians will need more time to bring this missile up to the required parameters.

At the beginning of 2014, the Indian Navy was worried about how to bring INS Vikramaditya, the aircraft carrier it had purchased from Russia, safely home. The reason- Vikramaditya, along with almost 25 of India's most advanced destroyers, frigates, and corvettes, lacks an Advanced Towed Array Sonar (ATAS) (Shukla, 2014). Without this crucial sensor, Pakistani submarines can target Indian warships with torpedoes from 50-80 kilometers away. The Indians had passed on their apprehensions to the United States which, in turn, had told the Pakistanis not to interfere with the Indian armada escorting Vikramaditya during the last leg of its journey. The Pakistan Navy complied. But, it did what it had been doing all along the years- collecting the acoustic signals and recording all the voice signatures of the Indian surface combatants and their crews. Most likely, the Pakistani submarines escorted the Indian ships all the way home.

Threat Assessment

Threat assessment has two dimensions 1) the enemy within; and 2) the external threats.

The Enemy Within

Presently the internal threat is more potent than the external one. This threat has been amply discussed in Chapter IX. The constituents of internal threat have already been identified as 1) centrifugal forces; 2) terrorism, and 3) civil-military divide. Pakistan, since the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, has been fighting an undeclared war forced on it by India, Afghanistan, the United States, and Iran. The United Arab Emirates is also playing a role in destabilizing Pakistan. Unlike conventional wars, this type of war can neither be fought solely with conventional forces nor are these forces amply trained to fight such a war. After suffering considerable losses, the army, and the air force have learned their lessons as a result of which the terrorists in the northwest and the separatists in Balochistan are on the run. However, the internal war cannot be decisively won unless all the ingredients of the national security framework are fully enmeshed. These are 1) internal security; 2) foreign policy; 3) finance; and 4) defence. In this regard, following aspects of the present situation are highlighted:-

- a. Over the period, a crop of politicians, intellectuals, and media persons has emerged which questions the existing security narrative as according to them it has been framed by the army. This is the main reason why the war against terrorism and (to an extent) separatism has lost its steam. After the recent bomb attacks in Paris, the French government declared a state of emergency. The present situation in Pakistan also needs declaring an emergency and promulgating the Defence of Pakistan Rules which will 1) curtail basic human rights; 2) pave the way for military courts. The present set up of military courts is a half- hearted attempt which will not deliver the desired results.
- b. As mentioned earlier, many politicians are deeply involved in terror financing to terminate their enemies, money laundering, and extortion. An unstable and weak Pakistan suits these people who thrive on borrowed power. Some of them are even prepared to bargain Pakistan's nuclear assets for coming/ remaining in power. The United States, since long, is working on getting its hands on Pakistan's nuclear weapons in return for paying off its foreign debts.
- c. The external powers mentioned above are using the indirect approach as a result of which Pakistan may, in not too distant future, implode.

The External Threats

With the present force ratios, India lacks the muscle to launch an aggression against Pakistan with conventional forces. According to the Indian schedules and assessments on reorganization of forces, new raisings, induction of new weapons platforms, and mating the existing and new platforms with critical sensors / weapon systems, most likely by 2025 or thereabouts the Indian government and its armed forces will feel confident and comfortable enough to start considering about actualizing India's strategic goals in the South Asian neighbourhood. And during this period Pakistan's military will not be sitting idle. Chances are that even beyond 2025 India will not be able to wage a conventional war against Pakistan unless Pakistan is internally destabilized in a 71 like situation.

What will India do? It has been discussed in detail how India is sponsoring the centrifugal forces in Pakistan. It will continue with its efforts to destabilize Pakistan and implode it through the indirect approach. Once the central authority in Pakistan is eroded, India will exploit the situation and augment the indirect approach with a series of military actions. In the past, India had been nibbling at Azad Kashmir and Baltistan and got away with it due to the ineptitude of Pakistan's civil and military leadership. India's most likely future thrust will remain focused on these areas. In the future, fighting in the mountainous terrain of Jammu, Kashmir, and Gilgit- Baltistan will no longer be characterized by slogging infantry attacks and conventional artillery duels. To generate battlefield mobility in the mountains, combined with a quick shifting of fire, India is acquiring high altitude helicopters and ultra-light howitzers in large numbers. These, in conjunction with the precision guided and standoff munitions held by IAF, will be used to dislodge Pakistani infantry from its defensive positions on the dominating heights.

India is raising a mountain strike corps to capture Aksai Chin, Gilgit, and Baltistan in a future two-front war against Pakistan and China. The likely objectives against Pakistan will be Skardu, Gilgit, and the proposed Bhasha Dam. An important task for this corps will be to disrupt the development of the projected China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) by destroying the communications network and important installations. This will materialize in the form of heliborne/ air assault landings in the rear of the objectives in conjunction with frontal assaults. Again, the military operation will be preceded by building upon the already simmering unrest in Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan. This will bring Iran into the matrix of confrontation. Success in disrupting CPEC will hinge upon how effectively India plays the Shia card in this region. In the past,

China remained silent when the Indian Army occupied Siachen glacier, and it remained indifferent during the Kargil war. With its strategic interests involved in CPEC, China's future response will be different.

Pakistan's northwestern and southwestern borders are no longer inert. We are well aware of the security environment along the Durand Line. However, the threat from Iran is rather underrated. In 2003, the president of Iran, Mohammad Khatemi, visited India as the chief guest for India's republic day parade. During the visit, he and the Indian prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, signed the New Delhi Declaration, which became the basis of a strategic relationship between the two countries. Two months later, Iranian and Indian warships conducted joint naval exercises (Hathaway, 2014). According to the declaration:-

1. Indian arms sales to Iran were discussed.
2. India agreed to help train Iranian military personnel.
3. India would help Iran maintain its MIG-29 fighter aircraft.
4. New Delhi will have the right to use Iranian military bases for combat operations against Pakistan should another Indo- Pakistan war breaks out.
5. India also agreed to assist in the development of Iranian port facilities and with the construction of road and rail links with Iran.

The extent to which Iran would extend cooperation to India during such a conflict is known in Pakistan. India is also using border areas of Afghanistan and Iran as staging areas for launching covert operations against Pakistan. Since the 1990s, India has tried to outflank Pakistan and open up a route to Afghanistan and Central Asia. The port of Chabahar, next to Gwadar, is central to India's intentions. India and Iran agreed to develop Chabahar in 2003 but the venture moved slowly because of the sanctions over Iran's nuclear programme. The sanctions having been lifted, development of Chabahar will pick up pace. India thinks that its presence in Chabahar will neutralize the Chinese presence in nearby Gwadar. To this end, India and Iran, along with Russia, have talked about creating a Russo-Iranian- Indian transport corridor. Indian access to the Iranian ports and military bases will present Pakistan with the threat of a two-front war. Not only Iran but also the other Gulf states, particularly UAE, consider the development of Gwadar port and the projected China-Pakistan Economic Corridor as a threat to their economies. They, along with India, are supporting various separatist Baloch groups that have sprouted along the coastal belt of Balochistan during the last decade.

Pakistan's Response

To squarely face the challenges highlighted above, Pakistan needs to take the following measures: -

Civil Dimension

1. Political will, where politics are not mixed up with business interests, is the order of the day.
2. Look inward for the most part of the 21st Century and consolidate itself ,even as the Japanese did after Commodore Perry's blockade of the Tokyo Bay on 8th July 1853. It was only after building up its industrial and military power when Japan defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese War. Japan was defeated during WW2 because at that time America was the sole nuclear power.
3. Remove non-state actors of all denominations, and their facilitators, from the strategic and tactical decision- making process.
4. Concentrate on building up the economy.
5. Let the Kashmiris fight against India. Short of waging war, provide them moral and material support to cause maximum attrition to India.
6. Build up international pressure against India and exploit UN resolutions wherever possible.
7. Pakistan must establish diplomatic relations with Israel to 1) dilute the Indo-Israeli strategic relationship; 2) counterbalance the Indo-Iranian strategic relationship.

Military Dimension

1. Do not provoke an armed confrontation with India. However, keep the powder dry.
2. Be prepared all the time to take on India if it threatens across the LOC, Working Boundary, and the Radcliffe Line. This requires shifting all the civil population away from a 5-8 km belt all along the Radcliffe Line, and also along the Working Boundary.
3. To effectively counter any Indian attempt at seizing Skardu and Gilgit, Pakistan must retaliate with an extensive infiltration to threaten the enemy's rear, combined with frontal attacks all across the LOC. Pakistan's sleeper cells inside IHK will be automatically activated. It is one of the likely scenarios where Pakistan can strike with its tactical nuclear weapons.

1. It is understood that in case of an Indian airborne operation to capture Gilgit-Baltistan, all the likely enemy concentration areas, airports, landing grounds and heliports (including the one at Thoise) in IHK will be subjected to massive artillery/ SSM/air force/drone attacks, combined with heliborne operations to capture Kargil and/or Dras.
2. To degrade and interdict India's heliborne capability in the mountains, own heliborne and artillery capabilities should be sufficiently enhanced. Armed drones and air-fuel bombs will play an important role in future mountain warfare.
3. To the south, Pakistan will let the Indians advance up to the green belt in a long delaying battle before engaging them in pre-selected killing areas. Based on an anti-tank ditch, fortifications should be built to impede the enemy armour advance.
4. The mushroom growth of built-up areas in the border belt in Punjab has eaten up the earmarked dispersal and concentration areas. If we are serious about fighting a war with India, these areas must be recovered by compensating the owners, and jealously guarded against any encroachment.
5. The existing defence canals have outlived their utility as populated areas have encroached right up to the canal banks. The border defence works should be rehabilitated and upgraded by realigning the defence canals/ditches.
6. In areas where the enemy is likely to launch operations with mechanized forces, the defence canals / ditches should have home banks (Bund) high and broad enough to set up tank ramps and artillery observation posts.
7. Quick response forces in the form of infantry/ armoured brigades, having artillery support, should be permanently deployed behind the Bund at appropriate locations. These quick response forces (QRFs) will have earmarked crossing places (preferably underground) to cross over the canal/ditch and engage the enemy within the pre-selected killing areas. The Army is already building brigade size cantonments all along the border for this purpose.
8. Planning for any future war with India will have to take into account the threats from Afghanistan and Iran. During the Afghan War, XI and XII Corps were raised for the western border. After the Afghan War, these corps were available for operations against India. This is no longer the case as both these corps have been engaged in the war against terrorism. To relieve these corps for a war with India, two new holding corps will have to be raised. This can be done within the available resources, and with less expenditure, by reorganizing FC (KPK) and FC (Balochistan)

into army corps. Each of these para-military organizations have the manpower to raise a corps HQ, 2x infantry divisions, and 1x Border Guards division (dedicated to anti-smuggling and anti- human trafficking operations). The conversion should take place gradually. With modern equipment and enhanced mobility, each Border Guards division will be more effectively poised to perform its duties than the present FC.

9. The new corps raised against Iran should be headquartered either at Khuzdar or Kalat. It should have a corps reserve comprising a mechanized division minus (div HQ, 1x armoured brigade, 1x mechanized brigade, and divisional artillery), and an independent infantry brigade.
10. Presently, Pakistan is constructing a ditch (wherever the terrain permits) along the western border to check against smuggling and human trafficking. This should be gradually developed into an anti-tank obstacle (wherever required), complete with fortifications, tank ramps, observation posts, and reinforced with wire and mines.

Finally, God may not always be on the side having the largest number of battalions

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